BALLOTS LOOM YOUTH LOOK AWAY

Posted on February 22, 2026February 25, 2026 by Digital Editor

The approaching national election is unfolding in a subdued atmosphere, especially among younger voters for whom politics barely intrudes. What once animated streets and campuses now passes as background noise, even as the official timetable promises new national momentum. For many, voting has become a convenience, fitted around work if it does not demand too much sacrifice. Others will cast ballots as a duty stripped of hope, in a climate where political communication feels technical, remote and pitched to experts rather than ordinary voters.

Survey data gathered by this newspaper from 142 respondents aged 18 to 30 captures that cooling mood. Some say they will support whichever party addresses jobs, inflation and the cost of living and rejects “ethnic politics,” yet concede they feel little choice. Others have opted out altogether, arguing that the electoral ecosystem is too narrow for parties beyond the governing one and that agendas and policies are thin. They complain that personalities overshadow substance, research is scarce and inclusiveness limited, leading them to view campaigns as emotional propaganda rather than an effort to change the country. Their scepticism is rooted partly in a highly contested election two decades ago that ended in violence and mass arrests, reinforcing the sense that power shifts more readily through force than through ballots.

Election authorities insist preparations are moving ahead. Polling stations are being categorised into green, yellow, and red zones based on security risk. Officials see most areas in Oromia Regional State fall into the green category, while Amhara Regional State contains stations in all three, and reported that Tigray Regional State has yet to provide updates on safety and displacements. According to electoral officials, security investigations will continue until the end, and they caution that conditions can change even in areas considered safe. The total number of polling stations has not yet been announced, but in the previous elections, 38.2 million voters were registered, 34 million ballots were cast, and 49,407 polling stations were used. Close to 169 civil society organisations have registered to observe, and foreign observers are being invited by the Foreign Ministry.

The depth and meaning of youth disengagement remain contested. Some civil society figures argue that it should not be read as a settled rejection of elections, noting that many young people are first-time voters and pointing to representation gaps, including a mismatch between candidate ages and the youth. Opposition party insiders offer a bleaker assessment, warning that a democratic election is not expected and that “youth disillusionment” is rooted in disputed contests, the cost of living and blurred lines between party and state, which critics say should be clearly separated. In Tigray Regional State, some fear that renewed conflict could again prevent elections and leave voters without parliamentary representation, while weak infrastructure and war damage constrain outreach to younger citizens. However, analysts link youth disinterest to broader disabling factors, the lack of sustained peace and credible security guarantees, and describe the “deafening” silence from candidates as a manifestation of a process lacking urgency and visible contestation.

Elections Coming But Young Voters Ghost the Ballots

Posted on February 22, 2026March 11, 2026 by Digital Editor

The national election is approaching with a strangely muted face. What once stirred streets, campuses, and café arguments now passes many young Ethiopians as background noise.

For some, the vote barely exists in their daily routines, despite an official timetable that promises a shift in national momentum.

Rahel Murka, 31, only learned about the election a few days ago. Nearly three months remain until polling day, yet movements from political parties, voters and the national electoral board feel quieter than in previous cycles.

For Rahel, participation is less a civic ritual than a logistical calculation. She plans to vote only if it fits around her work schedule, as she did last time.

A survey conducted by this newspaper among nearly 150 respondents aged 18 to 30 captures that cooling mood. Interest in the election represented 33pc. Of the 142 respondents, 46.5pc are not planning to vote, 26pc have not yet decided and 26pc intend to vote.

Election-related information is among the least followed topics. Close to 40pc are not tracking political news, and a majority rely on social media for whatever politics they encounter.

The survey mirrors Rahel’s habits. She has low exposure to major broadcasting platforms and relies on social media as her primary source. For her, voting is a question of convenience.

“I won’t be willing to sacrifice more than what it takes,” she told Fortune.

Unlike Rahel, others speak of duty, but without hope.

Samson Kassahun, 23, known as Simon to his friends, will vote because he feels he should, not because he expects change.

“I didn’t see hope in the election from my family and friends,” he said. “Everyone has given up.”

This will be the second time he votes. But, he barely remembers the last and felt it as almost forced.

Samson has lived in the Gofa area. He does not see the current atmosphere resembling an election season. The communication he notices is jargon-filled and addressed to experts rather than citizens. Only a few parties have promoted their social media accounts, and even those efforts, he felt, were limited and remote.

“It feels like communication between experts, not to me,” he said.

A public health graduate, he has refused to work in his field due to low pay. Most opportunities are in rural areas where limited infrastructure makes life difficult. His expectations are direct. Satisfactory job opportunities and taming inflation and curtailing living costs. He says he will vote for a party where citizens’ politics are prioritised over “ethnic politics” and insists this distinction will guide his choice.

For Rahel and Samson, voting is not new. Yet among poll respondents, 56.3pc have never voted. In a country where the majority of the population is young, not being registered signals withdrawal from national undertakings.

Even among those who follow the election, attention remains uneven. For many, election information is the least-watched part of their news diet, even when they scroll through political content. Social media, the main channel for most respondents, does not provide the shared rhythm of broadcast schedules and can leave people with fragments rather than a clear timeline of registration, candidates and rules.

Rahel’s late discovery of the election uncovers that gap. Samson, by contrast, knows the vote is coming but sees little that addresses his age group or immediate concerns.

Between these profiles sit the undecided 26pc and the larger bloc of non-participants, the 46.5pc who say they are not planning to vote.

These figures pose a blunt question about what it takes to turn a formal timetable into a public event. In that space, convenience, fatigue and distrust compete with civic language, and the election risks becoming background noise rather than a contested moment over the country’s direction.

Some political parties have begun social media campaigns, including the incumbent Prosperity Party (PP). Role shifts are visible.

The Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, a.k.a. EZEMA in its Amharic acronym, led by Brehanu Nega (PhD), is urging the public to take part in the process, while the governing party is asking to be retained in office. Among those who say they will not vote, 42pc cite lack of trust in the electoral process, about 30pc believe their voice does not matter, and 29pc dislike the candidates.

For Endale Kebede, a 38-year-old research and marketing development officer, disengagement is deliberate. Born in Shero Meda, a neighbour of Addis Abeba, and living there for nearly three decades, this election no longer matters to him. He insisted his decision is an informed judgment grounded in his college studies of political science.

He pointed to what he called a narrow electoral ecosystem that does not fully support parties other than the governing one.

“It doesn’t even fulfil election standards,” he said.

Endale argued that parties are campaigning only in neighbouring areas, limiting exposure and reducing their chances of winning.

“Agendas and policies lack clear presentation,” he told Fortune. “Personalities overshadow substance, research is thin, and inclusiveness within communities is limited.”

Endale has voted three times. Even though he understands the implications of abstaining, he has chosen to sit this one out.

“All I am seeing is emotional election propaganda based on opposing each other, not a sincere desire to change the country,” he said.

Endale reads recent history as proof that political power has changed hands more through bullets than ballots.

An election two decades ago is still remembered as the most contested Ethiopia had seen, yet even that process was disrupted. An opposition party, Coalition for Unity & Democracy (CUD, known in the local parlance as “Qinijit”, claimed to have won several seats that the ruling EPRDF conceded. But the results were later mired by violent conflicts, leading to security forces killing close to 200 people in Addis Abeba, and the mass arrest and later trial of opposition leaders, including Brehanu Nega (PhD).

Six national elections have been conducted since the constitutional order was installed in the mid-1990s. The last was postponed due to the COVID pandemic and later held under the ruling party, which changed from the EPRDF to the Prosperity Party, led by Abiy Ahmed (PhD).

Elections are meant to empower citizens while holding political parties vying for office accountable. Yet for the past five years, political parties have had almost no public voice until election season reappeared. Due to conflict during the last cycle, the Tigray Regional State did not vote and has not been represented in the federal legislative houses.

For Endale, this confirms his conviction that his voice will not matter. Some of the political figures who voiced concerns are now in prison, many of them public figures, including members of opposition parties in the federal legislature.

According to officials at the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), preparations are moving forward. The Chairperson, Melatework Hailu, university students are being assessed as part of a broader registration analysis, and the regional electoral stations have been categorised into green, yellow, and red areas, mirroring their security risk.

Green refers to areas deemed very safe and fully eligible to hold elections; yellow covers sensitive or unstable areas; red refers to high-risk areas where elections will not be conducted.

Melatework disclosed that “most areas” in the Oromia Regional State fall under the green category, while the Amhara Regional State includes stations in all three. According to the Chairperson, Tigray Regional State has yet to provide updates on safety and displacement following the Board’s request.

“The safety and security investigation will continue until the very end,” she said at a press briefing she gave at Skylight Hotel off the Africa Avenue (Bole Road), on February 12, 2026. “Anything can happen at any given moment, even in areas considered safe.”

However, the total number of polling stations for the upcoming election has yet to be announced, leaving the scale of the operation incomplete. If the previous election serves as any guide, 38.2 million voters were registered, where 34 million ballots were cast in 49,407 polling stations.

No fewer than 169 civil society organisations, including the Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organisations (CEHRO), have registered to observe the electoral process. With the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, foreign observers are being invited to monitor the election.

Civil society and party officials debate how deep youth rejection runs and what drives it.

For Mesud Gebeyehu, executive director of CEHRO, youth disengagement is not an evidence-based rejection of elections. Many young people are eligible voters for the first time, and he warned that they are increasingly absorbing biases from social media. He also blamed the lack of representation.

“Political party candidates currently don’t match the age profile of the youth,” he told Fortune.

When elections take place, youth form the bulk of voters; when instability follows, they also bear the consequences. Delayed party activities and a visible coldness toward the election, Mesud said, mean civil society organisations and the election board should double down on their efforts.

Mestawet Semegn, head of the women and youth league of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), an organisation with a storied past, does not expect a democratic election. She attributed “youth disillusionment” over the elections to a disputed electoral contest two decades ago and the disappointment that followed.

“What is worse than this?” she asked. “It should be no surprise.”

Mestawet see youth mortality and migration have increased in recent years, and that many young people are leaving the country in search of a decent life, driven by the rising cost of living at home.

She flagged the struggles of civil servants allegedly pressured to vote for the ruling party, along with claims that safety net allocations are used for political purposes.

“Party and government have to be separated,” she said.

In Tigray Regional State, which did not vote in the previous elections for the federal legislative houses, fears of renewed disruption persist.

“If there is a war between the interim Administration and Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), we may not have the chance to hold elections,” said Berehane Atsebeha, communication head of Salsay Weyane, one of the opposition parties active in the region.

He feared losing parliamentary representation again. He argued that the current leadership leaves little space for youth, even though they carry the heaviest burden.

“Outreach to young people in the region has been constrained by weak infrastructure and the collapse of telecommunications systems during the war,” he told Fortune.

Even though a population census has not been conducted in almost two decades, estimates from the World Bank place a median age around 20, and roughly 73.9 million people are expected to be 18 and above in 2025.

For analysts, a growing youth disinterest comes from underrepresentation within political parties and the absence of an equal playing field. Young people, they argue, are among the most affected by political decisions, yet often feel excluded from meaningful participation and leadership roles.

For some of the political commentators interviewed, the methodological gaps in this newspaper’s survey resulted from shortcomings in data collection and analysis. They argue the survey could have been more comprehensive and better categorised, particularly in its identification of the geographic distribution of respondents.

Others questioned the timing, claiming that surveys conducted before candidates begin active mobilisation may miss shifts in awareness or engagement.

Officials of NEBE declined to comment.

Solomon Kassahun recalled one of his teachers saying that extreme politics deters professionalism. Using a mathematical metaphor, he characterised the ideal relationship as asymptote lines that move in the same direction but never intersect.

He observed that several young people perceive political parties and the government as interchangeable, shaped by years of exposure to systems in which the distinction is unclear. The sentiment that “what I do doesn’t matter” becomes widespread, he argued, not only in Ethiopia but across parts of Africa.

Although civics and ethics are included in school curricula, he argued that these subjects are often taught as abstract definitions rather than practical disciplines. With economic concerns dominating daily life and media consumption driven by entertainment, political engagement can feel distant.

“Repetition becomes identity,” he said, arguing that consistent messaging shapes collective attitudes. “Politics should strive for collaboration and mutual benefit rather than zero-sum competition, but activism is often conflated with ethnic identity rather than constructive civic participation.”

For political analysts, being exposed to the consequences without having any meaningful part in the process makes disinterest unsurprising. Ongoing violence in multiple regional states, combined with pressures from neighbouring states, adds to uncertainty, while unemployment, rising migration, and inflation dominate daily concerns.

Ayenew Birhanu (PhD), an assistant professor of political science and international relations with more than two decades of experience, traced youth disinterest to “disabling factors for an equal playing ground”, chief among them the lack of sustained peace and credible guarantees for security.

For Ayenew said the broader atmosphere may itself be shaping perception.

“The silence from candidates is deafening,” he said.

He attributed subdued outreach from political actors and media institutions to a process without urgency or genuine contestations.

For many young people, Ayenew observed, democracy feels like a luxury, an abstract ideal rather than a lived experience.

“What ultimately deters many young people is a fading sense of possibility after cycles of unrest, unmet promises, and limited structural change,” Ayenew told Fortune. “Rebuilding engagement requires restoring peace, ensuring credible institutional guarantees, and creating an environment where political competition is fair and visible.”

For Ayenew and other political analysts, it is when young people see tangible evidence that participation can influence outcomes that disinterest begins to give way to civic involvement.

Young Voters Logged In, Tuned Out

Posted on February 22, 2026February 25, 2026 by Digital Editor

The next general election, pencilled in for June 2026, remains distant, yet among its plugged-in youth a quiet verdict is forming.

A digital poll of 142 respondents, mostly aged 22 to 30, conducted by this newspaper, finds that fewer than three in 10 intend to vote. Nearly half plan to stay home. In a country that must swap bullets for ballots, that statistic can be viewed as more than a curiosity. It should be a warning light on the dashboard of political discourse within a peaceful, legal and institutional framework.

Granted, the sample is neither scientific nor nationally representative. It is self-selected and skewed toward urban and internet-savvy Ethiopians. However, precisely for that reason, its findings matter. If the cohort most connected to information and opportunity is shrugging at the electoral franchise, the political class faces trouble.

Ironically, knowledge does not seem to be the problem. Close to 67pc of respondents say they know the date of the coming election, and 43pc rate their grasp of the process as “good” or “very good.” The rest called their understanding “fair” (23.9pc), “poor” (22.5pc) or “very poor” (10.6pc). Ignorance is not driving apathy. Disillusion does.

Nearly two-thirds admit they are “not very interested” or “not interested at all.” Close to 26.8pc say they will vote, the same share are undecided, and 46.5pc already intend to skip polling day. Only 12pc categorised themselves as “very interested” and another 21.8pc as “somewhat interested.”

For many, abstention is habitual. About 56.3pc have never voted in any election. Given the concentration in early adulthood, that should be unsurprising. It does mean that more than half lack a lived memory of filing into a booth, inking a finger and feeling represented. The democratic ritual has never become routine.

Why does the habit not take?

Among those uninterested or unsure, 43.7pc cite distrust of the process. Another 30.3pc doubt their vote counts. Fully 29.6pc dislike the candidates or parties on offer, while 16.9pc admit they are “not informed enough.” Smaller minorities noted safety concerns (5.6pc) or said elections do not affect their lives (3.5pc).

In mature democracies, double-digit distrust alarms pollsters. Here, nearly half place mistrust at the centre of their indifference. Only two respondents (1.4pc) profess enthusiasm because they “trust the election process.” Among those engaged, motives differ. Close to 23pc want to shape the country’s future, and another 23pc see voting as a civic duty. The democratic impulse survives in personal responsibility, but confidence in the system has drained away.

The cohort’s information diet deepens the challenge. An eye-catching 83.1pc rely mainly on social media for political news. Television is cited by 24.6pc, newspapers by 16.9pc, and radio by 8.5pc. Nearly a fifth lean on friends and family, and 11.3pc ignore politics altogether. Platforms that democratise information also amplify cynicism, rewarding outrage over nuance and ensuring that every procedural blunder or incendiary sound-bite is screen-shot, memed and litigated in real time.

For sceptical young Ethiopians, the endless churn can harden into fatalism. Nothing changes, why bother?

The poll is not monochrome. A small subsample of 18 respondents, conducted in Amharic, tilted the other way. In this group, 94.4pc are men aged 26 to 30, 72.2pc rate their process knowledge highly and a majority show keenness to participate. Some 56pc say they will vote. This may be the profile of party activists or campaign volunteers, already embedded in political structures. If so, youth politics is polarised. A small and highly engaged minority is defining an electoral outcome for a much larger and quietly cynical majority.

The risk is that the forthcoming election will be shaped chiefly by those already mobilised, while many others watch the drama through glowing screens, doom-scrolling past results they helped neither to win nor to legitimise.

For the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), led by Melatworq Hailu, political parties and civil-society groups, the implications should be uncomfortably clear. The trust deficit cannot be bridged by voter-education jingles alone. Young Ethiopians know the date, but they doubt the integrity. Transparent voter registration, swift dispute resolution and regular, granular communication are essential. Every opacity will confirm suspicions in a population where almost half already assume the game is rigged.

Political choice also looks stale as nearly 30pc complain that none of the parties or candidates appeal. Line-ups that recycle familiar faces and slogans will fail to persuade a generation raised on personalised feeds and global comparisons. Ethiopian politics needs fresh personalities and new ideas as urgently as it needs clean vote counting.

A smaller but telling share of respondents cite safety concerns or the belief that elections do not touch daily life. For citizens in conflict-affected regions or precarious urban jobs, these are rational fears. Polling should be secure, and the benefits of political stability (jobs, services, and rights) should travel beyond the capital’s corridor projects. Otherwise, elections remain distant spectacles.

Media outlets, too, have homework. Only one in six respondents lists newspapers as a primary source, yet the mainstream media remains where agenda-setting and fact-checked reporting are most likely to occur. Bridging the gulf between legacy journalism and the feeds that command youth attention will demand new formats, languages and partnerships.

None of this meant to doom the 2026 election. The same poll that uncovers scepticism also reveals reservoirs of civic commitment. More than a third of interested respondents are driven by a wish to influence Ethiopia’s direction or to fulfil a duty. Such instincts can be nurtured, but only if leaders treat young Ethiopians not as applause lines about “the youth” but as critical, data-literate citizens who have drawn their own conclusions.

Opinion polls, especially informal online ones, offer snapshots, not verdicts. The survey by this newspaper does not claim to speak for every wereda or campus. Yet the image it captures, of a generation highly connected, modestly informed, deeply sceptical and weakly attached to the ballot box, should concentrate minds in party headquarters and election-board offices alike.

Democracy is not a date on the calendar. It is a habit of participation. Right now, too many young Ethiopians are logged in but tuned out. Unless those numbers shift, the country risks staging a contest that is technically successful yet politically hollow, certified on paper but questioned in the feeds that matter most.

Scepticism, though deep, need not be destiny. Electorates elsewhere have switched from apathy to energy within a semester, and Ethiopia’s could too. A debate streamed on the social-media feeds used by 83.1pc of respondents, a newcomer speaking plainly about security and work, or a release of precinct tallies could upend assumptions. The poll’s 26.8pc of fence-sitters is an electorate within the electorate, bigger than the core of many parties. Converting them requires more than slogans. Politicians should tie promises to the arithmetic of rent, wages and safety and show how they will keep them.

For the Election Board, the job may seem easier to describe than to do. But, build transparency one document at a time. Publish rolls, explain how challenges are handled, and post rulings before rumours bloom. In a sample where 43.7pc already doubt the process, silence sounds like confession. Speed matters too. A day’s lag in declaring figures may look like manipulation on a phone screen.

Time remains, yet not much. Algorithms compress attention spans and spread outrage faster than corrections. If improvements arrive late, they may pass unnoticed. Ethiopia’s young are watching, waiting to learn whether anyone is listening.

Judges Reject Bid by Lawyers to Freeze Controversial VAT Directive

Posted on February 22, 2026February 25, 2026 by Digital Editor

A legal battle over who should register for value-added tax (VAT) has widened inside the legal profession, but it is tightening in court.

A bid by 89 lawyers to stop a tax directive that compels legal professionals and other service providers to register for VAT regardless of income level has been rejected by the Federal High Court. The ruling leaves the directive in force against the newly joined applicants, even as seven earlier plaintiffs remain temporarily shielded from its enforcement.

The dispute followed the Ministry of Finance’s shift from the turnover tax regime to VAT for professional services. Lawyers and other service providers are compelled to register within one month of their approval. The Ministry casts this as routine tax administration that should apply consistently. The challengers claim it is a legal overreach that forces VAT registration regardless of earnings.

The case began on November 6, 2025, when seven lawyers (Mebtayehu Alehagn, Mewal Berhe, Thomas H. Michael, Mesfin Beyene, Roba Tsegaye, Hailu Hasena and Yonas Woldeyes) filed suit at the Federal High Court. They appealed before a three-judge panel to suspend the directive, arguing that enforcement would cause “irreparable harm.” They also argued that the Ministry lacked legal authority to issue the directive, that it violates the Constitution, the VAT law and administrative procedures, and that enforcement should be halted until the court rules on legality.

The Ministry’s legal team, led by Abraham Rega, opposed the appeal, arguing that the directive was already in force. Suspending it, the Ministry’s lawyer claims, would not benefit the plaintiffs because VAT is paid by clients who receive legal services, not by the lawyers who provide them. It warned that suspending the directive, even for a limited group, would reduce government revenue and conflict with the wider public interest.

“The directive applies to many professional service providers, not only lawyers,” said the defendant. “The seven plaintiffs represented only a small portion of those affected.”

The Federal High Court, nonetheless, ordered that enforcement be suspended for the seven initial plaintiffs until a final judgment is issued, while leaving the directive in place for everyone else. The injunction created a narrow exception within a policy the government insisted should operate uniformly, without settling the underlying legality dispute.

The Ministry appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. It argued that the High Court had erred by suspending a directive that was already being implemented and had failed to weigh the consequences. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal, finding that the High Court’s temporary injunction was not a final judgment and therefore could not be reviewed at that stage.

That denial encouraged other lawyers to seek similar relief by intervening in the ongoing case. The intervening applicants organised themselves in clusters, including 57 lawyers under Thomas Berhane, 19 under Mulu Tesfa, four under Tsegaye Tesfaye, five under Mantegbosh Ayele, and others, including Mezimur Tenker and Sisay Eshetu, bringing the total to 89. They petitioned that the directive also be suspended in their favour until the High Court issues a final decision on the merits.

The Ministry opposed their request and called it “an attempt to win, through interim orders,” what should be decided at the end of the case.

“Administrative directives remain valid and enforceable unless and until a court formally revokes them,” said the Ministry’s lawyer. “Actions taken under them continue to have effect even if a directive is later struck down. Staying enforcement for a new group would ignore legislative intent and invite selective compliance.”

The lawyers warned that if filing a case could suspend enforcement, parties would be tempted to litigate as a delay tactic rather than a test of legality. Judicial review, they said, would risk becoming a tool of obstruction that disadvantages those who comply. The Ministry’s legal team, including Havana Hordofa and Abraham Rega, argued that frequent temporary injunctions weaken stability and predictability in administrative law and erode public confidence, particularly in taxation and public finance, where consistent application is central to policy.

The newly joined plaintiffs repeated the core argument made by the initial seven. They claimed that continued enforcement would cause them “irreparable harm.” They sought the same interim protection while the underlying challenge moves through the courts.

A three-judge panel again heard the matter. By a majority, Judges Yesuf Mohamed and Zenebe Gebrehiwot rejected the application. Their reasoning turned on timing written into the directive itself. Lawyers were required to register within one month of its approval. That period had passed, and the directive had already begun to be enforced against the applicants. In those circumstances, the Judges held, suspending enforcement now would not operate retroactively and could not undo obligations that had already taken effect.

Judge Kedir Idris dissented, arguing that the directive should be suspended for the newly joined plaintiffs if they were prepared to deposit a financial guarantee to cover any potential liability should they ultimately lose the case. His view did not carry the day, and the request was denied by majority vote.

With their attempt at temporary relief blocked, the 89 lawyers have signalled they plan to take the matter to the Federal Supreme Court.

Outside the courtroom, the directive continues to shape daily compliance practices for lawyers and other service providers, even as the High Court has yet to rule on validity.

Authority Widens Narcotics Controls in Bid to Shut Down Diversion Networks

Posted on February 22, 2026February 25, 2026 by Digital Editor

Federal drug authorities have rewritten the rules on how narcotic and psychotropic medicines move through the health system, tightening control from the moment a shipment enters the country to the point a tablet is prescribed, dispensed, stored or destroyed.

A directive issued in December 2025 by the Ethiopian Food & Drug Authority (EFDA) and public for nearly two months replaced a regime built around serial-numbered prescription pads with a framework that extends accountability along the entire supply chain and sharply raises the penalties for non-compliance. Under the revised rules, the Authority’s supervision explicitly covers manufacturing, import and export, and the storage and destruction of controlled medicines.

Enforcement powers are expanded, with inspectors entering facilities to audit stock levels, suspend licenses, confiscate medicines, and take cases to court. Trafficking, illegal possession and misuse of controlled medicines are treated as criminal offences. Medicines needed for legitimate treatment remain available through a special licensing system backed by prescriptions and documentation specifying dosage and quantity.

According to the Authority’s officials, the tougher position is driven by continued misuse and diversion of opioids and benzodiazepines. A national list for psychotropic substances and narcotic drugs, released in 2024, already limits which facilities may dispense them, restricting narcotic drugs more tightly than psychotropic medicines. Even so, higher-grade narcotics are reported on the black market and at social gatherings.

The directive introduces structural changes for pharmacies, requiring those that handle controlled medicines to separate storage, registry systems, and accountability mechanisms from ordinary pharmaceutical services. Facilities are required to obtain specific competency certification from EFDA and comply with stricter authorisation and monitoring requirements. However, several pharmacy operators told Fortune that while paper-prescription controls have been in place, they were unaware of the expanded responsibilities introduced by the new directive.

There are reports that milder narcotics are described as relatively easy to obtain illegally, while stronger opioids remain harder to find but still circulate through contraband and unregistered supplies.

According to Tolessa Gemeda, an executive at the Authority’s Narcotic & Psychotropic Medicine Control Desk, the directive is designed to close the gaps that allow legally imported medicines to slip into illicit markets.

“It aims to strengthen accountability and reduce diversion,” he told Fortune.

People familiar with the sector blame weaknesses within formal health institutions, including cases in which interns have been able to prescribe controlled medicines with limited oversight. Regulators and industry sources also point to procurement-stage manipulation, alleging that some licensed importers and healthcare institutions misrepresent quantities and perform minor surgical procedures requiring narcotics.

However, the system’s most fragile point may be the supply.

According to Kerod Niku, who has worked as an anaesthetist at the Black Lion Hospital, facilities with the highest demand for controlled medicines face constraints and often depend on low-cost alternatives.

“If large public hospitals struggle to secure adequate supplies,” he said, “smaller providers face even greater challenges.”

Clinicians and pharmacy experts warn that a heavier compliance burden, including additional documentation, separate storage, and tighter authorisation, could slow access to essential medicines, particularly for pain management and palliative (pacifying) care.

The human consequences of this tension emerge in personal accounts.

A 25-year-old tour guide began using Tramadol in 2021 while at university to cope with anxiety. A packet once cost 25 to 30 Br and today sells for 50 to 70 Br. He recalled opioids entering the country through Moyale and the border with Somalia without prescriptions and being distributed through informal networks that use Telegram channels. He obserevd women appear more susceptible to dependency, often taking Tramadol during their monthlies and combining it with soft drinks to ease cramps without medical guidance.

The directive attempts to address such personal risks and the system-level leakages that feed them. It decentralises enforcement by assigning regional regulatory bodies responsibility for monitoring manufacturing, importation and usage in their jurisdictions, with reports consolidated at the national level and submitted to the International Narcotics Control Board.

EFDA retains the authority to audit facilities, suspend licenses, confiscate controlled medicines and take offenders to court.

For cross-border movement, the Authority allows visitors to bring controlled medicines into the country if they present prescriptions, medical history and prior approval specifying the medicine type, dosage and duration. The directive also introduces a personal-use provision allowing patients to bring up to a three-month supply of prescribed narcotic or psychotropic medicines without an EFDA permit, with medicines verified at entry points rather than automatically confiscated.

It also allows special approvals to import unregistered and emergency medicines, including cancer treatments, ICU sedatives and rare drugs, based on Ministry of Health requests and supporting quality and origin certificates.

Whether these safeguards will curb abuse without cutting off access remains an open question.

Dawit Wondimagegn (MD), an associate professor of psychiatry at Addis Abeba University’s School of Medicine, believes the directive’s impact will depend on execution. He warned that stricter documentation could unintentionally reduce access to opioid pain relief, particularly for palliative care patients.

“Management gaps and involuntary pharmaceutical assistance contribute to weaknesses in drug control implementation,” he said. “The real test will be the capacity of regional regulators to enforce the rules without disrupting supply.”

Melese Alemnew, a senior pharmacy practice specialist, commends the flexibility to cases such as clinical trials. He echoed concerns that tighter prescription controls could delay access to critical pain medications. He nonetheless supported the guideline limiting prescriptions to one controlled drug per form.

“It reduces the risk that forged prescriptions will be used to obtain multiple medicines,” he told Fortune.

Leather Export Machine Being Regulated into Retreat

Posted on February 22, 2026February 25, 2026 by Digital Editor

The leather industry, once the second-largest export earner, is edging toward collapse. Industry officials say only a few tanneries operate nationwide, down from 35 a few years ago, and leaders of the Ethiopian Leather Industries Association (ELIA) warn that a sector once employing tens of thousands is shrinking fast.

Ethiopia has many millions of cattle, sheep and goats, making it one of Africa’s largest livestock producers. In 2021, its livestock produced about 41 million pieces of hides and skins. Only 22 million pieces, roughly half, reached tanneries, amounting to about 138 million square feet of leather. The rest was lost due to smuggling, spoilage or poor handling.

At its peak, the industry generated between 110 million and 130 million dollars in export earnings. Last year, it brought in only 30 million dollars. About 40pc of the previously recorded export revenue was lost after six tanneries shut down in connection with the Addis Abeba riverside project and the city’s environmental-protection drive. The affected factories included plants in Dire Dawa, Batu, HAFDE, Addis Abeba and Blue Nile leathers.

In the past two years, five tanneries have suspended operations, many of them tied to the Addis Abeba riverside project.

Launched in 2019, the project lies at the centre of the dispute. City officials, including Mayor Adanech Abiebie, presented it as an effort to enhance competitiveness and make the capital more attractive. Work on the project stalled for several years and resumed in 2024, coinciding with mounting pressure on tanneries along the river corridors. The plan envisions development along the Entoto-Bantyeqetu- Peacock–Karamara Bridge and Kebena Ginfile corridors and the Gurdumi riverside. Environmental regulators accuse several tanneries of dumping untreated waste into these waterways, and the city has used those charges to justify fines, closures and tighter scrutiny of factories that have operated for decades.

Addis Abeba Tannery, the country’s first, has become a focal point of the industry’s troubles.

Founded by two Armenian businessmen, the plant sits near the Gefersa River and has faced complaints that its discharges contaminate the water. The Tannery’s advisor, Yeheyis Asfaw, disclosed the company was fined 300,000 Br last April by the Addis Ketema District for discharging waste to the river. The factory has since stopped operations and laid off most of its workers. The Tannery once employed about 460 staff and processed nearly 450 hides a day. Only 60 workers remain.

The Management is trying to shift to activities that require less water and fewer chemicals, as it struggles with waste disposal, a lack of working capital, and accumulated debt. The plant, nationalised under the military government and later turned into a share company, is now at risk of closure.

According to the Association President Zelalem Merawi, who signed a five-year cooperation agreement with Trade & Fairs Consulting of Germany to strengthen and internationalise the All African Leather Fair, complying with environmental standards requires huge capital. He argued that the issue is not whether to protect the environment but how rules are enforced, and that instead of suddenly shutting long-established firms, the authorities should help them reduce pollution and shift to eco-friendly practices.

“Closing large employers will harm both the sector and the country,” Zelalem, who is also the CEO of Ker Ezhi Leather Manufacturing Plc, told Fortune.

The federal government’s response is to move production out of the capital and into a planned leather city in Modjo, 75Km south-east of Addis Abeba in Oromiya Regional State. Currently, out of the 11 tanneries in operation, seven operate in Modjo, while the remaining three are in the capital.

According to Zerihun Abebe, lead executive for Export Products at the Ministry of Industry, the town of Modjo was chosen “because many tanneries are already located” there. Officials say they plan to provide a common sewage system and treatment plant so factories can operate without polluting the environment, and to relocate closed tanneries in Addis Abeba.

The leather city is designed to cover a 174hct, an area equivalent to 250 football fields. The government and partners have allocated nearly 86 million dollars to develop the site and build the water-treatment plant. However, some industry veterans question the pace and sequencing of the policy.

Alem Asfaw, a veteran of the leather industry, supported the idea of compliant tanneries but questioned the way the city administration is going about it.

“These factories were established with huge capital and contribute to the country,” said Alem. “They should be given sufficient time to comply with environmental standards.”

Halting tanneries immediately and offering Modjo Leather City as a solution even before construction has started, he warned, will severely affect the industry.

Alem, who once managed Ethiopia Tannery, also pointed to structural weaknesses that reach back along the value chain. According to him, the industry faces problems across livestock farming to leather harvesting due to the lack of an institution to monitor the sector. Agriculture used to manage the industry before it was industrialised, but he believes it is difficult to control it solely through agriculture.

“There should be an independent institution to oversee and regulate the leather sector,” he said.

According to data from the Leather & Leather Product Industry Research & Development Centre, the country loses over 240 million square feet of leather each year, at a cost of around one billion Birr. In 2020/21, the sector earned 40 million dollars, down from 133 million dollars five years earlier, a 70pc drop, and over the decade starting in 2012, earnings from tanneries fell by 84pc while export volumes declined by 62pc.

Undersubscribed Dollar Auction Delivers a Rare Birr Rebound

Posted on February 22, 2026February 23, 2026 by Digital Editor

Central Bank Governor Eyob Tekalegn (PhD) spent last week signalling he was ready to spend currency to steady the Birr, the “Brewed Buck”, and defend the narrow corridor in which it traded. His tool is front-loaded auctions big enough to jolt the market and buy time for harvest proceeds and donor inflows.

Only four days after the 70 million dollar sale, which was oversubscribed by 45 million dollars, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) offered commercial lenders another half a billion dollars in an auction.

The Monday auction satisfied only a quarter of the bids, leaving most demand unfilled. Thirty-one banks queued up, while 21 walked away with allocations at a weighted-average rate of 155.12 Br to the dollar. The most successful bid was only two cents lower, at 155.10 Br, revealing how tightly the book was priced. The volume and narrow range around the clearing rate showed how auction outcomes now anchor expectations for the system.

By the weekend, a half-billion-dollar auction was needed to unclog the pipe and restore order. For the first time, it was undersubscribed by 44.71 million dollars, with all 30 banks buying at a weighted-average rate of 153.25 Br, lower by 1.87 Br from the previous auction. The undersubscription and price drop were unprecedented, signalling that the Central Bank’s toolkit had worked.

Across all 30 banks, the average rate was 152.99 Br on the buying side and 155.94 Br on the selling side.

Daily averages barely moved, inching from 152.93 Br on Monday to 153.11 Br on Saturday, while the average selling rate crept from 155.86 Br to 156.07 Br. The Brewed Buck depreciated by roughly 12 basis points over the week, still evidence of a supervised crawl rather than a rout.

The question is how much firepower will be required to keep the corridor intact through the lean season. Every jumbo sale could raise expectations for the next. Banks that paid 155.12 Br for a dollar would hesitate to sell below cost, and without fresh supply, retail quotes would rise, and premium banks may have to lift bids toward the corridor’s upper edge.

People selling hard currency found their best counterparty in Oromia Bank, whose bid climbed from 155.61 Br on February 16 to 156.22 Br on the last two days. Buyers chasing dollars could find relief at Dashen Bank, which asked 154.85 Br on five of the six days, while the state-owned Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) briefly undercut it on Tuesday with a 154.64 Br quote. The four-Birr gulf between these poles said more about scarcity than any headline average.

The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) began the week as a laggard. On Monday and Tuesday, it paid only 151.61 Br for dollars and charged 154.64 Br, far below its peers. From Wednesday, it vaulted to 152.99 Br on the bid and 156 Br on the ask, rates that shadowed the industrial average to four decimal places. For a bank often used to signal policy, hugging the average looked deliberate, placing it in the middle of the pack.

If CBE now marks the middle, Oromia Bank and the Central Bank itself set the ceiling. Oromia’s 156.22 Br bid and 159.35 Br ask were the week’s highest, more than 2.8 Br above the market-average buying rate and 3.4 Br above the average selling rate. The Central Bank’s published line of 155.57 Br for both buying and selling, with a zero spread, served as a beacon rather than a dealer’s quote, and banks orbited it, padding on the mandated two-percent margin.

Meanwhile, four of the private big five banks – Awash, Abyssinia, Wegagen and Zemen – migrated into the upper half of the market. Their bids averaged 153.17 Br, 153.08 Br, 153.23 Br and 153.70 Br, each above the market average, and by Saturday, all were quoted north of 153 Br, near the policy reference.

Dashen Bank moved the other way. With its unchanging 151.81 Br bid and 154.85 Br ask, it became the market’s discount window, offering the cheapest dollars to buyers and the lowest Birr to sellers. By undercutting rivals, Dashen Bank’s foreign-exchange managers courted retail buyers and exporters, betting that their hard-currency pipeline could sustain the flow. Should supply tighten again, that bargain strategy could quickly prove costly, forcing it to reprice upward from a low base as the rest of the market shifts higher.

Amhara Bank opened Monday with a spread of 1.53pc, widened it to 1.72pc on Tuesday and then conformed to the standard two percent. Hibret Bank spent four days at a 152.17 Br buying rate before leaping to 153.14 Br on Friday and 153.44 Br on Saturday. Its selling rate topped 156.5 Br. At the basement end, the Cooperative Bank of Oromia (Coop Bank), Goh Betoch Bank, Global Bank, Nib Bank and Amhara Bank at the week’s start consistently posted the cheapest quotes. Coop Bank averaged 152.13 Br on the bid and 155.18 Br on the ask, with Global Bank hardly higher.

The market sorted itself into four camps. An anchor pair, embodied in the Central Bank’s fixed midpoint and Oromia Bank’s lofty quotes, determined the ceiling of the band. Beneath it sat a “premium private” bloc – Zemen, Amhara, Wegagen, Awash, Abyssinia, Hibret and Tsedey – clustered below the ceiling. A broad middle hugged the average, while Dashen, Coop, Global and Nib banks kept the discount corner alive for clients willing to shop around.

Aside from Amhara Bank’s Monday misstep, every lender maintained the spread at the mandated two percent. The uniform margin removes one avenue of volatility but forces banks to signal stress by shifting the whole quote instead. The market can thus appear tranquil even as auction outcomes send ripples through it, and small shifts in posted rates become the language through which banks express expectations.

That is why auction pricing has come to matter so much. The half-billion-dollar auction, with a weighted-average rate of 153.25 Br, revealed that the Central Bank’s comfort zone is around 153 Br. The largest private banks, but Dashen Bank, carried that signal straight to their counters. Dashen Bank’s discount bet assumed it could keep restocking dollars cheaply at or below that line. If the next auction is smaller, this position could backfire.

Despite the stimulative effects of large injections, the regime still resembles a tightly managed crawling band rather than the free float once promised by policy reformers. As long as bids and offers are pinned two percent above or below bank reference points, genuine price discovery is deferred to the auction floor. If the Central Bank’s supply sputters, retail quotes will adjust in days, not weeks, transmitting the shock through the four camps of banks and their customers.

For now, Governor Eyob has achieved his objective. Over the week, the Brewed Buck gained ground, spreads held firm, and banks stuck to the script. Whether that discipline survives the next scramble for greenbacks will be decided in the auction hall as much as at the teller’s window. Each large auction is another espresso shot, jolting rates awake before they settle back into the band. The latest shot was the strongest yet, and the caffeine is still circulating.

Hit by Forex Reform Shock, Strategic Reset Under Way at Hibret Bank

Posted on February 22, 2026February 25, 2026 by Digital Editor

Hibret Bank’s last financial year is a paradox of scale without reward. By conventional measures of banking growth, the year looked strong. The balance sheet expanded, revenues expanded, and customer activity increased, yet the Bank ended with a net profit that plummeted substantially.

Management attributed the tumble to a one-off exchange-rate liberalisation that re-priced foreign-currency positions, amplified by a heavy tax charge that absorbed what remained of earnings. The Bank’s profit of 23.52 million Br for the 2024/25 financial year fell from 2.3 billion Br a year earlier.

Mesfin Tessema, a board chairman since December last year, framed the year as a “demanding macroeconomic climate” and linked the loss to the mismatch between the Bank’s foreign-currency assets and liabilities.

However, total assets surged by 18pc to 113.93 billion Br. Loans and advances, including interest-free banking (IFB) financing, a.k.a Sharia-compliant banking, reached 79.33 billion Br, up by 10.44 billion Br. Deposits climbed to 92.68 billion Br, with IFB deposits also rising to 5.57 billion Br. Despite the setbacks on the forex front and heavy tax burden, Hibret Bank was consolidating its franchise, deepening its loan books and strengthening its funding base.

Capital and liquidity, though tested, remained above regulatory floors. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was 11.71pc, above the eight percent regulatory threshold. Cash and bank balances increased to 16.45 billion Br, lifting their share of total assets to 14.4pc from 12.8pc. Cash and bank balances of 16.4 billion Br, in addition to investment securities of about 9.18 billion Br, provided roughly 25.6 billion Br of liquid cover against short-dated liabilities. The gross loan-to-deposit ratio stood around 85.6pc on combined deposits, about 93.1pc against deposits alone, levels that unveiled active use of the deposit base while leaving some buffer.

Revenue tracked this expansion as total income jumped to 16.74 billion Br. Interest income from loans and advances remained the main driver at 12.97 billion Br, while non-financial intermediation income, mainly net fees and commissions, jumped to 3.14 billion Br, pointing to rising transactional activities. Fees, commissions and other income together show a Bank doing more of the core business of mobilising deposits, extending credit and charging for services.

The positive narrative turned with the monetary policy change. Following the liberalisation of the foreign currency regime in August 2024, Hibret Bank recorded a forex revaluation loss of 3.76 billion Br, a single charge large enough to overwhelm what would otherwise have been a strong revenue year. The Bank’s board and senior executives attributed the earnings tumble to a “foreign currency revaluation loss” tied to a mismatch between foreign-currency assets and liabilities under the new regime, and to a net loss on foreign exchange linked to the revaluation of forex deposits and import-finance exposures.

According to analysts, the balance-sheet structure, rather than day-to-day operations, became the main transmission channel for policy risk.

Hibret Bank was not alone in such a predicament. Nib Bank closed the year with a net loss of 2.9 billion Br, reversing a profit of 957 million Br the previous year, while Tsedey Bank posted a loss of 2.13 billion Br.

“These headwinds placed considerable strain,” Mesfin said in the statement for shareholders met at the Sheraton Addis in December last year, “requiring banks like ours to adapt swiftly, strengthen risk management, and recalibrate strategies.”

However, Hibret Bank’s losses were 29.7pc higher than those of these banks, even though it still made a small after-tax profit. No dividend was declared, breaking with a record that shareholders had come to see as dependable. Incorporated in 1998 with 21.1 million Br paid-up capital raised from 352 shareholders, and among the first-generation private banks, Hibret Bank has historically posted earnings per share (EPS) in the range of 25pc to 30pc.

The loss to shareholders is most evident in EPS, which collapsed to 3.07 Br from 383.10 Br, a fall of about 99.2pc. In the same year, Zemen Bank paid nearly 683 Br a share, up from 376 Br a year earlier, revealing how divergent outcomes could be within the same macroeconomic setting.

For a founding shareholder, former board member and chairman Zafu Eyessuswork Zafu, the justification could not rest on policy alone. He accepted the link to macroeconomic reforms but argued that managing foreign-exchange exposure and policy risk is a management task, and that the previous leadership should be held accountable.

The change of guard at the senior executive level manifested this turbulence.

Turnover at the helm of the Bank added to uncertainty. Hibret Bank was led by its fifth president, Melaku Kebede, who stepped down in August after nearly four years in the role and earlier service as vice president at Zemen and Hibret banks. For the subsequent eight months, Tsigereda Tesfaye served as acting president. In August 2025, after the reporting period, the board appointed Negusu Gebregziabher, a former president of Lion International Bank and senior executive at the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) and Bank of Abyssinia, signalling a reset in executive leadership.

Beneath the forex revaluation hit, the Bank’s core intermediation engine remained active. Net interest income was 6.9 billion Br, built from interest income of 12.97 billion Br and interest expense of 5.97 billion Br. Net fees income of 3.14 billion Br and other operating income of 227.2 million Br lifted total operating income to about 10.3 billion Br, with roughly two-thirds from interest and a third from fees.

Costs, however, eroded the margin as interest on deposits and borrowings rose to 5.97 billion Br and total expenses climbed to 15.99 billion Br, including 3.75 billion Br in personnel expenses and 1.82 billion Br in other operating costs.

A clear response was de-risking the balance sheet. Net foreign-currency exposure fell to about 693 million Br from 3.57 billion Br a year earlier, reducing the potential scale of future revaluation shocks. Tax then turned a difficult year into an almost profitless one. A gross profit of 749 million Br was subjected to an income tax expense of 725.5 million Br, leaving only 23.5 million Br after tax. The management’s appeal to the Tax Appeal Commission offered little respite.

On the headline numbers, profitability ratios shrank almost to zero. Using profit after tax, end-year assets of 113.93 billion Br and equity of 12.28 billion Br, return on assets (ROA) was roughly 0.02pc and return on equity (ROE) about 0.19pc. However, the equity multiplier remained high at about 9.28 times on end-of-year figures and 8.44 times on an average basis, unveiling a leveraged balance sheet that earned little in this particular year.

On a pre-tax basis, the picture was less bleak but still weak for a Bank that grew at double digits, with pre-tax ROA of about 0.71pc and pre-tax ROE around six percent.

The loan book remained diversified but not without concentration risk.

Loans for imports accounted for 18.58pc of the portfolio, manufacturing 17.98pc and export 14.50pc, together representing more than half of loans. Abdulmenan Mohammed (PhD), the London-based financial analyst, warned that, given forex volatility and external fragility, heavy concentration in manufacturing and export financing carries risks, a judgment supported by the experience of the revaluation year.

Asset quality added further pressure. Stage 3 exposures stood at 5.35 billion Br out of gross loans of 79.33 billion Br, a proxy ratio of about 6.7pc. Stage 2 exposures fell to 3.76 billion Br from 10.13 billion Br, but the jump in Stage 3 from 2.28 billion Br in a single year revealed migration into default. Loss allowances against Stage 3 were 1.8 billion Br, while total loan loss allowance was a little over two billion Br, indicating Stage 3 coverage of about 33.6pc. The loan impairment charge was 561.2 million Br, and the total expected credit loss allowance was 2.04 billion Br (2.58pc) of gross loans.

Operationally, activity continued to rise. Card banking customers increased to 752,788, mobile banking users reached 2.54 million, and online banking customers jumped to 79,710. Hibret Bank opened 10 new branches, taking the branch network to 505 across the country, while closing five branches for operational optimisation and due to corridor development projects.

For people on the front line, however, volume growth did not offset the shock to returns.

Endashaw Desalegn, manager of the Bole Medhane Alem on Cameroon Street branch, called it the “weakest and most disappointing year for shareholders in the bank’s history.”

“The previous management lacked risk appetite and didn’t work closely with customers, especially major exporters,” Endeshaw, a veteran of two decades in the industry with experience at the CBE and Awash Bank, told Fortune. “There was a communication gap between head office and branches.”

He expected improvements in customer engagement and observed better communication with senior management.

“Improving non-funded income will be key,” he said.

For shareholders, the year ended with a thinner buffer. Equity declined to 12.28 billion Br, down by 364.06 million Br, mainly due to reduced retained earnings and higher provisions required under regulatory rules. The Bank recorded an accumulated loss of 369.73 million Br, largely from transfers of provisions exceeding regulatory requirements.

Nonetheless, the financial year’s results also depict a financial institution that continued to grow and generate operating income, while a sudden policy shift and heavy tax burden drained reported earnings. The Bank’s leadership pinned its hopes on lower forex exposure, stronger fee income, and expanding digital channels as the basis for stabilising performance and restoring dividends.

“Thriving in the year ahead will demand even closer collaboration among shareholders, the Board of Directors, management, and staff,” said Mesfin. “Together, we will continue to build a stronger Hibret Bank, one that delivers lasting value to our shareholders.”

A REGISTERED SHELTER. A NOISE COMPLAINT. HUNDREDS DEAD DOGS

Posted on February 22, 2026March 27, 2026 by Digital Editor

On Friday, February 6, city officials and security personnel entered a dog shelter in Aqaqi Qality after a relocation order triggered by noise complaints, according to shelter managers. Within hours, the shelter said more than 120 dogs were put down, an allegation that has intensified scrutiny of Addis Abeba’s rabies-control campaign and the legality of its enforcement.

The raid came two days after an earlier visit. Representatives of the community and officials from the City Administration’s Farmers & Urban Agriculture Commission met with shelter managers following a noise complaint from nearby residents. The shelter was told to relocate within a week. Biruk claimed a request for more time was rejected. A written agreement committing the shelter to vacate within seven days was signed.

The shelter, Animal Welfare & Protection Shelter in Aqaqi Qality District, is registered as an NGO with no income and therefore no tax liability, and operates under a certification from the Civil Society Organisations Authority and a ministerial support letter. Officials from the Aqaqi Qality District and the Commission later confirmed existing laws explicitly cover clinics and pharmacies, but were unclear on shelters.

The non-profit holds certification from the federal Authority and a letter of support from the Ministry of Agriculture, authorising it to collect, treat, vaccinate and sterilise stray and vulnerable dogs.

According to Biruk Eshetu (DVM), the officials who arrived at the compound refused to examine the documents he presented. Biruk alleged that his staff’s mobile phones were seized, and the security cameras were removed. More than 120 dogs were euthanised at the shelter.

It led for social media uproar, filled with angry reels and petitions from dog owners and animal-welfare advocates in Addis Abeba. More posts followed reports of dogs being put down with injections in private homes and neighbourhood compounds, measures city officials say are part of efforts to prevent disease. What began as scattered incidents has grown into a wider argument over legality, oversight and public health.

According to Bemnet Wondimagegn (DVM), the shelter’s veterinarian, the animals were fully vaccinated and healthy. Some of the dogs euthanised, he added, had completed documentation for international adoption.

“Except for five dogs undergoing surgery, all were sterilised and unable to reproduce,” he said.

For founder Hanna Asefa, the events cut through years of personal commitment. She traced the shelter’s origins to her childhood.

“When I was a child, I saw dogs being harmed by people, and when I grew up, I decided I had to do something for them,” she said. “It’s my civic duty.”

The shelter takes in injured, blind and homeless dogs, provides treatment and seeks to place them in legal adoptions abroad.

“Laws are made about animal welfare, but no one implements them,” said Hana.

The Shelter has spent millions of Birr but is now left with no dogs, and its founder is unsure whether she will be able to continue the work.

“What we want from the government is recognition and cooperation,” Hana told Fortune.

The compound that once echoed with barking and movement sat quietly last week. Staff, stripped of the animals they cared for, say they are unsure what comes next.

The controversy reached beyond a personal home. In Aqaqi Qality District, Wereda 6, dog owner Henok Getachew believes his household was also targeted. After watching a football match and putting his children to bed, he heard a knock at his gate around 8:00pm.

“They came in and asked me how many dogs I had,” he recalled.

The father of two cares for 10 dogs, and has been an advocate for dogs for 14 years. He presented medical records and mentioned laws governing rabies control, but the local officials did not respond to his arguments. A day earlier, the head of the District 6 Urban Agriculture Office had visited to confirm the presence of dogs at his home.

“They told me they had come to kill them,” he said. “I feel empty, and my children are traumatised.”

Henok questioned whether he could continue keeping animals without local officials’ acknowledgement. Vaccinations and treatments cost up to 3,500 Br a dog, and feed prices add further strain. He argued that dog ownership and related services have created jobs for young people and that mass killing carries social and financial costs that go beyond disease control.

Dog adoption is legal. The process involves submitting full records to the receiving country’s Ministry of Agriculture for verification before import approval. Henok recalled bringing a dog from Romania six years ago, paying 1,650 euros in airline fees and about 4,000 euros to buy the animal, a total of 5,650 euros. Since then, with foreign exchange pressures, costs have risen sharply. Airline fees alone can now reach 66,000 Br for dogs under 14Kg, with larger animals charged based on crate size.

Others tell similar stories. Feven Melese, founder of the “Animals Need Attention” movement and an advocate for five years.

“Had my dog been killed on claims of maintaining the peace of the community,” she said. “It would not be fair to me because I’m also part of the community.”

Her approach focuses on vaccination and sterilisation rather than killing. Feven would want to see marking vaccinated dogs, as she saw practised in Turkey, to increase public awareness and reduce violence against animals.

At the Ministry of Agriculture, the episode is viewed in the context of a broader public health strategy.

According to Wendu Mengesha (DVM), a coordinator of a national rabies prevention and control program, Ethiopia has adopted a global strategy to eradicate human deaths from rabies by 2030. Since 2022, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food & Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the Global Alliance for Rabies Control have worked together on this plan. Ethiopian authorities have refined it for national use.

Rabies is preventable through vaccination, but fatal if untreated. Globally, rabies kills about 59,000 people each year. In Ethiopia, more than 2,700 people, mostly women and children accounting for 40pc, are rabies victims. Rabies is believed to cause economic losses of 8.6 billion dollars worldwide each year, with Ethiopia losing more than 210 million Br directly and indirectly.

“We don’t give priority to putting down, but to treating before anything else,” Wendu said.

In Addis Abeba, a campaign is targeting to vaccinate 70pc of the city’s nearly 350,000 dogs. Close to two-thirds of the dogs are strays, making vaccine coverage difficult to achieve.

The City’s Commission, which reports to the Mayor’s Office, oversees dog elimination operations.

“Any actions that diverge from the national strategy are unacceptable,” Wendu told Fortune. “Legal shelters should continue to operate in coordination with the authorities. Improper methods are not acceptable.”

Officials from the Addis Abeba City Administration’s Farmers & Urban Agriculture Commission and the Aqaqi Qality District Farmers & Urban Agriculture Bureau declined to comment despite repeated efforts.

Wendu insisted that when euthanasia is deemed necessary, it should follow humane procedures. However, his Ministry has not received formal legal complaints over the recent incidents.

“We’ve seen the issue on social media like anyone else,” he said. “Any person with legal evidence can file a complaint and will receive a legal response.”

He observed that many people who sell dogs operate without licences and remain largely anonymous. Stronger communication with authorities, he argued, could prevent similar disputes.

Private practitioners, such as Segni Ambaw (DVM), who has worked as a veterinarian for 18 years, question how the killings have been carried out.

“Killing healthy dogs in a legal shelter is inappropriate,” he told Fortune. “Humane euthanasia standards must be respected.”

Segni noted that no law sets a limit on the number of dogs an individual may own and raised doubts over whether existing business laws clearly address commercial dog sales.

“The government should examine its policies,” he said, calling for clearer legal frameworks and rejecting cruel methods.

Between distressed owners, a closed shelter and officials under pressure to contain a deadly disease, the city’s dog policy now sits at the intersection of public health, law and ethics. For those who lost animals, like Henok, the debate is not abstract. It is measured in empty compounds, traumatised children and a silence where barking once filled the air.

National Bank Auction Sees Birr Appreciate Despite Under Subscribed

Posted on February 22, 2026February 24, 2026 by Digital Editor

The National Bank of Ethiopia’s second 500 million dollars special auction in less than a month concluded today, with the birr appreciating to a weighted average rate of 153.2503 per dollar. Total bids reached 455.29 million dollars, falling short of the full allotment for the first time in recent auction history.

In the previous auction held last Saturday, all 30 participating banks received their full allotments despite a 44.71 million dollars undersubscription. The marginal cut-off rate was 152.79 Br per dollar, while the highest successful bid reached 154 Br.

Three days before the current auction, a 70 million dollars regular auction cleared at 155.1223 Br per dollar, reflecting strong demand. The latest auction’s top successful bid of 154 Br per dollar shows a notable appreciation relative to the February 17 auction.

Analysts say the undersubscription may indicate easing demand pressures or a strategic shift by banks in response to the central bank’s aggressive liquidity injections.

Parties Reveal Election Symbols Ahead of 100-Day Countdown

Posted on February 22, 2026March 11, 2026 by Digital Editor

The Ethiopian Election Board held an event at Skylight Hotel on February 21, 2026, where 48 political parties signed a code of conduct and unveiled their election symbols. The code sets out the rules parties must follow and the boundaries they are required to observe.

NEBE Second Chairperson Tesfaye Neway said the regulations are designed to ensure peaceful proceedings, create a level playing field, protect voters’ freedom, and guarantee a fair and credible electoral process and outcome.

At the event’s opening, NEBE Chairperson Melatework Hailu announced the completion of a two-day training program for 300 main trainers. The trainees are now prepared to manage both digital and manual voter registration and will train 5,000 field trainers, who in turn will prepare 214,000 election officials assigned to polling stations.

“This cascading training system is intended to promote a fair, independent, and free election by ensuring competent, constitutionally guided officials capable of making accountable decisions, particularly with the introduction of a new digital method,” Melatework said.

With the event concluded, 100 days remain until the election.

Global Cooperation in a Time of Geopolitical Disruption

Posted on February 22, 2026February 27, 2026 by Digital Editor

If there was any doubt remaining about the return of great-power politics, it has been dispelled by US President Donald Trump’s attack on Venezuela, threats to annexe Greenland, and refusal to extend the New START treaty limiting the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia.

Such geopolitical upheavals are driven by “the will to power,” as Adam Tooze has pointed out, including “power over resources, purchasing power, the ability to resist the influence of others.”

The reverberations of this trend are being felt in the architecture of global cooperation, built around the Bretton Woods institutions, which, under these institutions, shaped countries’ behaviour through shared rules and formal governance structures. Within the “rules-based order,” at the heart of which lies the United Nations (UN), cooperation was operationalised through regular engagement, leading to incremental gains. This system often required countries to make concessions and accommodations, but they generally were willing to do so in exchange for long-term stability and predictability.

But this institutional approach to cooperation has broken down in recent years, as institutions have proven incapable of responding effectively to states’ evolving needs. From an outdated UN Security Council structure and stalled Rio Conventions to the persistence of longstanding conflicts, evidence of the UN system’s limitations steadily accumulated, eroding trust. As gridlock became entrenched, the rules-based order increasingly appeared rigid, unjust, and ineffectual. This demands a fundamental rethink of how states engage with one another to deliver global public goods.

The Global South recognised this a long time ago, with developing-country voices like Barbados Prime Minister Mia Amor Mottley often pointing out that powerful states act as if they are exempt from the rules they impose on others. Now, even G7 leaders are acknowledging this. In his much-discussed address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney conceded that the rules-based order always depended on a “pleasant fiction.” The benefits were sufficient, he admitted, that countries like his largely avoided “calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.”

Those gaps are now impossible to ignore. Institutional cooperation, and the UN system, specifically, is blighted by declining faith and effectiveness, as well as deep divisions over what actors’ roles and responsibilities should be, which values should underpin cooperation, and how cooperative efforts should be implemented.

The challenges associated with the institutional approach have driven some to embrace another form of cooperation in bilateral engagement, usually driven by narrow interests. This interest-based approach produces a complicated web of connections among states, and when guided by clear-headed diplomacy, it can cultivate interdependence, thereby helping to sustain a stable balance of power.

A classic example of such engagement is West Germany’s “Ostpolitik,” which sought to improve relations with East Germany and Eastern bloc countries in the 1960s and 1970s by promoting dialogue and economic cooperation. Conceptualised by Egon Bahr and implemented by Willy Brandt, first as foreign minister and then as chancellor, Ostpolitik opened the way for formal agreements that established diplomatic relations, clarified borders, and facilitated trade.

A similar logic guided then-US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger’s 1971 opening to China, which set the stage for decades of economic interdependence. The same can be said for Germany’s engagement with China and Russia in the 2000s. While the dependencies this created, on Chinese trade and Russian gas, have since begun to look more like vulnerabilities, America’s unreliability as a security partner shows that risks can arise even with close allies that have traditionally operated according to shared values.

But maintaining interest-based engagement demands substantial state capacity and diplomatic heft. It does not necessarily reflect any overarching logic, and it can lead to insecurity and uncertainty, especially if it morphs into beggar-thy-neighbour policies, which ignore political, ethical, cultural, or historical sensitivities. This approach also leaves smaller countries vulnerable to unfavourable deals with larger partners, with the more powerful side dictating the terms of engagement.

There is a third way. Under a “minilateral” approach, like-minded countries form issue-based coalitions, often outside the UN system. Often built around shared ideas, goals, and worldviews, minilateral groupings prioritise pragmatism, agility, and efficiency over broad consensus and formal legitimacy. Countries can thus circumvent the gridlock of broad-based cooperation without putting themselves at the mercy of major powers.

But minilateralism can be a double-edged sword. While groupings such as the BRICS+ emerging-market countries can act as early movers that muster momentum on critical issues and challenge the status quo, other minilateral groupings can entrench the status quo by limiting membership to preserve influence (as with the G7). More broadly, they can lead to fragmentation that hampers progress, though forums like the G20 can help to overcome this pitfall by facilitating engagement across groupings.

At a time when the institutional approach to international order is breaking down, the minilateral approach holds much promise, despite its imperfections. While the emergence of more minilateral groupings will lead to fragmentation in the short term and hasten the hollowing out of the UN system, it might also offer a means of devising new ideas and carrying out scalable interventions that tangibly improve people’s daily lives. Without interventions that deliver tangible benefits, international cooperation will remain a hard sell amidst the return of great-power politics.

Reinforcing shared norms is also vital, but it will not, on its own, save us from the great power-induced disruptions we are witnessing today. New cooperative frameworks that deliver on critical but often competing goals, such as energy justice and energy security, both climate resilience and economic diversification, and human dignity and prosperity, might be our best bet.

Month: February 2026