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Electric Cars Boom Tests Insurers’ Petrol-Era Rulebook

A year after federal transport authorities restricted fossil-fuelled vehicles to clear the market for electric vehicles (EVs), domestic insurers are discovering that the road to electrification runs through their balance sheets.

About 100,000 electric vehicles are estimated to be in circulation, less than five percent of the total fleet. Yet this small share has already forced an industry built around petrol cars to confront a harder equation that the premiums permitted under the existing rulebook do not easily match the repair bills landing on claims desks. Despite their marginal share of the fleet on the roads, EVs have already exposed a mismatch between their repair costs and the premiums insurers can charge.

The worry begins with the battery, the costliest part to replace.

According to Belay Tulu, insurance director at the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), the high cost of spare parts for EVs makes maintaining cover at the regulated minimum premium level unsustainable for insurers. The fix, he argued, is scale. Premiums fall as the pool of insured vehicles and policyholders grows, the basic principle of spreading risk. For premiums to ease, certain structural constraints should be addressed first, since rates naturally decline when the number of insured objects or persons is high.

The regulators at the NBE fixed minimum insurance rates below which no firm may price, a mandatory floor meant to protect policyholders by keeping insurers solvent and out of underpriced contracts. The rates are categorised by vehicle type (private or commercial) and engine capacity. They typically exclude profit; insurers build their own “motor charts” by adding operating costs and a margin on top.

Compulsory third-party rates, covering liabilities of up to 200,000 Br for property damage and bodily injury, are set separately by the Insurance Fund Office (IFO).

The regulator is also policing how insurers compete. According to Belay, the NBE does not permit price cartels, in which firms set uniform premiums for similar policies across the industry, thereby eliminating competition and turning the market against customers.

“It isn’t acceptable,” Belay told Fortune.

Insurers play down the alarm. According to Kiros Jirane, CEO of Africa Insurance, the first-generation firms, EVs do not introduce a fundamentally different category of physical risk. Electric and fuel-powered vehicles face similar accident conditions. The difference lies in repair costs and parts availability afterwards, above all batteries, which have limited lifespans and are hard to source for brands such as BYD.

“Reports that insurers have refused to cover EVs are ‘talk’ that does not reflect the industry,” he told Fortune.

According to Kiros, although insurers may set higher premiums for a new vehicle category with little claims history, the industry leans on the law of large numbers and internal loss ratios to adjust over time.

“No management-level decision has been made by major insurers to stop writing EV policies,” he said. “Firms continue to fulfil their obligation to restore damaged vehicles to their original condition by paying market value for the required parts.”

However, for those on the front line, such as Samson Bekele, head office branch manager at Zemen Insurance, the learning curve has been steep. Most insurers, his own included, first treated EVs as an unfamiliar category, then grew more comfortable as models such as BYD spread.

“The body structure resembles a petrol car,” he said, “but the battery system and overall functionality set EVs apart.”

Early on, no garages were equipped to service them, and insurers worried whether sealed battery units beneath the vehicles could be repaired after water damage or a crash. Those fears have eased, though parts remain costly, and electronic components such as lighting systems still carry high prices. Occasional difficulty sourcing parts can complicate claims.

As the fleet has grown, pricing has converged. According to Samson, initial premiums were higher, but the rising number of EVs has brought prices closer to those of conventional cars. High-end models such as Tesla, BMW and Audi are treated separately, while BYD parts have become more accessible and relatively affordable. Most insurers now apply the NBE minimum rates for familiar models, though Zemen Insurance uses specific underwriting guidelines for certain Chinese-manufactured vehicles.

The terms reveal where the risk sits. Batteries are handled separately under policy. In a total loss, customers contribute about 25pc to 30pc of battery costs through endorsements, while contributions for battery damage run 10pc to 15pc, depending on severity. Deductibles for accident claims fall between 10,000 Br and 15,000 Br, in line with other vehicles. Claims move faster when a local dealer is available, such as BYD through MOENCO. Without one, customers often source parts themselves.

Where the NBE mandated minimum rate for a vechile sits near 1.01pc, certain EVs reach two percent to 2.5pc depending on risk, though those rates are steadying as familiarity grows.

At Lucy Insurance, pricing matches conventional cars, with one twist. On a paid claim, the customer covers five percent more than standard, leaving conventional owners liable for up to 10pc and EV owners around 15pc.

The market absorbing these additions is itself expanding. As of June last year, the industry counted 22 companies, 14 composite firms, five general insurers and three re-insurers. Their total assets expanded to 78.26 billion Br from 66.84 billion Br a year earlier, and paid-up capital reached 15.85 billion Br, up from 11.69 billion Br. After-tax profit climbed to 7.44 billion Br from 5.77 billion Br, with investment income of 4.44 billion Br.

Motor cover dominates this business, and carries its heaviest losses. It generated gross premiums of 18.74 billion Br, 50.53pc of the industry’s total, up from 14.45 billion Br in 2024. Motor insurance accounted for a little more than half of the industry’s over 36 billion Br in total income. But it paid out 6.19 billion Br in claims, 54.02pc of the industry’s claims share. Even so, the motor insurance service result held at 9.88 billion Br for the year to June 2025, up from 6.26 billion Br.

For industry veterans, to help the industry absorb EVs without distortion, pricing may need to change.

According to Fikru Tsegaye, vice-president of the Society of Insurance Professionals (SIP) and a senior executive at Ethiopian Re-insurance, exceptionally high spare-part costs, driven by import dependency and foreign-currency shortages, have made minimum premiums hard to sustain, for those rates were designed for internal-combustion vehicles. He urged a shift to risk-based pricing that builds in battery value and claims history.

Batteries in EVs account for up to 50pc of a vehicle’s value.

“Policies should define coverage clearly and set fair cost-sharing, including depreciation by battery life,” Fikru told Fortune.

Experts in the industry observed that scarce specialised garages and components often force total-loss declarations even when repair is possible, calling for cooperation among insurers, importers and policymakers to build local repair capacity. The absence of historical risk data for new brands has led to inconsistent premiums, which could be addressed by a centralised industry database.

“Parallel imports without official dealer support add cost and complexity to claims,” Fikru said, urging minimum after-sales requirements for EV importers. “Coordinated action among regulators, insurers and repair providers is essential to build EV-specific underwriting and keep the sector stable as the fleet grows.”

Until that framework arrives, insurers are pricing a fast-growing fleet on scarce and patchy data, one battery claim at a time.

Soaring Fares Strand Families on Highways

At the sprawling Lamberet Long-Distance Bus Station near Asmara Road, the usual din of engines and shouting conductors has given way to an eerie and sluggish rhythm.

Clusters of medium-sized Tata buses, minibuses and cross-country coaches sat idle in long rows. Rather than working the highways that bind the capital to the regional states, drivers huddle in small groups, swapping jokes to pass the time, a light-hearted veneer over deep anxiety about a rapidly cooling market.

Nearby, travellers lug overstuffed bags and plastic jerricans filled with holy water. Yet a growing number of people at the station were not travelling at all. Unable to afford the spiking ticket prices, they were reducing their lives to cargo, paying drivers a fraction of the fare to ferry packages to rural relatives instead of visiting them in person.

The scene at Lamberet has become the epicentre of a creeping logistical and social crisis spreading across the country, weighing on passengers and drivers alike. A mix of soaring operating overheads, uncoordinated regional rules, and general inflation is pushing cross-country transport beyond the reach of ordinary citizens, fracturing families and disrupting internal trade.

The pressure is not strictly local. According to the macroeconomic monitor published by Secure Africa Partners last month, headline inflation rebounded to 13.4pc year-on-year (YoY), reversing months of disinflation, after an escalating war in the Middle East drove up global oil, fuel and fertiliser prices. It disrupted supply chains, feeding into domestic food and transport costs.

For the men and women at Lamberet, that abstraction arrived as a daily bill. Every climb in the global oil price was eventually paid at a rural bus window, in the gap between a fare a family had budgeted for and the one a conductor now demands.

For operators and small-scale traders, the mathematics of the road no longer adds up.

Wakeyo Awas, 72, has spent more than half a century behind the wheel of heavy-load vehicles. Three years ago, he shifted to the Addis Abeba–Adama route to stay closer to home and support his five grandchildren, orphaned after their father died. The move has been brutal.

“Our travel frequency has cratered,” Wakeyo said. “We used to make two trips a day; now we’re lucky to get three dispatches a week. We sit and wait for our turn the following week. Meanwhile, the price of spare parts is rising daily without any government oversight. We’re living in perpetual tension.”

The pressure has already reached his household. His grandchildren have dropped out of school, a small private tragedy folded into a national one. Five decades on the road have left him with less security than when he started.

The squeeze ripples through the marketplace almost at once.

Fikadu Adinew, 55, a retired soldier with the rank of lieutenant, leans on a modest monthly military pension of 4,070 Br. To stretch it, he works as a small-scale butter trader, travelling three times a week from Sheno, a town near Debre Birhan renowned for its butter, to Addis Abeba, where he sells directly to household clients.

“The transport fare has increased from 100 Br to 250 Br for a single trip; it has more than doubled,” Fikadu said.

Carrying between 15kg and 30kg of butter each week and charging 1,200 Br a kilogram, he depends on a narrow customer base and cannot pass the higher costs to consumers. Each trip eats further into a pension that was never meant to stretch this far.

“My daily costs are climbing while my profit margins are evaporating,” he said. “At my age, supporting my family’s survival has become an uphill battle.”

The strain falls hardest on the country’s youth, above all, university students shuttling between campuses in regional states and the capital. As higher-education institutions exhaust their seasonal budgets near the onset of winter, campuses enforce strict checkout deadlines, sending thousands of students onto the highways at once and triggering demand-driven fare increases.

Supply does not move; demand spikes for a few crowded days, and the price follows.

Tigist Girma, a third-year Business Administration Information Systems (BAIS) student at Wolaita Sodo University, has watched her transport bill balloon over the academic year.

“In September, the fare from Addis to Sodo was 700 Br on a Tata bus,” Tigist said. “By the January break, it was 850 Br. Two weeks ago, I paid 1,300 Br.”

For female students, the squeeze forces hard trade-offs.

“We’ve non-negotiable costs like sanitary products,” she said. “When transport takes everything, we’ve to cut back significantly. We’re entirely dependent on families who can’t even send money regularly.”

For Bereket Teshome, a second-year student at the same university, the distance has become more than geographical. He once visited his family in Shashemene, in Oromia Regional State, several times a year. Now, with fares having doubled, a trip home has become an unaffordable luxury.

He missed the Easter holiday and a major family reunion this year because he could not bear to ask his cash-strapped family for transport money.

“When I went home two months ago, the bus fare was 390 Br at the station,” he said. “But as we’re about to leave, they charged an additional 300 Br, an amount we had no choice but to pay.”

According to Bereket, a classmate recently missed the funeral of a close relative for the very same financial reason. The road, once a thread that held scattered families together, has become a barrier between them.

Even on relatively prosperous corridors such as the Addis Abeba–Adama route, drivers are buckling under rising overheads and shifting policy regimes.

Solomon Bedasa, a driver with five years of experience, pays 10,000 Br a month in rent for his home in Adama, where he lives with his wife and two children. He operates a commercial vehicle under a strict bailee arrangement.

He pays the vehicle owner a fixed 4,000 Br for every working day, on top of fuel, traffic fines. The figures leave little room for a bad week, and bad weeks have become the norm. On a three-day week, the fixed daily payment to the owner alone can swallow much of what the route brings in.

Recent municipal and regional transport directives have further complicated matters. Tighter enforcement of regional licence-plate designations means Solomon can no longer pick up intra-city taxi passengers within the capital. He is confined to countryside routes. Thinner passenger volumes and an 8:00pm operational curfew have cut his working week to three days.

The fall in earnings forced Solomon to withdraw his children from private schools and enrol them in underfunded public ones.

“What used to be a stable livelihood has turned into a daily battle for survival,” he said.

However, not every operator faces the same arithmetic. According to Berhane Zeru, chairman of the Ethio-Africa Transport & Trade Share Company, tariffs for his company are regulated by the Transport Ministry, unlike those of long-distance luxury buses, which have seen substantial fare increases.

The numbers tell the story. The fare from Addis Abeba to Dire Dawa was 2,000 Br two months ago but has since climbed to 2,650 Br. The fare from Woldia to Addis Abeba has jumped from 2,350 Br to 3,400 Br, while the fare to Arba Minch has moved from 1,900 Br to 2,560 Br.

Each jump lands on a household already absorbing a higher price for bread, fuel and rent.

The mounting pressure on passengers and operators is in sharp contrast to the government’s long-term ambitions for the sector. Under its 10-Year Perspective Plan, beginning in 2020, transport officials envision a system capable of meeting the country’s fast-growing mobility needs.

Road transport, which already carries more than 95pc of domestic passenger demand, is projected to support 1.5 billion intercity trips a year by the end of the decade, up from 722 million trips recorded in 2019.

The strategy seeks to expand the national road network to 245,942Km, expand railway infrastructure to nearly 4,000Km and raise the number of standardised airports from 22 to 28. It also aspires to increase long-distance public bus stations from 690 to 732 and cross-country routes from 225 to 384, while attracting private investment in mass transport to ease chronic shortages in bus services.

It is a blueprint for abundance. On the tarmac at Lamberet, it reads like a promise from another country.

The plan concedes that existing capacity has struggled to keep pace with demand. It notes that passengers in cities such as Bahir Dar, Gondar and Meqelle can wait as long as three hours for a bus because fleet capacity falls short of growing travel demand.

Officials of the Ministry of Transport & Logistics did not respond to repeated inquiries from this newspaper about unregulated cross-country fare increases and what provisions, if any, exist for students stranded at the close of a semester.

Economists warn that the gridlock in the sector threatens the broader economy. Transport works as the circulatory system of national output, shaping commercial liquidity, environmental efficiency and social cohesion.

“Transport is the blood vessel of a nation’s systems,” said Birhanu Zeleke (PhD), a transport management lecturer and development studies expert at Kotebe Metropolitan University. “When the transport sector is inefficient, national development is undermined.”

According to Birhanu, the erosion of domestic connectivity sets off a process of “de-development”, in which the links between surplus-producing agricultural zones and deficit-ridden urban consumer centres begin to break down.

“If the system is fluid, everything becomes simple,” he said. “But when connections weaken, both the farmer and the consumer lose out. The farmer cannot bring produce to market, and the consumer faces artificially inflated food prices.”

Recent logistics studies hosted by CGSpace, an open-access institutional repository for agricultural research, found that rural areas supply between 40pc and more than 90pc of Addis Abeba’s food commodities, depending on the category. When the buses stall, so does the chain that feeds the capital.

A delayed truck not only results in a late delivery but also leaves goods rotting in one place while prices rise elsewhere.

Resolving the crisis, according to Birhanu, requires immediate and coordinated state intervention rather than fragmented regional policymaking. He urges transport authorities to redesign rules that look beyond localised enforcement and prioritise broader national goals of low-cost, accessible and competitive transport corridors.

“The authorities need to establish a clear objective of making the transport sector efficient, competitive and affordable,” Birhanu said. “Unless we repair these arterial links, we risk falling backwards in every aspect of our development. Weak transport implies a stagnant economy.”

Back at Lamberet, the engines stayed quiet a while longer. The drivers wait for a dispatch that comes less often, the traders weigh shrinking margins, and the students count out fares they can no longer cover. The road is still there. Fewer and fewer can afford to travel.

For now, waiting is the market’s one reliable export.

The Rent Law Protects No One Well. Time to Rewrite It.

The federal legislative house rushed through one of the country’s most contentious housing laws two years ago. Today, the result satisfies almost no one. Tenants still feel insecure, property owners feel constrained, and the law struggles to deliver the protection it was meant to provide.

The law governing rent control and administration was contentious from the start. The way it was drafted and the speed with which it passed drew criticism. It was approved in haste, with limited deliberation, and media outlets were barred from the legislative session in which it was debated and adopted. A market long governed by informal understandings between property owners and tenants was pulled, almost overnight, into a formal legal frame.

The purpose was straightforward as the law sought to regulate rent increases for residential housing nationwide. Rent adjustments would be set by regulatory bodies established in Addis Abeba, Dire Dawa, and the regional states, which would weigh prevailing social and economic conditions, the cost of living, and other relevant factors before approving annual increases. It guaranteed tenants a minimum two-year tenancy and permitted eviction only under legally specified circumstances.

On paper, the law promised relief for hundreds of thousands of tenants. In a city such as Addis Abeba, where a large share of residents rent, state controls looked like a way to cool what was supposedly an overheated market and shield tenants from relentless rent increases. Others warned that the law went too far, restraining property rights and limiting what owners could do with their own assets.

Both readings have since found evidence to cite.

City administrations issued their own implementing directives, with Addis Abeba among the first to enforce the framework. In June 2024, city officials told lessors and tenants to register rental properties and sign legally recognised agreements approved by wereda administrations. The drive registered close to half a million rental units. Yet two years on, the system appears to be struggling under a formal arrangement that many believe is failing both parties. A law meant to stabilise rents and protect residents has instead created loopholes, encouraged unofficial arrangements, and raised doubts about whether it is meeting its objectives.

The pressure is showing again as another cycle of lease renewals arrives. For many lessors, rents have barely moved for nearly two years, even as the cost of living has climbed, and they are eager to adjust rentals to reflect the market. Tenants, already stretched by current rates, dread another wave of increases. City officials, such as Kidist Weldegiorgis, head of Bureau for the Addis Abeba Housing Development & Administration, keep warning that no adjustment is lawful without regulatory approval.

Nonetheless, the arrival of June has again brought uncertainty to thousands of households, with notices to vacate growing more common and anxiety over rent rises spreading.

Weak enforcement has deepened the problem. Although the law was meant to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction, many property owners have reportedly found other ways to reclaim their properties. Claims that an owner intends to move in or renovate have become standard explanations for ending a tenancy. As a result, many tenants find themselves insecure with the law set out to eliminate has not gone away.

The evidence is not only anecdotal. A 2024 study by EthioData identified high and volatile rents, frequent increases and widespread tenant insecurity as a defining problem in the private rental market. Many agreements remain verbal, which makes it easier for property owners to impose sudden increases or evict occupants without a formal procedure. National studies indicate that many households spend more than 30pc of their income on rent, while a substantial minority spend more than half their earnings on housing.

Recurrent spending on rent has become a defining feature of the capital’s housing market. Data from the Ethiopian Property Centre in early 2026 put the average monthly rent for studio apartments in the city centre at 45,000 Br, with rates ranging from 35,000 Br to 65,000 Br by location. Neighbourhoods such as Bole, Casanchis and Old Airport command premium rents, close to commercial centres and in demand among expatriates.

The rental surge is tied to a housing deficit estimated at more than one million units. Rapid population growth and rising household formation continue to widen the gap between demand and supply, according to studies by the Ethiopian Statistical Service and the United Nations. Although almost two decades, the most comprehensive count remains the 2007 Population & Housing Census, which recorded more than two million renters in Addis Abeba, over 1.2 million of whom were in privately rented housing.

However, later reviews unveiled that the trend has only intensified. An assessment conducted a decade later found rental housing accounted for 54pc of urban residences nationwide and more than 61pc in Addis Abeba. By 2025, projections indicated at least 60pc of households in the capital were in rental arrangements, as tenants or property owners.

If tenants struggle with affordability, many lessors counter that two years of largely frozen rents have become impossible to sustain. Food, transport, utilities, and taxes have all gone up sharply, while rental income for law-abiding owners has remained stagnant. In practice, the law overlooks illegal conduct on both sides while failing to protect either. Owners unable to earn enough from their assets are pushed toward non-compliance, and tenants determined to stay in their communities drift into unofficial deals of their own.

The damage runs deeper than money. Perhaps unintentionally, the law appears to have produced new forms of inequity. It has also frayed the relationships that once defined the rental market. The customs whereby lessors lived near their tenants and hesitated to evict them out of social obligation and personal ties seem to have gone. Today, disputes increasingly run through government offices and third parties, turning a neighbourly arrangement into an adversarial one.

Kidist and her officials reject these complaints, insisting the law is being enforced as intended. They argue that the law is built to protect tenants, stabilise rents and create predictability for both parties. The broader question, however, remains unresolved, and it extends well beyond the price of a lease. At its core lies the state’s role in the housing market.

Should government bureaucrats step back and let property owners and tenants negotiate under market conditions, or step in more forcefully with stronger oversight and firmer enforcement of the rules already on the books?

What is increasingly clear is that the law has fallen short of the goals it was used to justify. Enacted to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction and runaway rents, its enforcement has exposed weaknesses neither side foresaw. Property owners complain that prolonged limits on adjustments have eroded the value of properties’ income as living costs soar. Tenants react that unofficial increases and indirect evictions continue despite the legal shield.

Two years on, the argument is no longer about whether state intervention was warranted in a city wrestling with rising rents and a severe housing shortage. It has shifted to whether the present framework can balance two competing claims between protecting tenants from insecurity while preserving property owners’ right to benefit from and control their property.

The state should choose. It can commit fully to making the law work, through effective regulation, credible enforcement and a fair balance between competing interests, or it can reconsider the reach of its intervention altogether. What it cannot afford is the current middle ground, where tenants still feel insecure, property owners feel boxed in, and a law meant to bring order struggles to deliver on its promises.

Ethiopia’s Exports Grow, But It Trades Little With Its Own Continent

Ethiopia is selling more to the rest of Africa than ever before. The trouble is that “more” still adds up to remarkably little.

Exports to the continent jumped in 2025, yet trade with Ethiopia’s neighbours remains a sliver of the roughly 25 billion dollars in trade flows directed largely to the rest of the world. According to the latest annual trade report from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), the country’s exports to other African countries grew to 940 million dollars in 2025 up from 540 million dollars a year earlier, a jump of nearly three-quarters.

Imports from continental neighbours reached 1.19 billion dollars. Together, the two flows make up 2.13 billion dollars in two-way trade with the continent, which the Cairo-based institution places at over two percent of Ethiopia’s total global trade. The thinness sits awkwardly alongside Ethiopia’s portrayal in the same report as one of Africa’s standout performers. The Bank named the country the fastest-growing large economy in Eastern Africa, estimating 2025 expansion at 9.2pc and crediting industrial output and a sweeping macroeconomic reform programme.

The figure caps a climb from 6.4pc in 2022 to 7.2pc, then 8.1pc, in the two years that followed.

The reform dividend shows elsewhere. Inflation, which topped 30pc as recently as 2023, eased to 13.2pc in 2025 from 21pc the year before, a slowdown the Bank attributed to tighter monetary policy and the fading effect of earlier devaluations. The reading is close to the 13.4pc recorded by independent analysts at Secure Africa Partners for May 2026. Foreign-exchange reserves, nearly depleted two years ago, recovered to 6.8 billion dollars, according to the Bank’s estimate, enough to cover about three months of imports.

However, the cost of adjustment fell on the Birr, which weakened to an average of 138.4 Br to the dollar in 2025 from 83.1 Br a year earlier, and inched up to 157 Br last week, a result of a market-based exchange rate.

Ethiopian authorities have filed tariff schedules under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and the Afreximbank lists it among regional “champions” whose domestic demand helped lift total intra-African trade by 5.47pc to 213.8 billion dollars. South Africa, it notes, has used Ethiopia’s compliance to expand preferential exports of machinery and chemicals.

Still, Ethiopia imports far more than it sells, and mostly from outside Africa, which supplies few of the inputs its industrialising economy needs. The country exported 5.36 billion dollars in goods globally in 2025, nearly double the previous year, while importing 20.17 billion dollars, resulting in a merchandise trade gap of roughly 15 billion dollars.

As a net oil importer hungry for capital goods, fuel, fertiliser and intermediate inputs, Ethiopia, alongside Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has joined the enlarged BRICS grouping as a newer member. According to Afreximbank, the move is part of a broader African turn toward South-South cooperation, a hedge against Western protectionism and an effort to diversify beyond traditional markets. The Bank also flagged Washington’s “America First” reciprocal tariff framework, rolled out across 2025 and 2026, as a direct threat to textiles and apparel, sectors it called “vital” to export earnings and household incomes in countries such as Ethiopia and Lesotho.

The official account is more upbeat. According to George Elombi, president and chairman of the board of the African Export-Import Bank, Africa’s current policy choices will shape the opportunities open to its young population, the competitiveness of its firms and the continent’s place in global value chains.

Not everyone accepts the report’s assertions. According to an industry insider, Afreximbank’s figure of a 15 billion dollar deficit does not align with the Central Bank’s latest data. This person claimed export proceeds have risen sharply, “from eight billion dollars last year to over 10 billion dollars,” with merchandise exports now covering nearly 50pc of imports.

The person, who requested anonymity due to his closeness to the administration, also questioned the assumption that conflicts such as the war in Iran would automatically widen the gap.

“Higher transport costs,” he argued, “hit imports and exports alike. Both sides are likely to fall together rather than unevenly.”

The same period saw a paradox, with the parallel-market rate easing to around 178 Br and 180 Br as importers struggled to secure dollars and transport in the early phase of the conflict. He was sceptical of two fashionable hopes. AfCFTA’s potential remains limited, while African economies continue to produce similar primary goods rather than the industrial inputs the continent needs. Nor should BRICS be assumed to open export floodgates, given that Ethiopia has not yet assessed those markets commodity by commodity, with Brazil dominant in coffee and China focused on oilseeds.

“Most telling, Ethiopia’s coffee sector faces a supply constraint, not weak demand,” he told Fortune. “Buyers keep asking, but the volumes are not there.”

According to Fekadu Degafe, vice governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), a marked shift has taken hold in the external sector as reform narrows a long-standing trade gap. Commodity exports stood at 3.8 billion dollars before the reforms of the 2023/24 budget year and are projected to nearly triple to 11 billion dollars by the end of the current year. Imports grew from 18.7 billion dollars to 22.6 billion dollars, but export growth outpaced them, trimming the merchandise deficit from 14.2 billion dollars to 11.6 billion dollars, a 2.6-billion-dollar improvement, with gold and coffee the main drivers.

“The gains run beyond goods,” Fekadu told Fortune.

Remittances climbed from 6.2 billion dollars to 7.7 billion dollars, and foreign direct investment jumped by about 400 million dollars, while the current-account deficit narrowed from 6.2 billion dollars to 1.8 billion dollars, a 4.4-billion-dollar swing. He disclosed that reserves have grown more than fivefold, though exports to African countries remain limited and Africa’s share of Ethiopia’s trade is largely unchanged.

For Mered B. Fikreyohannes, an investment advisor and CEO of Pragma capital expert, the moment is a turning point. He observed that rising import and export prices have partly offset the wider gap. Fuel imports reached six billion dollars, up by 1.5 billion dollars, while firmer global prices for gold and coffee eased the pressure. Gold alone now makes up nearly 40pc of exports. Close to 98pc of gold output remains artisanal, capping value addition. Service exports, led by Ethiopian Airlines, are projected to reach 11 billion dollars this year, helping cover energy costs.

“Ethiopia’s core constraint is supply, not market access,” said Mered. “Were 50 large firms to run at high capacity, gold export earnings could reach 20 billion dollars.”

He warned that the present model is unsustainable, with fuel demand alone capable of reaching 10 billion dollars while reliance on raw commodities leaves the economy exposed.

Thousands Homeowners Risk Losing Title Deeds as the City Chases Land Revenue

For thousands of Addis Abeba homeowners, a house they paid for years ago may still not belong to them in the eyes of the law.

The city’s Land Development & Administration Bureau has issued a final call to buyers who bought homes but never completed ownership transfers or collected lease agreements, warning that those who fail to appear before July seven could lose access to the service altogether. The warning leaves thousands in an uneasy position. Many have moved in after settling their deals with sellers and closing the details through legally authenticated documents, yet have never finalised the transfer with the Bureau. The properties sit outside their names in the formal records.

The deadline arrives in the final days of the fiscal year, when public institutions push hardest to meet revenue targets. For the Bureau, the drive is about clearing delayed transfers and recovering revenue from deals that stayed outside the formal system. At the start of the budget year, it planned to collect 45 billion Br in service revenue. So far, the Bureau has collected 16.6 billion Br, only 37pc of the annual target.

The campaign reaches a vast pool of owners. According to the Addis Abeba Housing Management Bureau, more than 450,000 houses have been built and handed to residents over the past eight years, 21pc of them by private real estate companies and the rest through other arrangements, including public-private partnerships and city projects. The Bureau is calling on residents who bought from developers or individuals and signed sale agreements through the Documents Authentication & Registration Service (DARS), but never returned to obtain lease agreements in their own names.

According to a senior Bureau official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media, the decision is meant to bring long-delayed transactions into the formal arena. According to this official, some buyers have occupied their homes for five to 10 years without transferring ownership, leaving the city administration unable to collect the revenue those deals would have generated.

“We’re compelled to issue a public notice calling on owners to collect their title deeds,” the official said. “It’s only right that long-time homebuyers transition into the legal framework. On the other hand, because they have remained outside the formal system, the government has been missing out on the revenue it is rightfully owed.”

When a buyer purchases a house and seeks a lease agreement, the city administration collects six percent of the property’s value in ownership-transfer charges (capital gain tax) and stamp duty, among the city’s major sources of municipal revenue. The way that charge is calculated has shifted. It once rested on the price that the two parties declared. Now, district land offices apply their own benchmark prices, and where the declared price falls below that assessment, the tax is determined on the benchmark. For many owners, that extra cost has become the barrier to the final legal step.

The picture is more complicated, according to critics. Many owners are not refusing to comply but have exhausted their means to secure a place to live.

The deadline exposes a deeper tension in the property market, the gap between becoming a homeowner and a legally recognised property owner.

Ermias Fekede, a long-time observer of the housing market, believes bringing owners outside the registry into compliance is a necessary step. But he argued that the short deadline put pressure on people whose delays reflected not unwillingness but limited means.

“The approach could formalise long-standing deals, even as many owners struggle to find the added cost in so brief a window,” he said. “While the approach will effectively bring illicit operations into compliance, which is a positive step, it poses a severe challenge for the majority who remained informal simply because they lacked the financial means to become legal.”

Buying a house is often the largest financial decision a person makes. Many commit a lifetime’s savings and every available resource to it; by the time of transfer, administrative costs become another barrier.

“Buying a home or acquiring property doesn’t mean an individual is affluent,” Ermias told Fortune. “Many buyers exhaust all available resources just to secure the initial purchase, leaving them financially squeezed when it comes to settling government fees.”

According to Ermias, the problem is not that owners reject their obligations or want to dodge payments. They need more time and practical payment arrangements.

“The government is effectively telling people that before buying a house, they should already prepare the money they will later need to pay in fees,” he said.

The Bureau’s position is firm. Any transaction brought forward after the July deadline will face restrictions, including the registration remaining in the seller’s name, and the buyer will be denied legal title transfer. According to a senior official, letting buyers occupy properties for years without transferring ownership cannot continue. City officials are convinced that thousands have benefited while legal ownership stayed in the sellers’ names, creating uncertainty and depriving the city administration of revenue it is owed.

“The law must be enforced,” said the official. “The government must collect the revenues it is rightfully due.”

The Bureau’s next task is to work out how many buyers remain caught in this gap. Officials say they are reviewing sale agreements registered through DARS to identify buyers who signed but never appeared to transfer ownership and secure a lease. The exercise faces a thorny question on how to separate genuine sales from the thousands of other documents filed through notary offices.

In the city’s market, sellers commonly hand buyers powers of attorney after a deal, giving them authority to administer, use and manage a property without a formal sale agreement, blurring the line between an ownership transfer and delegated authority.

In the first nine months of the fiscal year, DARS registered and deregistered 422,011 power-of-attorney documents and verified 24,911 asset transfers for sales and gifts, a gap that shows both the volume of transactions and the difficulty of distinguishing completed sales from other authorisations.

It is unclear whether the Bureau will treat every such power of attorney as evidence of a sale requiring transfer, a distinction that could decide who should appear before the deadline. The senior official claims the Bureau has internal mechanisms to identify relevant cases, with the immediate focus on sale agreements registered through DARS. Even where records cannot be filtered, officials said, buyers who appear can be identified through the documents they submit during transfer.

A Shareholder Sues as Homebuyers Close in on Key Housing Finance Solution

Shareholders and senior managers of Key Housing Finance Solutions Plc are turning on one another, as a wave of homebuyer lawsuits alleging “fraud” and heavy financial losses converges on a company that had promised to widen access to affordable housing.

Launched with a plan to build 100,000 homes over 10 years, Key Housing now faces legal action from inside its own ownership and management. Its former Deputy Chief Executive, Girum Yilma, who holds a 20pc equity stake, has sued the company, the General Manager, Selam Yilma, and its Board Chairman, Nadew Getahun. The case was filed before the Trade & Investment Bench of the Federal First Instance Court on Haile Selassie St., in Piassa area.

Also a general manager at Abbay TV, Girum was the public face during Key Housing’s rapid expansion, leading engagement with prospective buyers and representing the company in media appearances and public announcements. His profile helped persuade many subscribers to trust the company and its housing-finance model. According to Girum, that confidence is now gone, and he has turned to the courts to contest the company’s operations.

In his statement of claim, Girum argued he resorted to litigation after concluding that “the company is operating completely outside standard procedures and regulations, failing to observe the basic principles of transparency and accountability.”

“This is seriously harming the rights and interests of both shareholders and ordinary individuals who continue saving with the belief that the company will eventually make them homeowners,” he said in his statement.

Represented by Haymanot Molla, an attorney at law, Girum’s suit initially rested on five claims. The first concerned an attempt to secure loans using houses built or acquired with subscribers’ savings as collateral. Alleging the decision as “unlawful and against buyers’ interests,” Girum appealed to the judges to block it.

“They must stop this immediately,” Girum argued through his lawyer. “If the company defaults on the loan, the lender will inevitably dispose of the houses to recover its money. Such an outcome would harm the interests of homebuyers and push the company toward total collapse.”

Girum also disputed the company’s procurement process, arguing that the bids for hiring construction contractors and their administration breached the company’s own rules and procedures.

According to the filing, Key Housing was founded as a rotating savings-based housing finance model, allowing individuals who cannot afford an upfront purchase to acquire homes through long-term monthly savings matched to their means, while returning value to shareholders. Instead, Girum alleged, current management has adopted practices that undermine subscribers, damage shareholder value, and erode public confidence.

The Plaintiff also argued that management has never allowed an independent external audit of the company’s accounts, “leaving shareholders blind to its true position.” Girum claims that despite repeated formal requests for such an audit, his appeals were ignored. He pleaded to the Court to appoint an independent external auditor to examine the records and file an official report.

The suit also alleges that the General Manager and the Board Chairman are related, and that “keeping the company’s finances under family control, with corporate accounts requiring only their joint signatures, has weakened internal checks.” Warning of a “significant risk,” Girum appealed to the Court to strip the two of exclusive control over finances and to hand financial management over to independent professionals.

The Court was not persuaded that the claim was ready. After reviewing the initial filing, Judge Shiferaw Abebe of the Trade & Investment Bench ruled that several aspects lacked clarity and ordered Girum to amend and refile.

The Judge told the plaintiff to clarify whether “professional financial management” meant removing the current executives, and to specify how the existing structure violates the company’s bylaws. He questioned the allegation that management intended to use completed houses as collateral for loans, ordering Girum to state the amount of financing, identify the units offered as collateral, specify how many properties are involved, and explain why the arrangement would breach company rules.

On procurement, the Judge probed whether the alleged violations concern bids already awarded or still to come, and directed the plaintiff to give the monetary value of the bids and show how the process breached internal rules.

Refiling his suit, the plaintiff abandoned the earlier submissions and narrowed the case to a single issue. He appealed to the Court only to appoint an independent external auditor.

Defendants filed their response to the amended claim on Thursday, June 25, 2026, and a hearing for oral arguments is set for July.

Since its incorporation in March 2023, the company has undergone a quiet but substantial redistribution of its one million Birr paid-up capital. Initially, the company had 100 shares, each valued at 10,000 Br, tightly controlled by three founding shareholders. Nadew Getahun held a commanding 80-share majority, while Elsa Girma held 18 shares, and Yesunesh Yirdaw retained a nominal two shares.

​Yet, this proved short-lived, giving way to a sudden influx of new stakeholders that transformed the ownership structure. A secondary list of shareholders abruptly emerged, holding exactly 80 shares combined. This new bloc was led by Hirut Getahun, who took a dominant position with 69 shares, supported by Thomas Gashaw with five, alongside Musie Argaw and Natan Girma holding three shares each.

​The corporate reshuffling did not end with that initial changing of shareholders. In a subsequent change, Girum entered the fray, negotiating a 20pc stake in the firm, acquiring 12 shares from the new majority holder, and another eight shares from founding shareholder, Elsa.

The shareholder suit lands as Key Housing faces mounting pressure from subscribers. Two groups of homebuyers have filed separate suits in different courts, seeking nearly 40 million Br in refunds, legal fees and compensation. Other groups are preparing to follow.

According to the plaintiffs, Key Housing breached its contracts by failing to deliver the housing-finance scheme it had promised after the collapse of the individual performance guarantee issued by Bunna Insurance. According to their submissions, the guarantee, for which subscribers paid extra premiums, formed a core part of the arrangement, and the replacement later offered by the Ethiopian Insurance Company (EIC) did not provide equivalent protection against developer non-performance.

Beyond the failed guarantee, they accuse Key Housing of misrepresenting its model and running what they describe as an “illegal pyramid-style scheme,” alleging that money from new subscribers is being used to meet obligations owed to earlier buyers.

They alleged the company operated “beyond its licensed activities,” engaging directly in real estate development and construction, failed to deliver the quality of housing promised in its promotional materials, favoured newly registered subscribers over earlier buyers in allocations, and unilaterally cancelled the contracts of customers who contested its practices.

Smaller Fertiliser Bags Meet Bigger Doubts in the Fields

The federal government has begun distributing heavily subsidised fertiliser for the current production season, and has launched a study to introduce smaller bag sizes for female and smallholder farmers.

Yet regional disparities and deep-seated attitudes toward chemical inputs threaten to blunt the effort.

The Ministry of Agriculture is conducting the study in response to repeated requests from female farmers and smallholders on less than half a hectare to set a formal standard for smaller packaging. Once approved, cooperative unions will receive bulk shipments from Djibouti and re-bag them into 25kg and 10kg units before distribution. By formalising the re-bagging, the Ministry hopes even farmers with the smallest plots can receive subsidised inputs suited to their holdings.

The initiative is intended to create a legal and technically sound alternative to unauthorised retail sales, which are now prohibited because exposing “white fertiliser” (Urea) to sunlight during loose retailing causes rapid nutrient loss. The Ministry officials continue to warn that illegal retail sales remain prohibited, particularly for Urea, which loses nutrient value when exposed to sunlight during unauthorised resale.

For the 2026 season, the Ministry has distributed 10.7 million quintals of fertiliser, backed by a federal subsidy of 84 billion Br. After 13.4 million quintals arrived at the Port of Djibouti, a logistics network moved 12.1 million quintals to central warehouses a daily inflow of up to 10,000tn carried by as many as 200 trucks. Available supply is 19.1 million quintals, including a seven-million-quintal carry-over from last year.

Distribution has increased by 1.5 million quintals compared with the same period last year, which the Ministry’s officials attributed to expanded irrigation. To shield farmers from international price swings, the federal government claims to provide a subsidy of 4,972 Br a quintal.

Agriculture officials expect the subsidised fertiliser to support farming across 22.36 million hectares, targeting 730 million quintals of output. Hitting that target is seen as critical to stabilising prices for staples such as teff and wheat, which are kept under pressure by rising production costs and value chain bottlenecks.

According to State Minister for Investment & Input, Sofia Kassa (PhD), the procurement system was revised in 2024 to allow direct purchases from manufacturers, a policy decision meant to optimise foreign-currency use.

Unable to afford or fully use a whole bag on their small plots, many depend on individuals who buy full sacks and resell them in smaller amounts. A single tin now costs between 140 Br and 160 Br.

For Melese Tadele, who rents land from smallholders in the South Gondar Zone of the Amhara Regional State, every planting season brings its own economic problems. Like many on plots well below one hectare, he finds a standard 50kg bag out of reach. Instead, local farmers buy fertiliser by the tin, a local canister equivalent to one kilogram. According to Melese, the local agriculture office officially sells a 50kg bag of Urea for 5,000 Br, while “black” fertiliser (DAP/NPS) costs 6,100 Br.

“The piecemeal system is the only practical option for many,” Melese said. “But it carries a cost. Buying by the tin caps the quantity farmers can afford, starving soils and lowering yields on already limited land.”

The Ministry’s focus is also shifting toward climate-resilient response, including fast-maturing seeds and moisture-retention techniques to soften El Niño effects in eastern zones, while balancing heavy subsidies against the need to feed a fast-growing population.

At the regional level, Leta Legesse, director for Agricultural Input under the Agriculture Bureau at the Sidama Regional State, notted that the study on re-bagging into smaller units is very significant.

“The move could matter,” he told Fortune. “Fertiliser has traditionally come only in 50kg bags. In Sidama, most farmers cultivate less than half a hectare, many under a quarter.”

He has long pressed for smaller packaging, arguing that the 50kg standard no longer reflects farmers’ means; requiring someone who needs half that to buy a full bag encourages waste and feeds informal distribution. However, Leta acknowledged that producing 15kg or 20kg bags would inflate costs due to extra packaging, transport, and weighing. But he called the proposal “the perfect medicine” for smallholders.

“Female farmers have repeatedly asked for five-kilogram and 10kg packs they can buy to their needs, which would improve use and lift productivity,” he said. “Weighed against the benefits, the extra packaging cost was ‘like heaven and earth’.”

Packaging operators, including those in Djibouti, have flagged higher costs and technical limitations, but he judged them minor compared with the gains from curbing informal trade and widening access. Shipments for the season, he noted, had arrived on schedule.

Research shows how small these holdings could be. According to the Ethiopian Economics Association, households average 1.62hct. A panel study by the African Development Bank found 1.55hct, while research in Cogent Food & Agriculture covering the central and southern wheat belt in Oromia Regional State found 1.94hct, and Haramaya University in the lowland Babille District found 1.26hct.

The Ministry’s own plans, though, reveal sharp regional gaps. Officials disclosed the Gambella Regional State is not scheduled to receive fertiliser from the current bulk procurement, despite an earlier plan to allocate 3,600tn. In the Central Ethiopia Regional State, the Ministry allocated 140,000tn, but only 42,000tn had been procured, and only 2,500tn had been cleared from Djibouti Port.

Although prices have climbed to about 12,000 Br a quintal after the exchange-rate liberalisation, farmers now worry more about whether fertiliser can be found than about its cost, and are greeting shipments with relief. Demand also tracks soil productivity. Farmers in Amhara Regional State are “100pc convinced” of its necessity, while those in regional states such as Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz remain less responsive, still viewing their land as naturally fertile.

According to Andrew Tut of the Gambella Agriculture Bureau, the low uptake is due to a persistent awareness gap that has led many farmers to believe their soils are naturally “blessed”, creating a fear that chemical fertilisers could damage them over time and leaving only part of the community willing to adopt modern inputs. The Bureau recognises the need for scientific soil testing to set nutrient requirements for major crops, particularly oilseeds and root crops.

“A study is needed,” he said, to move beyond traditional assumptions and ensure the right blends, including NPS, are applied. Average productivity in the Regional State is about 26Qtls a hectare, but field trials have shown more than 50Qtls a hectare with proper application.

“The Bureau has launched an awareness campaign to show the gains, with research recording individual plants producing as much as three times their normal grain output,” Andrew told Fortune.

Marelign Adugna (PhD), an agricultural economist with two decades of teaching experience and a faculty member at the University of Gondar, offered a broader read. He argued that while the smaller-packaging plan is meant to help smallholders, the 50kg bag remains the practical minimum for most rural farmers. Even those on a quarter of a hectare need at least one 50kg bag.

“Demand for 5kg or 15kg packs speaks more to urban gardening than to conventional farming,” he told Fortune.

According to Marelign, the government’s main problem has shifted from affordability to availability.

Federal Court Sends Fuel-graft Case to Trial on Amended Charges

Federal prosecutors last week opened proceedings on an amended charge sheet at the Federal High Court’s Lideta Division, on Dejazmach Bekele Weya St., narrowing one of the year’s largest fuel-corruption cases and splitting it into two trials.

The revised indictment reduces the number of defendants and divides the initial case into two separate proceedings. It names Esmlealem Mihiretu, former director general of the Ethiopian Petroleum Supply Enterprise (EPSE); Dibara Fufa, deputy director general of the Ethiopian Petroleum & Energy Authority (EPEA); and seven others.

Prosecutors initially charged 13 defendants. Nine have remained in police custody since April, after federal prosecutors alleged they conspired for personal gain by supplying fuel to unauthorised beneficiaries, disrupting government operations and creating artificial shortages in the domestic market. According to the original charge sheet, the alleged scheme cost the federal government more than 68.8 million Br.

The amendment followed the prosecution’s decision to withdraw the third count in that charge sheet, after the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) chose to drop it. The withdrawn count accused Dibara Fufa and two other EPEA officials of conspiring to unlawfully allocate more than one million litres of fuel to Yegna Petroleum Plc, allegedly costing the government more than 21 million Br.

With the count gone, the Justice Ministry ordered the release of Yilak Aweke and Abela Gizaw, who had been held solely in connection with it. Prosecutors also dropped charges against Yilkal Yenesew, the general manager of Yegna Petroleum Plc, and the company itself, both of whom had previously been prosecuted in absentia.

The principal case now carries nine defendants. Dibara, who faced three counts in the original indictment, is charged with two. Under the amended sheet, he, along with Shumalem Birhane, a fuel-supply and distribution-monitoring expert at the Authority, Estifanos Getnet, head of its energy market research & tariff desk, and others, is charged with causing more than 1.4 million Br in losses by “unlawfully facilitating the allocation of more than 30 million litres of fuel” to businesspeople, including Bereket Worku, widely known as “Bereket Geberewa,” and Abush Ayalew.

Investigators have been unable to locate two of the businesspeople named in the amended indictment. Police told the Court that Bereket could not be found at her registered address. After prosecutors issued a public summons in a nationally circulated newspaper and she failed to appear, they requested that the Court proceed against her in absentia, and the Bench granted the request.

The status of another businessman, Abush Ayalew, drew a lengthy argument at the bench. His whereabouts, along with those of Getachew Amoghe, became the focus of the hearing on Thursday, June 25, 2026. Prosecutors requested more time to find the remaining defendants, arguing that police needed it to execute arrest warrants and to issue public notices before the accused could be brought before the Bench.

Defence lawyers objected, arguing that repeatedly extending the proceedings to accommodate defendants who had not been apprehended infringed on the rights of those already in custody. Representing Dibara, a defence lawyer appealed to the Court, stating that he had previously petitioned the prosecution to withdraw the charges against his client altogether.

“It’s inappropriate to cause further delays for a case that should be dismissed,” the lawyer argued.

Prosecutors objected, insisting that seeking time to apprehend the remaining suspects and publish newspaper notices did not violate the rights of defendants in custody. They rebuked the defence for assuming the case would eventually be dismissed, calling the assertion procedurally hasty.

Esmlealem Mihiretu, who remains in custody, will stand trial under a separate charge sheet alongside two former EPSE officials, Abayneh Awol and Bisrat Abebaw. The three are charged for “violating the national fuel supply-chain monitoring system, keeping nearly 1.9 million litres of fuel outside government control.” Prosecutors claim that they unlawfully transported subsidised fuel from Djibouti, causing losses of more than 17.8 million Br.

The three-judge Bench asked the defence whether it intended to raise preliminary objections to the amended indictment. The defence responded that the amendments did not materially alter the case and argued that proceedings should move directly to the evidentiary stage. Prosecutors told the Court they had lined up 24 witnesses ready to testify.

The Bench adjourned until July 28 to hear the prosecution’s witnesses and review efforts to locate the remaining defendants through the police and public notices. It also ruled that proceedings against Bereket would continue in absentia, after she failed to appear despite a public summons published in the newspapers. In addition to Bereket, prosecutors continue to seek Abush and Getachew. Yilkal, previously prosecuted in absentia, is no longer part of the proceedings following the withdrawal of charges against him.

A Forex Auction Softens Pressure Without Moving the Boards

The Birr, the Brewed Buck, did not break in the forex market last week. It sagged across bank boards, revealing pressure rather than panic and leaving the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) with a hard message. Liquidity can be supplied without resetting the price banks post for dollars.

The average commercial-bank buying rate for the dollar jumped to 158.58 Br from 157.99 Br, excluding the Central Bank. The average selling rate moved almost in step, to 161.75 from 161.15 Br. In market terms, the Birr lost about 0.37pc of its cash value over six days. In political-economy terms, the movement showed the Central Bank leaning against pressure rather than putting it out.

The week turned on Wednesday, June 24, when the Central Bank injected 100 million dollars into the market through its second foreign-exchange auction in two weeks. Fourteen of the 30 banks took part, and at least nine won allocations.

Accepted bids ranged from 152 to 157 Br to the dollar. Yet the auction did not pull cash boards lower. By Saturday, the average commercial-bank buying rate was still above 158.5 Br. The Central Bank’s buying rate was 158.18 Br, 3.68 Br higher than Tsehay Bank’s unchanged 154.49 Br. The auction supplied liquidity and a reference point. However, it did not establish a new market centre.

That gap between auction prices and retail cash boards was the week’s main story. The Central Bank’s accepted range sat below much of the banking industry’s public buying board. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) ended closest to the auction ceiling, raising its buying rate by exactly one Birr, to 157.01 Br. But it remained below the private-market centre. On Saturday, the industrial average was 1.56 Br above CBE. Using the narrower industry average of about 158.89 Br, the CBE discount was closer to 1.87 Br. Its advertised top-up bonus complicates the comparison, for it could make the effective rate higher than the headline board.

The six-day unweighted industrial average was 158.29 Br for buying and 161.47 Br for selling. Including the Central Bank’s barely changed the buying average, at 158.31 Br, but pulled the selling average down to 161.37 Br because the Central Bank posts no spread.

For most banks, the spread itself told little. They kept the difference between buying and selling at two percent, making the selling board a mark-up over the buying board. The telling competition was in the buying quote, where foreign-currency cash remains scarce, sensitive and politically watched.

Oromia Bank remained the premium outlier. Its buying rate of 162.73 Br and selling rate of 165.99 Br were unchanged over the six days, keeping it above those of every other bank.

By Saturday, the next upper cluster was between 159.57 Br and 159.62 Br, including Wegagen, Global Bank Ethiopia, Berhan, Amhara Bank, Goh Betoch, Bunna, and Siinqee banks. Oromia Bank was not merely high; it was detached. Its buying quote was 4.15 Br above the commercial-bank average and 5.72 Br above CBE’s posted buying rate.

At the other end were Tsehay and Hijra banks.

Tsehay Bank posted the lowest buying and selling offers all week, unchanged at 154.49 Br and 157.58 Br. Hijra stayed still at 154.99 Br for buying and 158 Br for selling. They did not follow the centre upward even as lower-quoted peers adjusted sharply.

In a rising market, a flat low quote may signal limited appetite for buying dollars, weak urgency, a narrower client base, or confidence that posted rates do not determine actual foreign-exchange capture.

Between these poles, the middle tightened. Gadaa Bank raised its buying rate by 2.95 Br, to 158.82 Br, the largest increase seen last week. Siinqee Bank followed with 2.45 Br, while Ninb Bank added 1.87 Br. Zemen Bank lifted its rate by 1.08 Br. CBE added one Birr, while Dashen Bank’s jumped by 0.96 Br, Global Bank Ethiopia by 0.91 Br, and Hibret Bank by 0.86 Br. These moves narrowed their gap with the market average and pushed the overall average higher.

However, the largest adjustment came late. The average buying rate grew by 0.06 Br on June 23, 0.13 BR on June 24, 0.16 Br on June 25, 0.17 Br between June 25 and June 26, and only 0.03 Br on June 27. The pattern revealed a market that adjusted after the auction but was nearly flat by the end of the week.

The range between the top and bottom commercial buying rates remained wide at 8.23 Br, as Oromia and Tsehay banks remained fixed at opposite ends. But the middle tightened.

The standard deviation of commercial buying rates fell to about 1.50 Br on June 27 from about 1.73 on June 22. The average buying rate increased to 158.82 Br from 158.41 Br, while the average selling rate grew to 162 Br from 161.58 Br.

Large private banks moved cautiously last week. The market was split into behavioural groups as there was no disorderly depreciation on posted boards, only a managed crawl, a tighter middle and stubborn outliers.

The premium-sticky group, led by Oromia Bank and followed by Wegagen Bank, Global Bank Ethiopia, Berhan, Amhara Bank, Goh Betoch, and Bunna banks, held high boards or moved into the upper cluster. The controlled-adjustment group included Abyssinia, Awash, CBE, Dashen, Addis, Sidama, Tsedey and Enat. The catch-up group included Gadaa, Nib, Siinqee, and Zemen banks. The low-sticky group, led by Tsehay and Hijra banks, refused to chase the market.

There were anomalies, too. Coop Bank’s June 23 board was the clearest technical break. Its buying rate fell to 156.12 Br while its selling rate stayed at 160.27 Br, widening the spread to 2.65pc before returning to the two percent norm the following day.

The Central Bank’s sale may have reduced market pressure. It did not erase the premium in retail quotes.

Less than half of the 30 banks bid, showing that the liquidity operation was large but not system-wide. Banks buying dollars at an auction high of 157 Br and posting cash buying rates near 159 Br or above may be dealing with different markets, maturities, clients and costs. For banks, the buying rate is no longer only a service price. In a dollar-short economy, it has become a balance sheet, a liquidity signal, and a public index of confidence in the Brewed Buck.

The official auction shows one clearing range. Cash boards show another. Effective rates, after bonuses and access limits, may show a third.

Fantu Cheru, An African Mind That Never Left Home, Dies at 77

Fantu Cheru maintained influential dialogues with progressive African leaders, including a close intellectual friendship with the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. These relationships were grounded in the conviction that transforming African economies required the intellectual courage to challenge inherited dogmas and humanise policy. He teamed with his contemporaries to examine the ethical foundations of governance, asserting that justice and knowledge should actively serve one another, write Abdul Mohammed and Aklilu Fikresellasie.

With profound sorrow and deep gratitude, we mourn the passing of my dear friend and brother, Fantu Cheru (Prof.), an extraordinary Ethiopian and African intellectual whose life embodied the rare harmony between thought and action, scholarship and service, intellect and humility.

Fantu’s journey, from the hills of northern Ethiopia to the lecture halls of the world’s leading universities, from the shepherd’s pasture to the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), was never a departure from his origins. It was a lifelong conversation with them. He carried the quiet dignity of his rural beginnings into the corridors of power and knowledge, never losing sight of the people who shaped his conscience. His scholarship was rooted in lived experience; his intellect disciplined by compassion; and his activism guided by moral clarity.

In a world often seduced by imitation, Fantu stood apart as a creative interpreter and user of knowledge. He absorbed lessons from China, America and Europe, not to replicate them, but to reinterpret them through Africa’s own moral and historical lens. For him, learning from others meant strengthening one’s own authenticity. He believed deeply that Africa’s path to modernity lay not in mimicry, but in creative appropriation, transforming ideas into instruments of emancipation rather than dependency.

Throughout his life, Fantu remained a steadfast advocate of African unity and integration. He was an early and passionate supporter of initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the work of the Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA), constantly urging African leaders to look beyond narrow national horizons and short-term interests toward a continent bound by shared destiny and economic solidarity. He laboured tirelessly to connect ideas with institutions, to give meaning and credibility to the dream of pan-African renewal.

Fantu’s intellectual mission was never abstract. He sought to understand the world’s growing complexity to guide both policy and conscience, always asking.

How do these global transformations affect the lives of ordinary people?

He listened carefully to the poor, the marginalised and the forgotten, and from them learned the moral logic of survival, dignity and resilience. His writings were rigorous, but his sympathies always belonged to the voiceless.

He was also a bridge between intellect and leadership. His friendship with Meles Zenawi, the former prime minister, and with many of Ethiopia’s and Africa’s most progressive leaders and thinkers, was anchored in a shared conviction that Africa’s transformation required not only political struggle but intellectual courage. The courage to think originally, to challenge inherited dogmas and to humanise development. Together with his contemporaries, he worked to renew the ethical foundations of governance, arguing that justice and knowledge should serve one another.

As an economist, Fantu built a distinguished international academic career spanning several decades, becoming one of the most prominent African development economists of his generation. Born in 1949 in Azezo, Gonder, he pursued higher education at Teferi Mekonnen in Addis Ababa and advanced education abroad. He held a long-term post at American University in Washington, DC, as a professor in the School of International Service, specialising in international development, political economy and African studies. He was widely recognised for his critical scholarship on structural adjustment, debt, poverty and development policy in Africa and the Global South.

Later in his career, Fantu was affiliated with the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) at Uppsala University in Sweden, where he served as a senior researcher. The Institute, the Swedish connection associated with his career, is a leading Scandinavian research centre on African political, social and economic issues. His scholarship ranged widely. It covered African debt crises, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), poverty reduction, and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. He studied the Ethiopian political economy and development strategy, South-South cooperation, particularly China-Africa relations, post-colonial development frameworks, and critiques of Western aid models.

Fantu also served as the United Nations Independent Expert, or Special Rapporteur, on Foreign Debt & Structural Adjustment. Through that role, he advised the world body on how debt and the economic conditionalities imposed by international financial institutions were affecting developing countries, particularly in Africa. He authored and co-edited several influential books, including “African Renaissance” and “The Silent Revolution in Africa,” and contributed extensively to journals on development studies, African affairs and international political economy.

Beyond his remarkable intellectual and public life, Fantu was deeply devoted to his family. He shared a long and loving partnership with his wife, Annika Tornqvist, and took great pride in his children, Malkom and Makeda, as well as in family life. Those who knew him personally understood that behind the internationally respected scholar and public intellectual stood a warm, caring and deeply humane family man. His humanity was not confined to public causes or intellectual debates. It was equally present in the quiet generosity, loyalty and affection he extended to those closest to him.

And yet, beyond all his achievements, Fantu remained a man of uncommon modesty and moral clarity. He was humble in speech, generous in friendship, and rigorous in principle. He spoke softly, but his words carried conviction. He achieved much, but claimed little. He exemplified what it means to be an intellectual in the service of the people, upright, honest and unwavering in his belief that knowledge is a public good, not a private possession.

We mourn not only the loss of a brilliant mind but the passing of a moral compass. Fantu was a man whose life was a testament to integrity, compassion and the lifelong struggle for justice and human dignity.

Fantu is remembered as a foundational voice in critical African development studies, a scholar who consistently advocated people-centred, sovereignty-respecting development in opposition to externally imposed structural adjustment orthodoxies. Future generations of Africans may continue to walk the paths Fantu illuminated through his words, his example and his enduring love for his people and for humanity.

Abay Bank Lists on Ethiopian Securities Exchange as Fifth Entrant

Abay Bank Share Company began trading on the Main Board of the Ethiopian Securities Exchange (ESX) on June 25, becoming the fifth company to list after registering its ordinary shares with the Ethiopian Capital Market Authority (ECMA). The stock debuted at 1,800 Br a share, making all 9.66 million ordinary shares immediately tradable.

The listing follows a year of strong financial and digital growth. For the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025, the bank reported a three-billion-Br profit, assets of 9.1 billion Br and deposits of 7.1 billion Br. It has also shifted 69pc of its transaction volume to digital channels and expanded its network to 546 branches.

Chief Executive Officer Yehuala Gessesse said the listing marks a milestone in the bank’s growth since its establishment in 2010 with 125 million Br in paid-up capital from 823 founding shareholders. He said the move supports the country’s economic reforms by strengthening transparency, corporate governance and competitiveness, while providing shareholders with a regulated trading platform and creating opportunities for future capital raising.

Will AI Yield Abundance Without Purpose?

In Kurt Vonnegut’s 1952 novel, “Player Piano”, machines have automated most industry, leaving only a few engineers and managers to oversee things. Everyone else is fed and housed by the state, with nothing to do.

Was Vonnegut prescient?

Whether AI will render a large share of the workforce redundant is, of course, unknowable. But we do already know that AI poses challenges in two critical dimensions of human flourishing: happiness and meaning.

In terms of happiness, automating much of our work should, on average, make us richer, which should, in turn, lead to higher life satisfaction. Research finds that doubling income lifts how we rate our life by a similar amount, whether rich or poor. The challenge that AI poses here is about redistribution.

Meaning is different. As Betsey Stevenson of the University of Michigan shows in her analysis of the cross-country evidence, reported meaning and purpose do not track income growth the same way. Work supplies more than money. Joblessness harms mental health even when incomes are fully replaced. Alongside a paycheck, work offers structure and a sense of belonging, status, and contribution. These attributes cannot easily be redistributed.

AI threatens meaning in at least three ways. To undermine our sense of purpose, AI does not have to be better than us, only functionally adequate and cheaper. It is one thing to be surpassed by something truly extraordinary. It is another thing to be made irrelevant by something merely good enough.

Moreover, AI-powered entertainment and companionship could capture enough of people’s time and social appetite to displace the more challenging activities that generate meaning. By offering a frictionless sense of connection, AI could crowd out the effort – the obligations, reciprocity, selflessness, and inconveniences – that real relationships require. AI companionship asks nothing of us. It is consumption dressed up as connection.

Digital life has already reshaped human connection, and not always for the better. Across the OECD, face-to-face interaction has declined and heavy social media use tracks lower well-being among the young. None of this is AI’s doing (yet), but it does suggest that an easier digital connection does not reliably deepen the human variety. Convenience tends to win out, even when people know that the alternative is better for them.

Lastly, meaning is rarely produced from a state of comfort. It comes from effort in the service of a chosen goal, be it raising a child or mastering a craft. What people value, in retrospect, is not ease but having struggled toward something that mattered. If AI removes friction at scale, it may remove one of the raw materials from which meaning is made. This may explain why richer societies report more comfort without more purpose.

True, not all work will disappear even if AI exceeds human capabilities. Humans did not stop playing chess when computers surpassed them. People still run, cook, make music, build furniture, and pay a premium for live performances. Meaning comes from competition, mastery, and self-expression within human-scaled constraints, not from generating optimal outputs. The value of human effort can grow even as human performance declines.

But this principle has limits. It works where activities are social, embodied, and have a tradition of amateur practice, but not where meaning has come entirely from professional prestige or economic necessity. Chess was always a game, even if some made it a job. The same cannot be said for back-office accounting. Moreover, even where meaning may survive, it will live in the process rather than the result. Before the 2025 Open Championship, Scottie Scheffler said that winning a golf trophy is gratifying but fleeting (“awesome for two minutes”).

The daily work of mastery is what confers a more enduring sense of meaning.

A common, reassuring refrain from AI boosters is that the meaning problem will solve itself. If AI gives us more time, we will become more rooted in family, place, and community, the way people were before industrialisation bundled meaning into paid employment. Perhaps that will be true for some people. But preindustrial rootedness was sustained by conditions, such as low mobility, kinship obligations, religion, and local necessity, that were often constraining and sometimes oppressive.

We should not wish them back, nor would they reappear automatically with mass leisure.

Material abundance alone does not recreate the structures from which meaning was once drawn. Consider Sweden. It combines a robust welfare state and very high life satisfaction with an unusually large share of single-person households and evidence that younger adults have less meaning in their lives than older ones.

Of course, some meaning will emerge organically. But the question is whether it will be felt broadly enough to replace what work once supplied. There is little reason to assume so. Higher incomes can reduce stress, but they do not necessarily produce a role that others depend on, a community that notices our absence, or a challenge worth struggling with. Those require functioning traditions of participation and institutions that sustain it.

The institutions that once provided sources of meaning, including unions, professions, churches, schools, and civic associations, were built over time, through a mix of local initiative and public support. The same will be true of what comes next. We can think of it as meaning infrastructure. The institutions through which people find roles, recognition, and a sense of being.

What makes such institutions durable is not goodwill but a simple principle. Prestige should follow performance. Show up reliably, and earn a voice. Master a craft and earn recognition. Mentor others and earn status. Take responsibility for a shared task and earn authority.

Far from ending the competition for status, abundance would merely redirect it. This new competition would then need to be civilised, for example, by expanding what counts as a contribution worthy of honour. How this happens will differ from place to place. Societies with strong families, dense civil institutions, and high social trust will find it easier. Those without will have to build from less. But the challenge would be the same everywhere, and no amount of abundance would solve it.