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NEBE Announces Expanded Airtime Allocation as Parties Underutilized Media in Previous Election

Ethiopia’s National Election Board held a briefing on Saturday, March 28, 2026, at the Ethiopian Skylight Hotel outlining free media access for political parties ahead of the 7th national election.

At the event, the National Election Board of Ethiopia detailed that parties will receive 782.5 hours of radio airtime, 513.45 hours on television, and 576 newspaper columns, distributed across 50 media outlets nationwide. Compared to the previous national election, this represents a 10% increase in total media access.

Out of the 50 media outlets, 24 are radio stations, evenly divided between government-controlled state radio and private broadcasters. 20 are television stations, of which 12 are government-controlled and 8 are privately owned. The remaining 6 outlets are newspapers, all of which are government-controlled.

The distribution of airtime follows a structured formula: 40% is shared equally among all parties, 25% is allocated based on the total number of candidates fielded by each party, 15% is allocated based on the number of candidates with disabilities, 15% based on the number of women candidates, and 5% based on women candidates with disabilities.
According to Haimanot Zeleke, Director General of the Ethiopian Media Authority, the initiative aims to improve equitable access to voters through public media platforms.

Data from the 6th national election indicates that a substantial portion of allocated airtime went unused. Political parties utilized 376.83 hours out of 711 hours of radio airtime, leaving 46.8% unused, while on television they used 335.34 hours out of 558.9 hours, leaving 40% unused.

For the upcoming election cycle, the free airtime allocation will run from Wednesday, April 1, 2026, to May 27, 2026, covering 40 days, excluding weekends and public holidays.

FROM FIELDS TO FORTUNES The Economic Power of Honeybees’ Pollination

In the bustling fields of Ethiopia, bees hum quietly as they move from flower to flower. To most, they are simply creatures that make honey. However, the scientists at the International Centre of Insect Physiology and  Ecology (icipe) see these tiny pollinators as unseen workers powering the country’s economy. As a result, icipe, in partnership with the Mastercard Foundation, the Ministry of Agriculture, and Bees for Development Ethiopia, pledged to include Honeybees’ pollination into the national accounting system. The initiative is being implemented under the Mass Youth Employment in Apiculture ( MaYEA) program, creating dignified and fulfilling jobs for over 1,000,000 young people across the country in apiculture and the aligned value chain

Tadele Tefera (PhD), Country Head of the icipe Ethiopia Office, described pollination as the “invisible engine of our food systems,” noting that about 75 percent of global food crops depend partly on pollinators, while 35  percent of global crop production benefits directly from them. He noted that pollination is crucial for increasing crop yields, maintaining biodiversity, and improving the nutritional quality of the crops.

“Pollination should be recognized as natural capital that underpins agricultural economies,” Dr. Tadele, highlighting its global economic value, which is estimated at 235-577 billion dollars annually.

In Ethiopia, the economic contribution is also significant. Dr. Tadele estimated that pollination services generate approximately 544 million dollars annually, particularly benefiting crops such as coffee, pulses, and oilseeds. He added that pollination can increase crop yields by 20 to 70 percent while improving quality, seed formation, and shelf life.

Zewdu Ayalew(PhD), an economist specializing in innovation and impact assessment, reinforced these findings by framing pollination as a fundamental agricultural input, comparable to fertilizer but often overlooked in economic systems. He noted that about 71 pc of crops grown in the country rely on animal pollination.

According to Dr. Zewdu, the total economic value of pollination services in Ethiopia ranges from 500 million to 800 million dollars annually, with broader estimates reaching up to 2.5 billion dollars depending on agroecological suitability. He emphasized that pollination plays a critical role not only in enhancing crop production but also in reducing poverty, improving nutrition, and strengthening overall economic resilience.

Both experts underscored the strong link between pollination and nutrition. Pollinators support the production of nutrient-rich foods such as fruits, vegetables, legumes, and oilseeds, which are essential sources of vitamins and minerals. Declines in pollinators, they warned, could lead to reduced productivity, dietary diversity, and increased malnutrition.

One of the research pieces of evidence presented by Dr. Zewdu showed that increasing the share of land under pollinator-dependent crops can significantly boost household incomes and reduce micronutrient deficiencies, including protein, iron, and vitamin A deficiencies.

The role of managed bees was also highlighted as a major economic driver. Dr. Zewdu noted that beekeeping not only generates income from honey and related products but also delivers wider agricultural benefits through pollination. Nationally, pollination-related contributions were estimated at around one billion dollars per year, about 2 pc of total GDP and 4.4 pc of agricultural GDP.

Experimental studies further indicate that the use of modern beehives can increase crop yields, particularly in coffee production, while significantly boosting farm profits. The broader social benefits of pollination, he added, far exceed the private income earned from honey production.

Dr. Tadele emphasized the broader environmental and economic significance of pollinators, underscoring their contributions to biodiversity conservation, ecosystem resilience, and habitat regeneration. He also highlighted the potential for youth employment in beekeeping enterprises and other pollination-based services that enhance crop production.

Programs like MOYESH and MaYEA demonstrate the potential for large-scale job creation, particularly for young people, engaging them in apiculture and an aligned value chain while simultaneously supporting pollination services and boosting crop productivity.

Despite these benefits, both experts warned that pollinators are under increasing threat from habitat loss, pesticide misuse, climate change, monocropping systems, and invasive species. These pressures pose risks to food security, ecosystem stability, and economic sustainability.

They called for urgent policy action, including pollinator-friendly agricultural practices, improved pesticide regulation, habitat conservation, and increased investment in apiculture value chains. Dr. Zewdu further emphasized the need to integrate pollination into national income accounting systems and policy frameworks, noting that it remains largely invisible in economic planning and investments.

Ethiopia has strong potential to lead in pollination-based economies due to its large honeybee population, rich biodiversity, and long-standing beekeeping traditions. However, realizing this potential will require coordinated policy support and investment.

Both Dr. Tadele and Dr. Zewdu stressed that investing in pollination is essential for strengthening food systems, boosting rural incomes, protecting ecosystems, and driving sustainable economic growth.

Agricultural experts, researchers, and government officials are calling for stronger recognition of pollination services in farming systems, warning that chemical misuse and lack of awareness are undermining one of the country’s most critical natural assets.

Ato Aziz Ayalew, Head of Animal and Fishery Development at the Ministry of Agriculture, said the increased and often uncoordinated use of agricultural chemicals has negatively affected pollinators, particularly bees.

According to Aziz, chemicals such as pesticides and herbicides have had a significant impact on bee populations, which are the primary pollinators. To address this, the ministry, in collaboration with the International Centre of Insect Physiology and  Ecology(icipe), has been piloting a community-managed pesticide use approach under the Mass Youth Employment in Apiculture (MaYEA) program, which trained farmers and  youths  on the proper use of chemicals and their environmental impacts.

“These efforts have already shown positive results in improving product quality and supporting the return of pollinators,” Aziz noted.

However, he warned that challenges remain, including the use of expired chemicals and repeated over-application, both of which continue to harm pollination and human health.

Highlighting the importance of bees, Aziz explained that a single beehive can contain up to 60,000 bees, with around 40,000 actively involved in pollination. A single bee can visit about 100 flowers in one trip and make up to 15 trips per day, pollinating approximately 1,500 flowers daily. “This shows the enormous potential of one beehive,” he said.

He added that most of the country’s crops depend on pollination and recommended placing three to five beehives per hectare to maximize productivity.

Aziz noted that bee pollination not only increases crop yields but also improves the nutritional quality of foods

Meanwhile, Bedaso Taye, a Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation Expert at icipe, stressed the need to integrate pollination into national income accounting systems. He argued that the sector remains undervalued due to limited awareness and is often excluded from national income accounting.

“Pollination has a role that cannot be undermined,” Bedaso said, adding that the lack of recognition has led to insufficient investment, with resources often directed elsewhere.

Bedaso highlighted that the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (icipe), in partnership with the Mastercard Foundation, has made significant investments in beekeeping initiatives in Ethiopia over the past decade through three major programs, YESH, MOYESH, and MaYEA, with budgets of USD 10 million, USD 55 million, and USD 80 million, respectively, implemented from 2016 to the present. The primary objective of these projects was to create dignified and fulfilling jobs for young people, 70–80 percent of whom are young women and persons with disabilities. Through this investment, the programs have indirectly contributed to pollination services and enhanced crop productivity

Experts say that improving awareness, strengthening policy support, and increasing investment in pollination services will be essential to enhancing agricultural productivity, improving nutrition, and ensuring long-term sustainability in Ethiopia’s food systems.

Notes for Editors:

Established in 1970 and headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (www.icipe.org), is distinct, being the only research organisation in Africa working primarily on insects and other arthropods. icipe is also the sole institution that combines research and development activities across plant health, human health, animal health and environmental health. icipe generates world-class scientific knowledge and translates it into insect-based, nature-positive, One Health innovations that sustainably transform millions of livelihoods across Africa and beyond. Additionally, icipe nurtures Africa’s talent and leadership in insect-science through the Centre’s long-standing programmes in doctoral and postdoctoral training, advancement of research and innovation in applied sciences, engineering and technology, and the creation of a bioeconomy, in Africa. The Centre has a staff of about 500 international and national staff, operations in more than 40 countries in Africa, and over 300 partnerships with diverse organizations across the world. For additional information, visit: (www.icipe.org).

About the Mastercard Foundation: The Mastercard Foundation is a registered Canadian charity and one of the largest foundations in the world. It works with visionary organizations to advance education and financial inclusion to enable young people in Africa and Indigenous youth in Canada to access dignified and fulfilling work. Its Young Africa Works strategy aims to enable 30 million young people to access dignified and fulfilling work by 2030, while its EleV strategy will support 100,000 Indigenous youth in Canada to complete their education and transition to meaningful work aligned with their traditions, values, and aspirations. Established in 2006 through the generosity of Mastercard when it became a public company, the Foundation is an independent organization. Its policies, operations, and program decisions are determined by its Board of Directors and Leadership team. For more information on the Foundation, please visit:  www.mastercardfdn.org

ADDIS ABEBA FUEL QUEUES UNCOVER COST OF KEEPING THE COUNTRY MOVING

An aerial visualisation of a fuel queue winding in Addis Abeba last week did more than capture a city stuck in traffic. It uncovered a capital stalled by scarcity. Stretching a gruelling 2.1Km around the Ambassador Theatre area, the line of vehicles, from buses and minibuses to private SUVs and trucks, snaked through some of the city’s most prominent landmarks in a surreal procession of delay and frustration. The digital map traced motorists’ desperate path from a fuel pump behind what was once the Harambie Hotel, past Ambassador Park, the Zewditu Memorial Hospital and the Sheraton Addis, before looping toward the Filwuha thermal baths and circling back to the Total gas station, one of the 153 stations in the city. In those lost hours on the asphalt, a chronic fuel shortage, particularly of Diesel, became a visible measure of the productivity drained from a city forced to idle while waiting to fill its tankers.

Behind that urban tableau sits a fuel trade of staggering scale. The Ethiopian Petroleum Supply Enterprise (EPSE) imports and distributes nearly four billion tons of petroleum products, estimated to cost over four billion dollars. In the 2025 fiscal year, its revenue from contracts with customers surged sharply to 457.35 billion Br, from 259.37 billion Br a year earlier. Cost of sales climbed even faster, to 496.14 billion Br from 246.09 billion Br, revealing the magnitude of the trade, while a 40.4 billion Br claim from the fuel price stabilisation fund helped the Enterprise post a gross profit of 1.61 billion Br and net profit of 1.06 billion Br. Inventories more than doubled to 34.54 billion Br by year-end, while receivables from the fuel price stabilisation fund ballooned to 183.56 billion Br.

Budget Freeze Leaves a Region Paying for Political Deadlock

Felege Asmelash, 53, has spent nearly 26 years as a public service employee in Meqelle, the seat of Tigray Regional State. For much of this time, a government paycheck covered rent, school costs and basic needs. That stability has broken down now.

Felege, whose husband is retired, lives in a modest rented house and pays 8,000 Br in monthly rent. Her youngest daughter, in Grade 10, goes to a private school that costs her 3,000 Br. Those two bills alone absorb more than half of her monthly income. Four of her five children are working as public servants, but supporting the household still rests on her, as she works as a resource mobilisation coordinator in the HIV Control & Prevention Unit at the Health Bureau of the Regional State.

Her net monthly salary of 13,000 Br is the family’s only dependable income, or at least it was. Since February, it has stopped as the Regional Government has ceased paying more than 141,000 public servants after federal budget cuts. For Felege, it is a daily test of survival.

“I’ve no money left,” she said. “I can’t pay rent. I can’t send my child to school. I go to work hungry.”

It started during the civil war, which erupted in the late 2020 in Tigray Regional State, and engulfed the neighbouring states before a ceasefire was signed two years later. The conflict between the federal government and armed groups under the TPLF, the governing party of the Regional State, wrecked much of the economy and crippled public revenue. When the war ended, much of the region’s formal economy had collapsed, almost.

Businesses had closed, banks struggled to operate, and tax collection had been dismantled or made ineffective. Many of the activities that returned afterwards were informal and largely outside the tax system. With its local revenue base weakened, the interim regional administration, first under Getachew Reda and now under Tadesse Werede (Maj. Gen.), whose term is about to end, came to rely on federal budget transfers from the Ministry of Finance to pay salaries and provide basic public services. During the two-year war, public servants had already gone unpaid for 16 months.

Dubbed a Cessation of Hostilities, the deal signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022, was supposed to mark a turning point. The federal government allocated 24 billion Br for the year, with funds released during the first three months. But since October, the flow has slowed. Only a fraction of the expected monthly transfers has reached the Regional State. Tadesse’s Interim Administration tried to cover wages with limited revenue mobilised from internal sources.

Even that has stopped, and public service employees have gone unpaid for nearly two months.

At a mass gathering in Aksum during the Hidar Tsion religious celebrations, Tadesse admitted that his Administration is under serious strain because a federal budget freeze has left it unable to pay civil servants or maintain essential services.

Across the region, the consequences are visible. Fuel shortages nearly paralyse transport.

According to officials of the Regional State’s Trade & Export Agency, fuel supplies to the region have been completely halted since January, with serious disruptions to public services, infrastructure work, and healthcare delivery expected. Monthly supplies of fuel and diesel, once between 12 million and 15 million litres, had fallen to 850,000 litres by February last year and have been fully stopped since January 2026.

Banks have little cash businesses remain mostly closed. The fear that another cycle of deadly conflict could return hangs over many, like Felege.

She is struggling to survive on small loans from relatives, stretching each Birr as far as it will go.

“But what happens when this money is gone?” she asked. “If there is no one left to help us, I don’t know how we will survive.”

Transport costs have tripled. What used to cost her 80 Br for a round trip to work now costs nearly 240 Br. She walks nearly three hours each day, there and back, despite health problems, for she can no longer afford the limited transport available.

“We’re already struggling to afford even one proper meal a day,” Felege told Fortune.

The numbers show how little room the region has left.

The regional authorities blame the federal government for freezing budget transfers, which represent six percent of the 328.76 billion Br Parliament apportioned as federal subsidies to regional states for the fiscal year 2025/26. Inching close to 24 billion Br, the budget subsidy the Regional State was allocated to claims one percent of the country’s GDP. But the region needs 2.8 billion Br every month to pay salaries for public service employees like Felege, and only around 700 million Br is generated locally.

According to Mihiret Beyene (PhD), head of the region’s Finance Bureau, repeated requests to the Ministry of Finance have gone unanswered.

Felege is discontented with finding herself on the receiving end of this debacle.

“We aren’t politicians. We’ve done nothing wrong,” Felege told Fortune. “If mistakes were made, those responsible should answer for them. But why are we being punished?”

This same question has spread far beyond one household.

On March 24, 2026, thousands of civil service employees under the Regional Administration joined protests organised by officials of the regional Education Bureau, leaders of the Teachers’ Association, and PTA representatives. Held in towns including Meqelle, Adwa and Adigrat, teachers, parents and students marched protesting that “cutting the budget is starving teachers and denying children their future.”

Among the over 46,000 teachers working in the Regional State is Tsige Abera, a 50-year-old mathematics teacher at Neblet Primary School in the Enbaslet District. For 24 years, he has taught Grade 6 students. Like Felege, he depends entirely on his salary.

“I’ve been asking for unpaid salary for 16 months so that I can clear my debts,” he told Fortune. “Now that I’m not getting paid, I find it difficult to feed my family.”

According to Tsige, the crisis follows him into the classroom, leaving him unable to focus. Standing before his students, he keeps thinking about how he could provide for his children. What hurts him most, he said, is what it does to his children.

“When I see my children hungry, I can’t help but feel completely helpless,” Tsige said. “It’s very hard to teach with this burden.”

Teachers across the region share the same plight, as many say they are losing motivation. Some are trying to leave their teaching jobs in search of any work that can sustain their families. However, Tsige still reports to school, still standing before his students.

“We’re just teachers,” he said. “We can’t go even one day without our salary without feeling the impact. Everything depends on it. Why is this happening to us?”

The answer to Tsige’s bewilderment goes back to the long-brewing political rupture between the federal government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) and the leaders of the TPLF, which culminated in sharp differences after years of deteriorating relations. Rooted in its fall from the centre of power after nearly three decades as the dominant force in the ruling coalition, the EPRDF, that governed Ethiopia after 1991, TPLF leaders collided with Abiy’s reform agenda, his restructuring of the ruling party, and a mounting struggle over legitimacy, authority and the future of regional autonomy under the federal order.

The rift deepened after Abiy, who rise to power in 2018 on the back of nationwide protests against the old order, dissolved the ruling coalition and formed the Prosperity Party (PP), a new political vehicle the TPLF leaders under Debretsion Gebremicheal (PhD) refused to join, leaving them outside the governing party for the first time since 1991 and reinforcing their view that the federal government was seeking to roll back the federal system and their influence. The mistrust sharpened further when Abiy signed a 2018 peace deal with Eritrea’s Issayas Afeworqi, which TPLF leaders interpreted as a threat to the region’s security and evidence that Addis Abeba was aligning with their regional adversaries.

The confrontation hardened in 2020 when national and regional elections due in August were postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the House of Federation extended federal and regional mandates, a move the TPLF denounced as unconstitutional. Defying Addis Abeba, its leaders proceeded with a regional election in September 2020, which the House of Federation declared illegal and “nullified”. TPLF leaders in turn declared the federal government’s mandate expired, leaving each side openly questioning the other’s legitimacy.

What followed was a dangerous slide from institutional dispute to military confrontation. The federal government began cutting budget transfers to Tigray Regional State, as both sides accused each other of preparing for war. Hostile rhetoric intensified, and the final rupture came on the night of November 4, 2020, when armed forces under the Regional State seized control of the Northern Command’s bases, an action the TPLF leaders later admitted was “a pre-emptive” move.

The federal government denounced it as a “treasonous” attack on the national army, prompting the Prime Minister to launch what his government called a “law-enforcement operation” against TPLF leaders. This campaign rapidly expanded into a full-scale civil war in Tigray Regional State involving federal forces, regional militias and Eritrean troops.

The war inflicted severe damage, particularly on education, which comprised over 2,500 schools. Millions of children were pushed out of school for years, and many still do not have access to education. Schools were destroyed, and teachers died, were displaced or left their careers. The system was deeply disrupted to serve the 1.46 million student population in the Regional State, accounting for close to seven percent of the national student population.

Since November 2022, efforts have been underway to restore schooling, but the recovery remains in its early stages.

According to Kiros Guesh (PhD), head of the regional Education Bureau, budget cuts and delays in teachers’ salaries are creating severe hardship in an already fragile system.

“It’s unfair to inflict more damage on a sector still trying to recover,” he told Fortune.

The budget moratorium is pushing some schools toward closure, and the Bureau has received no official response from the Ministry of Education.

On March 9, the Education Bureau wrote to the Ministry, warning that years of progress in rebuilding the system after the war “faces a serious risk of reversal” without stable funding. The letter pointed directly to the federal government’s decision to withhold the budget subsidy since October 2025.

The alarm is not confined to schools. On March 5, the Health Bureau under the Regional State issued a similar appeal, warning that the healthcare system “faced imminent collapse” due to severe fuel shortages, discontinued pharmaceutical supplies, and growing financial constraints.

“Ambulance services and the distribution of medicines from central warehouses to health facilities had become impossible,” reads the letter the Bureau issued. “Immediate intervention is required to prevent avoidable morbidity and mortality among millions of civilians.”

Several attempts to get responses from the federal government have yielded little. Officials at the ministries of Education and Health insisted that the issue is budget-related, but the Ministry of Finance has not responded. According to Girma Kebede, its communications head, the matter is sensitive, and they have declined to comment.

Prime Minister Abiy, in an interview with the Ethiopian News Agency held in March this year, accused the TPLF of continuing military activities and preparing for another war. He affirmed that the federal government has no intention of initiating war in the region but alleged that the TPLF leaders are exploiting gold and other mineral resources in the region to finance the procurement of weapons.

Gebru Asrat, a veteran politician who once served as the founding president of the Tigray Regional State, voiced similar concerns, accusing the TPLF of preparing for another war. But he argued that the budget freeze places an “unfair burden” on ordinary civil servants.

“The Ministry of Finance should explore ways to pay public employees directly to prevent further harm to the people,” he told Fortune.

For ordinary citizens like Felege, the politics offer little comfort. Rent, school fees and food still demand cash.

Cash has become the painful bottleneck. For businesspeople like Fikre Tensay, a resident of Meqelle and a former businessman, who closed his shop in the Qedamay Weyane market because bringing goods into the city had become impossible, and customers were too few, withdrawing cash has become nearly impossible in an environment where banks disburse only 1,000 Br a day, often after hours of waiting. An officer at Lion Bank’s Meqelle Branch, who requested anonymity, confirmed the shortage but blamed the scramble to hold cash out of fear that conflict could resume, while deposits have nearly disappeared.

Felege still goes to work, walking, and awaits a salary that has stopped coming.

The Economy Grows on Paper as Tomorrow’s Assets Go Unbuilt

The most alarming economic losses are often the hardest to see. A bridge destroyed by war is visible, not a factory closed down by foreign-exchange shortages. The machinery not imported, the warehouse not built, the workshop not expanded, the processing line not installed, and the fleet not financed remain outside of public discourse.

A construction site gone may be visible, but the slow erosion of private capital accumulation is harder to spot. This is a quieter form of collapse that may prove to be one of the costliest setbacks Ethiopia has suffered in a generation.

The real damage lies there, accumulating quietly year after year. It shows that private capital accumulation, measured through private gross fixed capital formation, expanded through the 2000s and mid-2010s, peaking at 24.51pc of GDP in 2017. Two years later, the share was still 21.4pc. Then the break came. By 2021, private investment had fallen to about 12.5pc of GDP. In 2024, it had recovered only partly, to 14.85pc.

This, beyond a normal cyclical dip, is a structural retreat in wealth formation.

Ironically, nominal figures offer a false comfort. On paper, private fixed investment appears to have grown from about eight billion Birr in 2000/01 to around 1.745 trillion Br almost a quarter of a century later. Total investment at current market prices also climbed, from 948.9 billion Br in 2018/19 to 2.409 trillion Br after five years. But inflation has done much of the lifting. In real terms, private capital accumulation grew until 2017, then contracted sharply in 2020 and 2021, and has recovered only partly since.

The nominal rise masks an erosion in the economy’s real capacity to build productive assets.

That matters because capital accumulation is the skeleton of growth. Countries become richer by building the assets (such as machines, industrial sheds, irrigation systems, logistics depots, hotels, gold chains, processing plants and digital infrastructure) that make future production possible. When private capital accumulation slows, an economy is weakening its ability to grow tomorrow.

Political leaders and policymakers once seemed to grasp this. The past quarter of a century can be seen in five phases, and the most striking was the decade-long ascent that began in 2004. Public infrastructure spending and rapid GDP growth helped pull private investment upward. Roads, power plants and industrial parks raised expected returns. Debt relief created fiscal room, while private investors followed the state into a widening field of opportunity.

The erosion began before the full force of the recent crises. By 2018 and 2019, the debt-fuelled public investment boom was already fading. The Birr (the Brewed Buck) was overvalued. Access to foreign currency had become a severe constraint for firms that depended on imported machinery or inputs. Some firms waited from six months to two years for foreign exchange, after first depositing the full Birr equivalent in their accounts.

On the factory floor, the absurdity was plain, and remains so. Capital tied up, imported equipment delayed, and expansion plans frozen, while overheads still running. This is how investment dies in practice, not in one dramatic event, but in a long administrative suffocation.

Then came the triple shock. The global pandemic, COVID-19, disrupted supply chains and confidence. The civil war in Tigray Regional State damaged the investment climate more severely than any event since the war with Eritrea in the late 1990s. It caused an estimated loss of over 28 billion dollars.

Macroeconomic deterioration delivered a third blow. Inflation remained stuck around 30pc for years, foreign-exchange shortages deepened, external support weakened, and the country defaulted on its one-billion-dollar Eurobond in December 2023. By 2021, private investment’s share of GDP had fallen by nearly nine percentage points from its 2019 level. It was a collapse in the rate at which the private sector was adding to the country’s productive stock.

The share of private investment in the economy in 2024 was still about 10 percentage points below its peak in 2017, even though the economy’s nominal GDP is now roughly five times larger. The estimate is evident, with annual private capital accumulation about 700 billion Br to 900 billion Br less than it would have been had the pre-crisis investment ratio been sustained. That is about five billion to 6.5 billion dollars a year, more than the country’s annual foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows.

What is evolving is a strange phenomenon in which the country has people with money but not enough productive capital. According to the Africa Wealth Report by Henley & Partners, by 2015, Ethiopia had 2,700 millionaires, more than double the 2007 figure, yet much of that wealth, while sitting in banking rather than being channelled into industrial production or infrastructure, remains unchanged a decade later.

Nonetheless, a country can produce millionaires without producing enough machinery, and it can generate wealth without compounding productive capacity.

Borrowing from Vladimir Lenin’s famous adage, “what needs to be done?” should be the “burning question” of the moment.

Foremost, it is an understatement to say Ethiopia needs peace, stability and consensus, goals that could be achieved through a negotiated political settlement carried out in good faith. It needs a governance reality that prioritises policy predictability over slogans. Private capital is cowardly by nature. It flees noise, uncertainty and arbitrary interruption. As long as wars and conflicts persist and the political compact remains unsettled, investors will keep shortening their time horizons, favouring commodity trading, arbitrage, and quick-turnover activities over factories and assets.

Indeed, policies and reforms targeting macroeconomic stabilisation should continue, but they have to be credible in the eyes of the public and investment-compatible. The mounting cost of living, high inflation, exchange-rate distortions, and foreign-exchange rationing have together been toxic to capital formation. The July 2024 liberalisation of the foreign-exchange regime, which reduced the parallel-market premium albeit with high cost, was an important step.

But liberalisation alone is not enough. Investors need a system through which capital goods can be financed and imported on a predictable timetable. A manufacturer would tolerate a weaker currency sooner than an unknowable one. What kills investment is uncertainty.

Policymakers also need to confront the deepest structural brake that is access to finance. An economy cannot preach industrialisation while asking entrepreneurs to post over 100pc collateral for loans. Nor can it mobilise large-scale domestic capital while keeping debt markets narrow and heavily regulated. The economy needs long-term finance at scale, including leasing, a broader corporate debt market, credible collateral enforcement, better credit information and financial institutions willing to lend against viable projects rather than existing assets.

Public investment should crowd in private capital, not retreat into fiscal exhaustion or crowd it out through distortion. The strongest driver over the long arc was the crowding-in effect of roads, power and industrial parks. The state needs to do the few things private investors cannot do alone. That is to mean, with no ambiguity, reliable electricity, trade logistics, industrial land, customs efficiency and the legal infrastructure of commerce.

Policy should reward reinvestment rather than speculative accumulation. Tax incentives, accelerated depreciation for capital equipment, export-linked investment privileges, and clearer treatment of retained earnings can help move wealthy domestic investors away from passive rent-seeking and toward productive asset formation. Policymakers should also resist the comfort of nominal growth. Construction values can rise while real investment ratios fall. Banks can report larger balance sheets while productive lending stagnates. Fiscal revenues can swell in Birr terms while the capital base decays. These are all unfolding now.

The private capital base was not eroded in a single blow, and a single reform will not rebuild it. But the country cannot afford complacency. When private investment falls from nearly a quarter of GDP to the middle teens, and stays there while the economy grows larger, the missing capital becomes a national economic wound. The question is whether it can restore the conditions under which private capital will once again dare to stay, build and compound.

That is what growth really is, not the temporary thrill of money changing hands. It is the patient accumulation of assets that makes tomorrow more productive than today. Ethiopia has already lost too much of that patience. It should not lose another decade.

Ethiopian Airlines Pitches Project Finance for Bishoftu Rail Link

Ethiopian Airlines Group (EAG) has moved to structure the railway and transport component of the planned Bishoftu International Airport under a project-finance model, separating it from the airport’s core construction as it seeks to unlock funding for one of the largest infrastructure schemes in the country.

According to Adamu Tadelle, chief financial officer, several letters of intent have been submitted, and prospective partners are reviewing contract documents. The Group is prepared to accommodate multiple financing options for the transport component, which is intended to serve passengers and employees, many of whom commute from Addis Abeba.

“The project is seen as different parts even though they are in the same project,” Adamu told Fortune.

The distinction lies at the heart of the Group’s financing logic. While the airport itself is being advanced through specialised aviation contractors, the railway and associated mobility systems are being packaged separately, with promoters hoping this will widen the pool of financiers and technical partners.

Of the project’s estimated 12.5 billion dollar cost, 954 million dollars is allocated to the transport segment. The wider development includes two parallel runways, an automated passenger mover, and tunnels.

The new airport is designed to be linked directly to Bole International Airport through dedicated road and rail connections, forming what Ethiopian Airlines executives described as a two-airport system. The development spans 35SqKm of freehold land, with an additional 2.84SqKm secured for future expansion.

According to project officials, the rail system, access roads, depot, and passenger and cargo stations at Bole are all being bundled into a single engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract.

London-based Clyde & Co. has been hired as legal advisor. The firm is tasked with helping establish the special purpose vehicle (SPV) company, which will anchor the financing structure, while also overseeing regulatory compliance, legal due diligence, and the negotiations of financing and project agreements. It is hired to coordinate with financiers and other advisors to align risk allocation and the broader legal framework.

According to Adamu, the SPC needs to be established quickly, given that the financing model depends on it.

Construction procurement has been divided into five packages. An early-works contract worth an estimated 700 million dollars will initially be financed through Ethiopian Airlines equity and refinanced at financial close. Four other packages will cover infrastructure, main and support facilities, and specialised systems. The bulk of capital expenditure is expected to be procured through lump-sum turnkey contracts, a structure intended to shift construction and performance risks to contractors and enforce tighter cost and schedule discipline.

The timetable is ambitious. Contractors were to be shortlisted by December 2025 for initial ground works. Initial financing approval was expected by February 2026, followed by bids in early March and contract signing by August 27, 2026. Final financing approval is scheduled for December this year, with full financial close targeted for March next year, following the conclusion of lender and funding agreements.

Operational plans envision Bole International Airport retaining 90pc to 95pc of domestic passenger traffic, while Bishoftu International Airport will handle the balance. Bishoftu is expected to handle all international passenger traffic, particularly international transfer flows, as well as international belly cargo and freighter operations. Bole will remain in operation during the transition to preserve service continuity.

“The project had built-in contingencies,” said Adamu, arguing that regional geopolitical tensions, including the Iran-Israel crisis, would not materially affect construction costs.

The project is also beginning to attract attention from foreign financiers. In the past two weeks, Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia, Chen Hai, and a delegation from the Export-Import Bank of China visited the project site, while Finance Minister Ahmed Shide has discussed possible financing avenues for Bishoftu International Airport, alongside Ethiopia’s debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework.

Interest has also emerged from Italy. During talks in Rome last week, Giancarlo Giorgetti, Italy’s minister of Economy & Finance, praised Ethiopian Airlines’ performance and expressed readiness to support selected components of the airport through Italian financial institutions. Both sides agreed to open technical discussions involving Ethiopian Airlines, financial experts, and advisors to work out financing structures and modalities.

For some observers, the structure is as consequential as the financing itself.

For Mered Fikireyohannes, an investment consultant at Pragma Plc, the plan reflects a broad management scheme that could improve efficiency, smooth project execution, and strengthen investor confidence. But he warned that human capital may prove the weakest link unless Ethiopian Airlines expands its management bench and offers competitive incentives to retain specialised staff.

Preventable Child, Mother Deaths Shadow Health Sector Gains

Ethiopia is placed at the centre of a pressing health debate, where high stillbirth rates shadow official claims of progress and expose fragile care available to mothers and newborns before, during and after birth.

A new report released last week in Nairobi, Kenya, placed Ethiopia alongside Nigeria, the DR Congo, Tanzania and Sudan, for carrying the heaviest burden of stillbirths, where Africa recorded nearly one million in 2023. Health experts see it as a crisis that is persistent and, in many cases, preventable. Birth defects were the leading cause of stillbirths, accounting for 24pc of cases, with neural tube defects the most common.

Across Africa, experts found that 72pc of stillbirths were preventable through stronger medical, emotional and nutritional care from conception through birth, especially with better antenatal and obstetric care. The Child Health & Mortality Prevention Surveillance (CHAMPS) identified causes for 2,087 stillbirths across sites in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and South Africa. These were findings set within a picture of uneven gains.

According to Macrotrends, Ethiopia’s infant mortality rate declined to 27.19 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2025, down four percent from 2024, when the rate fell to 28.36, a 20.57pc decrease from the year before. Earlier years showed smaller declines, from 37 in 2022 to 35.70 in 2023. According to experts, the direction is positive, but the pace is uneven. They believe part of the pressure comes from a health system under financial pressure.

The federal government apportioned 32pc of GDP to debt servicing, while tax revenue contribution was at five percent. Although the plan is to keep this under half of GDP, healthcare financing has faced a gap for several years. The shortfall has left maternity and child health services competing for scarce resources.

According to Dereje Duguma (MD), state minister for Health, the federal government was trying to improve maternal health through domestic resource mobilisation. The maternal mortality rate has declined to 141 per 100,000 live births, and the Ministry wants to reduce it to less than 70 by 2030.

The government has introduced the Reproductive Maternal, Newborn, & Child Health compact agreement, bringing together 11 partners and expected to mobilise 284 million dollars over the next three years.

“The initiative is designed to procure essential family planning and maternal health commodities, with more than 85pc of those resources intended to reach community and health facility level,” said the State Minister.

A technical task force was overseeing the initiative under an accountability mechanism, and the Ministry of Finance has agreed to provide an additional budget of more than 140 million dollars for maternity leave.

The Ethiopian Obstetric Surveillance System (EthOSS) collected data on maternal deaths, removed personal identifiers and submitted the cases for review by the EthOSS committee for Confidential Enquiry into Maternal Deaths. The study was approved by the College of Health & Medical Sciences of Haramaya University and the University of Oxford’s Oxford Tropical Research Ethics Committee.

The reviews, carried out in 13 hospitals, found that most of the deaths were caused by direct obstetric causes. During the study period, EthOSS recorded 34,090 live births and 70 maternal deaths in the 13 participating hospitals. Haemorrhage killed 27 mothers (46pc) of the study group, while a quarter of the deaths were linked to hypertensive disorders of pregnancy. Delays in seeking care, reaching the right health facility and receiving adequate care were identified in more than 80pc of the cases reviewed.

“The numbers show a system in which women face danger at every step,” said Abiy Seifu, an assistant professor at Addis abeba univeity with 15 years of experience in maternal and child care.

Pregnancy and childbirth remained perilous for thousands of women in 2023, even though many of the complications that proved fatal are well understood and often treatable. Heavy bleeding, infection, dangerously high blood pressure and severe weakness from anaemia were among the most common threats. For many women, the danger was compounded by where they lived and how hard it was to reach care. Those in remote areas often arrived too late or not at all, and many went through pregnancy without even basic checkups. Too often, the most critical moments came after delivery, when complications struck, but urgent care was out of reach.

Only 22pc of the women who died were admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), and 80pc of the deaths occurred during the postpartum period. For many mothers, giving birth was not the end of the risk.

Clinicians warn that the gap between policy and outcomes remains wide. According to Abiy, 90pc of child deaths were preventable except those linked to underweight issues, respiratory problems and hereditary malformations. He attributed the problem in ultrasound shortage to security problems, lack of care during transport, poor health facilities and a shortage of skilled. He stated that AI-enabled ultrasounds would help midwives in crisis situations and support early care.

“Taxi-hailing companies could be given incentives during labour time to encourage them to help save lives,” he said.

Abiy observed that based on the 2030 plan, most countries, including Ethiopia, are behind schedule. Conflict, weaker external support, capacity problems and lower domestic budget allocations have slowed progress over the past two years.

“The speed of decreasing deaths in children has to accelerate by fivefold,” Abiy told Fortune.

Supreme Court Sets to Rule on CBE Executive’s Bail Fight

Justices at the Federal Supreme Court’s Appellate Bench are expected to decide whether Nuri Hussein, a senior executive in interest-free banking at the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), should remain behind bars or be released on bail as federal investigators continue an alleged corruption probe.

The ruling will determine whether a Federal High Court decision granting him bail of 200,000 Br stands, or the appeal lodged by Federal Police will keep him in custody while investigators press ahead with an inquiry reaching into loan disbursements, staff promotion allegations, bank accounts linked to Nuri’s relatives, and an internal audit report investigators allege reveales “a breach of directive” inside the Bank.

The case moved quickly through the courts. Within a week of the Federal High Court Lideta Division’s decision allowing Nuri to post bail and remain free during the investigation, the Federal Supreme Court received the case file after the Federal Police challenged the ruling. Investigators argued that releasing him could affect the inquiry. The Appellate Division registered the appeal, heard oral arguments, and set the matter down for a ruling expected this week.

Before his arrest, Nuri served as vice president of CBE Noor, the Bank’s interest-free banking division. He also worked as director of the Interest-Free Banking Department at Oromia Bank.

Investigators detained him and his secretary, Aster Ayalew, about three weeks ago at the Bank’s headquarters, on Ras Desta Damtew St., on suspicion of “abuse of office and corruption.” Both were brought before the Federal High Court’s pre-trial hearing bench, where police accused them of using “official responsibilities and institutional access to facilitate corrupt transactions.”

Federal investigators claimed that Nuri “solicited bribes” from borrowers seeking loan disbursements. They told judges that access to financing had been “made conditional on kickbacks or other benefits.” Federal police also alleged that he sought “gains from bank employees by promising promotions or career advancement in return,” an accusation investigators argued amounted to abuse of authority tied to his senior position. Aster, according to investigators, acted as an intermediary. Police alleged that “she communicated with clients, directed them to Nuri, and received kickbacks on his behalf.”

Afro Salt Processing & Manufacturing Plc has emerged as central to the ongoing investigation. Federal investigators told judges that the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) had authorised 2.9 million dollars in forex access for the company to finance expansion projects and procure construction materials from abroad. Investigators alleged that, instead of processing the authorised disbursement complying with the directive, Nuri “demanded bribes from the company and received benefits, both in cash and in kind, as a condition for facilitating access to the funds.” They also claimed that the investigation carried out “indicated that money from 300,000 Br to 3.9 million Br were allegedly received in connection with loan execution, while other suspected benefits were linked to promises of promotion for bank staff.”

Investigators have also widened the inquiry beyond CBE’s internal chain of command.

In Court, the police alleged that Nuri is “suspected of using accounts belonging to close relatives, specifically his brother and sister-in-law,” both of whom are described as businesspeople, as “channels for receiving funds connected to the case.” They attributed it to an internal audit report prepared by the CBE, claiming “it showed a breach of directive within the institution,” though the report did not identify who was responsible.

Investigators told the Court that part of their work is determining whether that breach can be attributed to Nuri, to others, or to a broader set of decisions inside the Bank.

According to investigators, the Bank had attempted to reassign “both suspects” from their positions and had even offered Aster a promotion. They said both declined the reassignment. Investigators argued that the refusal could be linked to an interest in retaining control over positions through which the alleged misconduct was carried out. They told the Court the case began after information was received about suspected irregularities and that additional information came from anti-corruption sources, particularly concerning Nuri.

Those claims were tested in open court at a hearing on March 23, 2026, before the Federal High Court Lideta Division’s pre-trial bench. The session, initially scheduled for the morning, was moved to the afternoon due to a heavy caseload. Federal Police asked for 14 more days of custody to continue the investigation.

Investigators said only a limited part of the inquiry had been completed due to workload constraints. Even so, they told the Court they had already identified 36 borrowers allegedly involved in transactions linked to the suspect and were obtaining statements from them. Police appealed to the Court that they were examining financial transactions and had requested an explanation in internal audit documents and other records from the CBE.

Two defence lawyers representing Nuri, including Aster’s lawyer, rejected the investigators’ account, arguing that their clients were not involved in any criminal conduct and that the allegations lacked sufficient evidence. They appealed to the Justices, arguing that their clients have known addresses, are unlikely to abscond, and would cooperate with investigators, making bail appropriate.

Nuri’s lawyers also contested the substance of the accusations. They argued that he lacked the authority to grant promotions within the Bank, challenging the claim that he could influence staff advancement. They also counter argued that there is “no procedure requiring a written letter from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) for loan disbursement in the manner described by investigators.” They maintained that the operational framework of interest-free banking did not support the allegations that the police have presented.

Federal Police, nevertheless, opposed bail, cautioning that Nuri’s “seniority and influence could allow him to interfere with witnesses or evidence.” Investigators told the Court he could pressure Bank staff members who agreed to testify.

A three-judge panel granted bail, also setting a 100,000 Br bond for Aster. Police objected and appealed to the Court to suspend the order. The Court accepted the request for an appeal and instructed investigators to submit their challenge formally. They did so three days later, on Thursday, and oral arguments were presented before the Federal Supreme Court the following day.

The ruling is now pending at the Supreme Court, which will decide the question of bail.

Export-Zone Ambitions Collide With a Financing Squeeze

Senior executives of the Industry Park Development Corporation (IPDC), which is converting all industrial parks into special economic zones, have pressed for deeper financial engagement, where credit remains a major constraint.

They are targeting one billion dollars in exports by next year, though the manufacturing goal has been set at 300 million dollars. Unable to recover from export market losses after the country was delisted from the African Growth & Opportunity Act (AGOA), the executives are counting on solar-cell exports, with three solar-cell exporters operating in the Hawassa Special Economic Zone, and more expected to join.

Federal government officials want to see special economic zones to drive exports, but developers argue that financing remains constrained, costly and poorly coordinated with conditions in the zones. The minimum capital requirement for special economic zone developers is set at 75 million dollars, though the authorities say they reserve the right to revise it. Even with tax relief and government support, developers complain that financing remains difficult.

Twelve industrial parks have been upgraded to special economic zone status, with 700 companies employing fewer than 100,000 people. They include four private companies (Arerti, Eastern, Huajan and George Shoe) as well as three newly designated zones, including Universal and Addis Tomorrow. The Investment Commission has licensed a sub-developer expected to have capital of 30 million dollars. Domestic investors now account for 58pc of special economic zone stakeholders, a shift officials link to changes in the lease law that allow lease payments in Birr rather than hard currency.

The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) issued a directive in January allowing bank branches to open inside economic zones, a move authorities state was intended to limit participation to no more than 20 banks. Yet only four banks – the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), Awash Bank, Enat Bank and the Cooperative Bank of Oromia (Coop Bank) – are operating inside them. Developers urged changes to certain rules and pressed banks to devise innovative financing structures.

Two weeks ago, the Corporation’s executives convened bankers, developers and officials from the NBE and the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) for a discussion held at the Skylight Hotel on Africa Avenue (Bole Road) that exposed the major problem.

Habtamu Simachew (PhD), a senior legal advisor at the Investement Commission with more than 15 years of experience in legal advisory, research, and teaching, told participants that problems have also surfaced from the NBE rules on collateral registrations. While the directive allows for more than 15 banks, some experts say only half might be eligible now. To qualify, banks should hold more than one percent market share, meet liquidity thresholds and keep a capital adequacy ratio above two percent.

According to Abera Ayalew, a deputy for regulatory affairs at the NBE, the focus is on the quality of products offered by lenders to international customers, who expect better service.

“It isn’t a one-time requirement,” Abera said. “It must be maintained.”

Mitiku Geberekidan of Anbesa Bank finds the bank-branch initiative discouraging and urged the NBE to focus on operational excellence. He called for African settlement accounts to be included in the system. Mitiku also flagged that the capital requirement is set in foreign exchange, which, together with monetary reforms, has increased loan demand from developers.

For developers, the bottlenecks extend beyond entry requirements. Debt-to-equity ratio rules have blocked developers’ access to financing, argued Hibret Lemma, a representative for the Hawassa Special Economic Zone.

“Offshore account management remains at an early stage,” he said.

Although the government insists on allowing full dividend repatriation, the experience of companies invested in these zones tells a different story. Letters of credit and other service fees can reach as high as four percent.

“These are out of line with what businesses pay in other countries,” said Hibret.

Other developers complained that telegraphic transfers, Letters of Credit, and Cash Against Document charges have risen to 10pc, increasing product costs and eroding competitiveness.

For Abebaw Laqew of the NBE, the rates may look high, but he argued that they used to run above 15pc a few years ago.

The pressure was made tangible by Teshome Beyene, a Ketran pharmaceutical manufacturing in the Qilinto Special Economic Zone. Despite securing a market for five to seven years from the Ethiopian Pharmaceuticals Service, his company is under heavy financial strain and needs a loan to cover operating costs. Yet banks continue to fall back on traditional collateral-based lending.

According to Abebaw, the intention is to push banks to compete on better services and argued that more entrants could bring prices down. He hopes that settlement in Africa may offer hope, as the NBE has begun discussions with the African Development Bank (AfDB), which has proposed a unified payment system to be implemented after approval.

The discussion unfolded as the banking industry was under the spotlight after stress tests conducted by the Central Bank found vulnerabilities requiring close supervision. Liquidity stress tests and foreign-exchange scenarios showed the industry is broadly resilient, but a few financial institutions would still come under pressure during extreme deposit withdrawals or large foreign-exchange shocks. Under a severe credit-shock scenario, four banks could fall below regulatory capital thresholds and would need 8.3 billion Br in fresh capital to restore their buffers.

Andualem Hailu (PhD), CEO of Awash Capital Investment Bank, argued that banks need stronger incentives to do business in the zones.

“Excluding the zones from the credit ceiling would improve lending,” he said.

However, Andualem questioned how attractive the special economic zone transaction business is for lenders and urged integrating importers into the zones to help supply inputs.

Despite an intact ambition, economic zones developers, bankers and policymakers left the Skylight Hotel meeting with the financing model still in dispute.

Electric Vehicle Sales Scheme Draws Expanding Fraud Probe

What began as a promise to put affordable electric cars within reach of buyers has turned into an allegedly widening criminal case that has stretched beyond one company and its founders to a circle of artists, promoters and social-media personalities accused of helping sell credibility. Daniel Yohannes, co-founder of Fintech Investment Plc, has been charged by federal prosecutors with fraud allegedly committed through computer systems. Federal Police have held him in custody since February 17, 2026, while the investigation continues.

An electric-vehicle scheme federal investigators allege drew in more than 1,430 people, collected nearly 1.7 billion Br in upfront, and used celebrity-backed promotion to persuade buyers that the offer was real. According to police, the investigation has widened because the company’s marketing machine was not incidental to the alleged scheme. Several public figures are under investigation for promoting the company through advertising campaigns and social media content that investigators allege was “exaggerated and misleading.”

Those detained at the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Bureau, on Mozambique St., near Genet Hotel, include Serawit Fikre, an advertising and film guru; Daniel Tegegn, actor and television personality; Yigerem Dejene and Solomon Bogale both actors; Abraham Gizaw, a businessman known for organising events; Mensur Jemal, a TikTok personality; and, Khalid Nasir, founder of the Wendim Khalid Foundation. According to federal investigators, the inquiry is likely to widen further as they probe how the campaign helped buyers treat the company’s claims about supply, financing, delivery and timing as credible.

Fintech Investment Plc was incorporated in 2024 by Daniel and his associate, Girmay Teklemichael, with a registered capital of seven million Birr. The company has been engaged in wholesale import and export activities, particularly in the import and sale of vehicles and spare parts. Prosecutors alleged that the lawful corporate shell was instead “used as the front for organised fraud.”

In public promotional broadcasts, Fintech Investment presented itself as the exclusive importer of BYD Seagull Flying Version electric vehicles in Ethiopia and promoted what it called an “affordable and accessible” scheme. Prospective buyers were told they could secure a vehicle by paying about half the price, around 950,000 Br, upfront, and settling the balance over five years without interest. The cars, the company claimed, would be delivered within three months. Buyers were also told they would receive a five-year insurance guarantee through Tsehay Insurance S.C., together with bank-linked financing arrangements.

According to federal prosecutors, those claims were false. They alleged that the company had no contractual relationship with the Chinese electric-vehicle manufacturer BYD, despite claiming it did, and that its promises for delivery, financing, and insurance constituted “a coordinated effort to defraud the public.” The company’s founders solicited advances from 950,000 Br to 1.8 million Br for each vehicle.

Federal prosecutors argued that credibility was manufactured as carefully as the sales pitch. In a statement posted on social media, Federal Police said people involved in promoting the scheme received BYD Song Plus vehicles, valued at about eight million Birr each, in return for their participation. According to police, investigators are trying to identify and apprehend additional suspects (artists and advertising professionals) allegedly involved in “the fraud”.

According to federal investigators, the company also tried to bolster its public image by importing 148 vehicles through Djibouti, around 100 of which were delivered to selected individuals. However, prosecutors claim the company later told media outlets that it had delivered 520 vehicles, “a figure unsupported by evidence.” Federal investigators alleged that Daniel and Girmay told clients that 400 vehicles were waiting at the Port of Djibouti for shipment when no such vehicles were there. Police claim “vehicles gathered from various sources were displayed at Meskel Square to create the impression that they had been imported by the company.”

For prosecutors, the case is not only about false promises but about repetition. They say Daniel had previously established ventures, including Hello Taxi, through which he allegedly collected advance payments of as much as 200,000 Br from more than 5,000 people, totalling over 600 million Br, without providing the promised services.

Prosecutors portray a case in which marketing, spectacle and partial delivery were used to sustain confidence and keep money coming in steadily. They have filed 19 counts of fraud based on identified victims and documented transactions, while maintaining that the total number of alleged victims is far higher. According to the police, additional suspects remain at large, including Girmay, whom they are seeking to apprehend.

Girmay had faced earlier criminal proceedings for his role in a scheme in which he collected close to 38 million Br, promising to arrange travel for Ethiopian soccer spectators to the World Cup South Africa hosted in 2010. The indictment that was filed by prosecutors disclosed that Girmay was a fugitive before he was extradited through Interpol and subsequently convicted.

Birr Holds Steady as the Foreign Currency Market Splinters

The Birr (Brewed BucK) looked calm on the surface last week.

The week opened with the Central Bank posting the highest buy quote, but it closed with Oromia Bank as the most aggressive commercial bidder and the leader on the sell side. By the end of the week, the National Bank of Ethiopia’s (NBE) buying rate was 3.44 Br above Tsehay Bank’s 152.99 Br, yet 0.55 Br below Oromia Bank’s top commercial bid.

The average buying rate moved from 153.77 Br to 153.91 Br, while the average selling rate edged up from 156.74 Br to 156.89 Br. On a simple average across 30 banks, the buying rate was 153.85 Br and the selling rate 156.82 Br. The Birr weakened by only under 0.1pc in six days.

But the averages concealed a market that was no longer moving in one line. It was fragmenting into tiers, with some banks repricing sharply, others barely moving, and the Central Bank following a pattern unlike the rest.

The decisive break came on March 26, when the average buying rate for the market jumped by almost 0.10 Br in a single day, the largest collective repricing of the week. Even then, the average understated the strain. The slight fall in the all-bank average the following day did not point to a stronger Birr. It came almost entirely from a single move by the Central Bank. Excluding it, the commercial-bank average buying rate increased every day last week.

That mattered because the Central Bank began the week as the strongest quoted buyer in the market. Through March 26, it posted a buying rate of 157.10 Br. Yet it was an outlier. Its selling rate was identical to its buying rate, leaving it with a zero spread, while every commercial bank maintained a two percent spread. Then, on March 27, the Central Bank cut its buying rate by 0.65 Br to 156.44 Br and kept it there on March 28. That was the sharpest negative adjustment recorded during the week, and it changed the market’s pecking order.

The beneficiary was Oromia Bank. It had held its buying rate at 156.99 Br for most of the week before inching it up to 157 Br on March 28. Its selling rate remained the highest throughout, rising from 160.13 Br to 160.14 Br.

For the first three days of last week, Goh Betoch Bank was the lowest buyer, posting 152.63 Br from March 23 to March 25. It then reset sharply higher to 153.44 Br on March 26. From that point, Tsehay Bank became the buyer with the lowest rate, staying at 152.99 Br through the rest of the week. The same sequence appeared on the selling side. Goh Betoch posted the lowest selling rate, 155.68 Br, for the first half of the week, before Tsehay took over at 156 Br from March 26 onward. By March 28, the distance between the highest and lowest buying quotes had widened to over 4.00 Br, from Oromia Bank’s 157 Br to Tsehay’s 152.99 Br.

The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) sat close to that lower boundary. Its buying rate moved from 153.01 Br on March 23 to 153.02 Br on March 28, a rise of only 0.015 Br over six days. While much of the market drifted up, CBE was nearly fixed. On a sticker price basis, it ended the week about 0.88 Br below the March 28 market average of 153.91 Br. That made its quoted board conservative relative to peers. In practice, banks appeared increasingly willing to offset low headline quotes with bonuses and sweeteners, making posted rates a less complete guide to bid intensity.

The fracture was also visible among the large private banks, which no longer moved as a bloc. By March 28, Wegagen Bank and Zemen Bank occupied a higher tier, with buying rates of 154.59 Br and 154.62 Br. Bank of Abyssinia sat below them, but still above the low-153 tier, at 154.26 Br. Awash Bank and Dashen Bank remained lower at 153.32 Br and 153.09 Br, respectively. The spread between the highest and lowest bidder within this group reached 1.53 Br on the final day.

Wegagen and Zemen banks looked less like temporary outliers than members of a separate pricing club. Abyssinia followed its own pattern, making the clearest jump among the big private five when its buying rate leapt by 0.43 Br on March 25 before easing into daily increments.

Elsewhere, the market was sorted into classes. Oromia Bank was the commercial pace setter, while the Central Bank was the administrative outlier. Premium private banks, notably Wegagen, Zemen, and, to a lesser degree, Abyssinia, kept buying rates above the market average and most of their peers.

Then came the late repricers and catch-up movers. Ahadu Bank’s buying rate increased by 0.89 Br on March 26, marking the week’s largest positive repricing. Goh Betoch Bank jumped by 0.81 Br on the same day. Berhan Bank followed with a 0.55 Br increase on March 27. Addis Bank moved by 0.38 Br on March 26 and by another 0.16 Br on March 28. The state policy bank, the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), made its main move earlier, with a 0.38 Br increase on March 24. ZamZam surged by 0.50 Br on March 26, only to reverse 0.32 Br a day later. Bunna Bank also belonged to this broader class of one-off movers.

At the other extreme sat the near-fixed quoters.

Tsehay, NIB, Dashen, Sinqee, and, by behaviour if not by ownership, the CBE, all acted as low-posting anchors. Gadaa and Hijra banks remained unchanged throughout the week, while Nib and Tsehay were also effectively frozen.

The anomalies ran in several directions at once, as the Central Bank’s zero-spread quote and Oromia Bank’s persistence at the top of the sell rankings and eventual capture of the top buy ranking. Wegagen’s and Zemen’s refusal to converge with Awash and Dashen banks, and the divide between banks that moved by less than one hundredth of a Birr and those that repriced by half a Birr or more.

The week’s main message was structural, not directional, as the Central Bank no longer dominated pricing leadership. Neither were the large private banks acting as a coherent bloc. CBE’s board rate was low enough to require bonuses to stay competitive. The Brewed Buck did not simply weaken. It splintered into tiers. That was what made Oromia Bank’s move through 157 Br, and the Central Bank’s retreat to 156.44 Br, the defining markers of the week.

Agricultural Insurance Coverage Remains Low as New Initiatives Roll Out

The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Association of Ethiopian Insurers have launched two new initiatives focusing on agricultural insurance. The initiatives were announced at a CEO Forum convened by the Ministry of Agriculture with support from UNDP and the Association of Ethiopian Insurers.

A one-year Knowledge to Action Accelerator Programme will train participants in product design, risk modelling, pricing, data management, and claims calculation. The programme will focus on Area Yield Index Insurance and Weather Index Insurance, with pilot prototypes planned in parts of Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray Regioanl States.

In parallel, the Association of Ethiopian Insurers will establish a multipurpose risk-sharing platform to improve data access, market coordination, and reinsurance solutions, supporting product innovation and sector growth.

An Actuarial Capacity Fund will run for two years to build local expertise through scholarships and talent development, backed by an initial 50,000 dollars contribution from BMZ and UNDP under the UNDP-Milliman Global Actuarial Initiative.

Agriculture accounts for about 32pc of Ethiopia’s GDP, while insurance penetration remains below 0.4pc, underscoring the sector’s growth potential. The initiatives fall under a partnership launched in November 2025 between the Ministry of Agriculture, the Association of Ethiopian Insurers, and UNDP, with additional backing from the Gates Foundation and the German government.

The forum brought together industry leaders to align on agricultural insurance as a tool for resilience, food security, and financial inclusion.