AWASH BANK RINGS IN A MARKET STILL LEARNING TO TRADE

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

Awash Bank’s arrival on the Ethiopian Securities Exchange (ESX) last week placed one of the country’s largest private banks at the centre of the nascent public securities trading, turning a bell-ringing ceremony into a marker of how far the capital market has moved from concept to transaction.

The Bank became the second to Wegagen Bank and the fourth company to list on the Exchange, a debut watched closely by the financial sector, bank executives, and early investors looking for signals from a market still forming its rhythm. The event at ESX headquarters on Ras Abebe Aregay St., near Commerce College, carried the symbolism of a financial sector seeking to broaden ownership, formalise share trading, and bring larger corporate names into a regulated marketplace. For Exchange officials, Awash Bank’s listing was presented as more than a corporate event. For Tilahun, it is a sign of confidence in the Exchange and in its ability to mobilise investment through formal channels.

“The listing provides investors with an opportunity to participate in a regulated market and demonstrates our commitment to fostering a stable and diverse investment landscape,” he said.

Awash Bank floated 37 million shares for trading out of its 54 million existing shares, giving the new market one of its most substantial early listings. Trading began with visible interest. Prices on the floor reached 3,000 Br, while opening transactions were reported as high as 4,000 Br. More than 8,000 shares changed hands within the first hours, providing an early glimpse of investor appetite for one of the country’s most established private financial institutions.

The listing also gives Awash Bank a public-market platform three decades after its formation. Incorporated in November 1994 with paid-up capital of 24.2 million Br raised from 486 founding shareholders, the Bank has since grown into an institution with 37.9 billion Br in capital held by more than 12,000 shareholders. It began business with a single branch and 37 employees, and it now operates 1,004 branches and employs over 20,000 staff, a scale that places it among the country’s largest private banks.

That expansion is reflected in its latest financial results. Net interest income reached 26.3 billion Br in the 2024/25 financial year, rising from 19.9 billion Br a year earlier and 15.9 billion Br in 2023. Net operating income climbed to 52.3 billion Br, while gross profit more than doubled to 25.7 billion Br, and net profit was 18.7 billion Br. The balance sheet also grew sharply, with total assets reaching 442.5 billion Br by June 2025, supported by deposits of 332.9 billion Br and net loans of 215 billion Br. Compare this with industrywide commercial-bank assets, which expanded by 44.5pc to 4.74 trillion Br. Deposits climbed by 40.7pc to 3.51 trillion Br. Liquid assets almost doubled to 1.07 trillion Br. Net income after tax jumped by 61.3pc to 93.4 billion Br. Total liquid assets grew by 90.9pc in a single year.

Awash Bank’s earnings per share increased to 783 Br, while the loan-to-deposit ratio declined to 65pc, revealing faster deposit mobilisation than lending growth. The figures show a Bank expanding across assets, income and branch reach while entering a market where disclosure, governance and tradable valuation will become more visible to investors. Tsehay dubbed the listing a continuation of Awash Bank’s record of market leadership.

“This ensures we remain at the forefront of innovation and value creation,” he said. “The move would improve transparency, strengthen corporate governance and broaden participation for both domestic and foreign investors.”

The listing comes as the Bank prepares another stage of expansion. Awash Bank plans to raise its capital to 55 billion Br this year, with a longer-term target of 300 billion Br.

Transport Squeeze Leaves Commuters Paying the Price

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

Before sunrise reached the outskirts of Addis Abeba, Demelash Assefa was already on the road, measuring the city’s transport crisis in minutes, fares and absences.

At quarter to six early in the morning, the 49-year-old teacher left his home in Sendafa, a town northeast of the capital, for a daily endurance test. It begins with a 15 Br Bajaj ride, then a wait at 44 Mazoria, a location marked by the number of the bus serving the area, lasting more than an hour before the bus arrives. The ride to Megenagna takes another hour and 20 minutes and costs 40 Br. From there, the final leg to Arat Kilo takes 45 minutes more.

On good days, he reaches work by 9:00am. On bad ones, the delay carries a penalty.

“The attendance system marks you absent for half a day if you arrive after 2:45a.m.,” Demelash told Fortune.

By the time he returns home, often close to 9:00p.m., the working day has swallowed more than 15 hours. It repeats five days a week, draining 150 Br a day, nearly a fifth of his 15,000 Br monthly salary. For a father of four and the sole provider, the loss is not only financial.

“I leave before my children wake up and return after they have fallen asleep,” he said. “I can’t guide them or spend time with them.”

What was once manageable has become punishing, shaped by fuel shortages, fewer taxis, long queues and fares that move with pressure rather than rule. Taxis, once a flexible fallback when buses failed, now bring their own uncertainty.

“Sometimes taxi fare costs more during peak hours,” Demelash said, describing drivers who raise prices when passengers have few alternatives. “I’m always the first to argue when they increase prices. But it’s difficult.”

The pressure has entered home life. Weekly family outings have stopped. Visits to friends have become rare. Even small gestures have disappeared.

“I used to bring fruits home after work,” he said. “Now I can’t. Everything is increasing day by day, but our income is fixed.”

Transport costs, added to inflation, have forced life back to essentials.

For Merawie Mekonnen, a 35-year-old private-sector employee who travels each day from Qality, in the southeastern part of the capital, to Megenagna and then to Kotebe, the burden repeats in stages. Each taxi ride brings a fresh possibility of being charged above the tariff.

“In almost every trip, there is an extra 10 to 15 Br added to the tariff,” he said.

On some routes, the increase could be higher. The deeper grievance is the absence of predictability.

“There are no clearly communicated tariffs,” Merawie told Fortune. “This gives drivers the space to charge what they want.”

Evenings and holidays bring further increases. Rising rents have also pushed residents to peripheral areas such as Qality, Sululta and Burayu, where cheaper housing often means higher transport costs.

“I’ve friends who moved there to find cheaper rent,” Merawie says. “Now their transport costs are very high. They’re struggling.”

The bargain between affordable housing and reachable work is fraying. A bus ride from Qality to Addisu Gebeya may cost 30 Br. The same taxi route can exceed 150 Br. For many commuters, the choice is no longer between comfort and inconvenience but an affordable fare and a completed journey.

Both Demelash and Merawie see weak enforcement behind the daily bargaining. They obserevd that regulators and queue coordinators are unable to control fare practices consistently.

“We need stronger control,” Merawie said. “And passengers also need to cooperate and stand for their rights.”

Yet the story looks different from behind the wheel. On the route between Ferensay Legasion and Arat Kilo, a 37-year-old driver of a white-and-blue Toyota HiAce witnesses the transport economics changing beyond recognition. He may complete up to seven round-trip a day, but the count hides the costs. Fuel now defines the business. Filling his 65Ltr tank at 142.41 Br a litre costs about 9,300 Br, enough for roughly three days on a route where the tariff is 20 Br a trip. Monthly fuel expenses exceed 90,000 Br.

“This isn’t worth it for us anymore,” he told Fortune. “But, this taxi is our only source of income.”

Daily income may range from 4,000 Br to 6,000 Br, but fuel takes the largest share, followed by maintenance, rent, and family expenses.

Passengers often see surcharges as arbitrary, but drivers frame them as a survival.

“When we get a chance to increase prices, we do,” said the driver. “Because we also have a life and a family.”

For many drivers, the official tariff no longer resembles operating reality. Even reaching the road can be difficult. Hours spent waiting at stations mean fewer trips and less income. Each lost hour tightens margins. The driver’s account demonstrates part of what commuters experience. One side sees unpredictability and rising fares, while the other sees shrinking viability. Both are responding to the same pressure, from opposite ends of Addis Abeba’s increasingly strained transport system.

That tension is familiar to Abraham Belayneh, a 38-year-old driver on the Qality-Megenagna route. His work, which once supported his family, is becoming difficult to maintain. Rising costs pushed him, his wife and three children back into his mother’s house.

“I used to live independently,” he said. “But now I can’t afford rent anymore.”

The official tariff on his route is about 50 Br, but he found it barely reflects costs.

“Even if the tariff increases substantially, it still doesn’t cover our costs,” said Abraham.

Fuel is only part of it. Drivers also face a web of formal and informal expenses, from terminal payments to inconsistent penalties. They pay supervisors regularly, in the morning and again in the afternoon. Fuel shortages have cut deeper. Trips have fallen from eight round-trip a day to about five. Each missed run is lost income. Abraham has let go of a taxi assistant and now drives cautiously to avoid repairs he may not be able to afford.

“I work two days, then spend three days waiting for fuel,” he said.

Passengers see delays where Abraham sees risk management.

“People know why prices are higher,” said Abraham. “It isn’t only about benefiting.”

The pressure has reached home. He has stopped contributing to Iqub, the informal savings group that once helped with financial stability.

“Food is also the biggest challenge,” he told Fortune.

Like many drivers, Abraham considers leaving the transport sector. He saw that some of his colleagues had already left the country in search of work.

The crisis is no longer only about fuel, tariffs, or queues, but also about whether everyday mobility can hold up as drivers work fewer days and passengers wait longer. As costs rise, negotiation grows sharper. The system functions, but is under visible stress.

Transport officials acknowledge the strain, though they frame it as a turning point.

According to Dagim Belihu, director of communication affairs at the Addis Abeba City Transport Bureau, authorities are increasing oversight at taxi terminals while urging commuters toward public buses, especially electric fleets.

“We’ll monitor taxi drivers at each terminal to ensure that they don’t overcharge or overbook passengers,” Dagim told Fortune, urging passengers to report violations through hotline 9417. “The buses are using fuel from their own depot. There has been no problem with the overall operation of buses related to fuel so far.”

However, enforcement is only one part of the plan. The Bureau is also using the crisis to push a structural shift away from a transport system heavily dependent on fuel-powered taxis.

“Passengers are encouraged to use buses instead of wasting their time in taxi queues,” Dagim said.

Addis Abeba now operates more than 1,800 buses, including about 100 electric buses that are insulated against fuel shortages. The city Administration plans to import more than 500 electric buses over the next two years, signalling a shift from fragmented taxi dependence toward coordinated mass transit. According to Dagim, some commuters may need to rethink how they move.

“Passengers should use bicycles for transportation beyond recreation,” he said.

Transport experts such as Tafere Worku (PhD) at Bahir Dar University agree. They urge that long-term responses should go beyond short-term fixes.

For Tafere, the deeper warning lies beyond today’s queues.

“Ethiopia relies heavily on imported fuel, and largely through a single route,” he says. “That makes the system vulnerable. We need to invest in alternatives, electric vehicles, natural gas, and other sustainable options.”

He sees room for modest behavioural changes.

“People can also adapt, walking short distances, using bicycles, or other alternatives where possible,” he said.

The crisis has also changed traffic patterns, with congestion around fuel stations becoming a major cause of blockages.

“Queues of cars waiting to refill their tanks are blocking key corridors,” said Amare Tarekegn, deputy director of the Addis Abeba Traffic Management Authority. “The city moves unevenly, flowing in one corridor and freezing in another.”

The Administration of Mayor Adanech Abiebie has formed a task force to manage the fuel crisis, prioritising essential services, deployment and monitoring.

“We’re implementing different mechanisms to manage the fuel supply challenge,” said Jantirar Abay, deputy mayor.

However, for experts studying the transport sector, the crisis mirrors a supply-side imbalance. They see the fuel shortage as exposing long-standing vulnerabilities in a fragile system. Limited supply, combined with rising demand, has made price distortions hard to avoid.

“Transportation is a public good,” said Tafere. “It involves the community, the government, and service providers. When one part weakens, the whole system feels it. External factors may have driven the problem, but weak follow-up and limited coordination among stakeholders are making it worse.”

Across Addis Abeba, passengers report unofficial fare increases while drivers insist the official tariff no longer matches operating costs. Tafere sees the tension as a predictable result of weak enforcement.

“When control mechanisms are not strong, prices tend to rise beyond reasonable levels,” he said. “And that directly affects the community.”

According to Tafere, the recent tariff adjustments have some basis.

“The increase is understandable given the fuel situation,” he said. “But fare changes alone can’t resolve the crisis. Short-term measures like targeted subsidies could help stabilise the situation. Without them, the burden keeps shifting between drivers trying to survive and passengers struggling to afford daily mobility.”

Beyond pricing, Tafere blamed inefficiencies in resource management. He urged a structured system to ensure fuel is used efficiently. He also warned that weak oversight allows irregular practices to persist.

Still, he does not place responsibility on one actor. He sees passengers as having a part in the correction, not merely victims of the crisis.

“The community should report illegal practices and support enforcement efforts,” he said.

That is the truth emerging from long queues and rising fares. Commuters, drivers and officials are not facing separate crises. They inhabit the same one from different ends. Passengers bargain to protect limited incomes. Drivers bend rules to preserve shrinking livelihoods. Authorities push toward mass transit while struggling to stabilise the present. In fuel lines and taxi queues before dawn, these pressures meet every day.

What unfolds there is an urban system improvising to hold together. In that exchange, the shortage becomes visible not as a single event, but as a daily contest over time, income, and the right to reach work without breaking household budgets. For those who rise before daylight to move through it, the question is how long that balance can endure.

According to Tafere, what is unfolding in Addis Abeba’s taxi queues is not merely an inconvenience.

“This is an alarm,” he said. “It shows the need for long-term thinking and coordinated action.”

Addis Abeba’s Roads Reveal a Country Where the Powerful Drive Through the Law

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

In a political community, official speeches show what governments want their citizens to see. But a country can be read through its roads, where streets show what citizens live with.

In Addis Abeba, traffic is more than a nuisance, where one can see who waits, who is waved on, who pays for disorder and who may create it. The capital’s streets are a theatre of inequality. Minibus drivers are fined for failing to maintain lane discipline. Taxi drivers are chased for stopping where parking barely exists. Private motorists discover violations only when digital penalties surface during renewal.

Yet convoys with sirens, markings and other protected vehicles cut through junctions as though the code were advisory. There appears to be an understanding and a silent consensus that the law is not a neutral command. It is rank.

What is unfolding in Addis Abeba’s traffic matters because it is not only about congestion. It is a miniature of an order in which laws are plentiful, but accountability is scarce, where rules are enforced against those with little bargaining power and waived near authority. On paper, order has tightened.

A revised regulation enacted in January 2025 brought tougher penalties. First offences carry fines of 500 Br to 1,500 Br. Vehicle-related violations can reach 20,000 Br. A demerit system imposes a suspension after 12 to 14 points; at 21 points or more, a licence may be suspended for 18 months. Reinstatement requires retraining and retesting.

Such rules would be easier to defend if applied fairly. The trouble is that they are not. A 1,500 Br fine may exceed 35pc of a commercial driver’s monthly income, above the one or two percent burden traffic fines impose in better-calibrated systems. The offence may be minor. For a driver feeding a household, a citation can feel like confiscation.

Disproportionate penalties create room for petty corruption. The larger the fine, the greater the officer’s bargaining power. Digital ticketing was meant to close it. Instead, technology dresses discretion in modern clothes. Drivers complain of threats that violations will be “uploaded” unless settled informally. The state calls it modernisation, while motorists call it extortion with a tablet.

Officers received more than 600 tablets, while 2,800 parking operators got smartphones. But digital records are not the rule of law. A database can automate arbitrariness as easily as justice.

The numbers reveal a system that is better at collecting than at ordering. Between January and November 2025, Addis Abeba recorded 172,743 penalties. More than 40,000 were unpaid or unnotified. Revenues from fines reportedly reached 800 million Br in nine months.

Some drivers learn of unpaid penalties only at renewal. By then, the violation has swollen with an 850 Br administrative fee and five percent interest for those with more than five violations, a form of delayed extraction. A system designed to improve behaviour should notify, explain and allow contestation. One that lets debt mature silently looks closer to revenue farming than ensuring safety.

Addis Abeba has expanded corridors and vistas, but deficits remain severe. Parking is scarce, and pedestrian behaviour is poorly managed. Freight cuts through dense urban space, and public transport vehicles operate on punishing margins, while the city beautifies even as safety lags.

The cost is counted in bodies. Across the country, there has been a reported loss of an average of 13 people a day to road traffic crashes. Addis Abeba accounts for about 85pc of national crash fatalities. Victims with head or neck injuries face higher risks. Those with oxygen saturation below 95pc survive, on average, 15 fewer days than those with better saturation.

If road safety were the goal, emergency response, pedestrian protection, lighting, trauma care and helmet and seatbelt enforcement would matter.

Punishment is easier than prevention. It is simpler to fine a minibus driver than redesign an unsafe junction. It is cheaper to digitise citations than build a credible appeal mechanism. It is more lucrative to extract from road users than to confront convoys, protected plates, and connected motorists, teaching contempt for the law.

The contrast is at intersections where a battered taxi waits behind a line and a delivery truck inches forward under an officer’s gaze. Then a tinted vehicle with official bearing slides across, followed by another with no legal privilege but the confidence of one. The queue pauses, the officer looks away, and in that glance, the laws are edited.

Ethiopia’s law-and-order crisis can be learned there. Citizens need no lecture on institutional decay when a traffic light becomes optional for the well-connected. They need no seminar on impunity when a driver is punished for stopping while a convoy blocks a lane because rank has privatised space.

The problem is not only official arrogance, but also failed urban design. However, the road hierarchy mirrors a wider one. The same logic appears in urban redevelopment, where the Corridor Development projects disciplined modernity while raising questions over dispossession.

In several parts of the city, thousands, including children and the elderly, were evicted with only 24 to 72 hours’ notice. A state demanding procedural obedience from a taxi driver cannot disregard due process when removing households.

Across Ethiopia, accusations of arbitrary detention, extrajudicial violence, ransom kidnapping and security abuses have eroded confidence that the state can police itself. A surge of disturbing incidents on social media has renewed outrage over this pattern. Individuals abusing power, evading consequences, and exposing selective justice have become all too common.

From violent misconduct to reckless traffic violations causing injuries and fatalities, the thread is impunity. The farther from the capital, the wider the gap, with rights violations often met by silence or delay.

Once citizens suspect those entrusted with protection may also profit from fear, the civic contract frays. Traffic policing no longer looks neutral. It becomes another checkpoint in a wider system of vulnerability.

Unpredictable enforcement works like a hidden tax on the productive poor. Commercial drivers, small traders and transport operators have tight cash flows. When penalties are severe, appeals opaque and enforcement selective, the road becomes another venue for informal taxation. Compliance weakens because citizens see rules as instruments deployed downward.

That is the corrosive effect of unequal enforcement. It teaches society that law is negotiable, purchasable and positional. A child in the back seat sees which car is stopped and which is saluted. A young officer learns which offender can be challenged or ignored. A driver calculates not what the law says but who is watching. Legality dies through thousands of small public exceptions.

The remedy is not to abolish enforcement or romanticise disorder. Society needs rules, safer roads and disciplined drivers. But an order imposed selectively is domination. Reform should start with equality of enforcement, where official vehicles obey the same lights, lanes and parking rules as everyone else, except in verifiable emergencies.

Legitimacy is not built by resurfacing roads or erecting medians. It is built when citizens believe the law will protect them from the powerful as well as restrain them. Addis Abeba’s roads say the opposite, where law enforcement sees the weak clearly and the strong dimly. They say modernisation has outrun accountability. When a traffic light is obeyed only by those without influence, it no longer regulates. It reveals power.

Addis Abeba Tightens Purse Strings to Curb Year-End Budget Rush

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

Officials of Addis Abeba’s City Administration have ordered a freeze on new procurements across the bureaucracy, imposing a citywide spending clampdown as the capital enters the final quarter of the fiscal year, in an attempt to halt the rush to exhaust public budgets. The restriction, introduced last week, applies to almost all offices under Mayor Adanech Abiebie’s Administration.

A letter signed by Abdulkadir Redwan, head of the Addis Abeba Finance Bureau, instructed the city’s administrative structures not to initiate fresh purchases. It covers 87 sectoral bureaus, 11 districts and 119 woredas, placing the city’s largest spending networks under a procurement freeze when offices usually race to execute delayed plans.

City officials cast the order as a test of fiscal discipline for an administration managing a record 350 billion Br budget in the 2025/26 fiscal year. It is the first budget financed from internal revenue without federal government support. The city planned to mobilise more than 98pc of the total from the city’s sources, a 51pc increase from the previous target. Capital spending has surged by 68pc to more than 246 billion Br, giving the Finance Bureau an incentive to redirect resources from administrative spending to large projects.

For the Bureau, the timing is not accidental. According to Abiy Bitew, loan fund managment coordinator, the last quarter of the fiscal year often encourages offices to rush purchases rather than returning unused budgets. He disclosed to Fortune the Administration’s priorities for saving and shifting money toward mega projects.

“The Bureau imposed the restriction to curb wasteful spending, noting that purchases made in the fourth quarter are often vulnerable to misuse,” said Abiy. “Rather than returning unused funds, these expenditures are frequently driven by a ‘use up the budget’ mentality, a practice the Bureau wants to put an end to.”

The decision has disrupted plans inside the city government. The Labour & Skills Bureau had intended to upgrade its communications department by procuring modern computers and equipment for graphics work, as well as cameras. The purchases were scheduled for the current quarter but have now been stopped. According to Teklemariam Jatena, the Bureau’s communications head, his office had prepared to modernise its work before the directive arrived.

“We had planned to acquire the latest equipment to upgrade our communication work,” he told Fortune. “But that has now been stopped because of the ban.”

Abiy treats such interruptions less as collateral damage than as evidence of weak planning. He argued that bureaus that fail to initiate procurement in the first nine months and then rush to spend in the final quarter reveal poor planning and a tendency toward waste.

“Suppliers anticipate the end-of-year rush and raise prices accordingly,” he said. “Even to avoid inflated prices, it is advisable not to procure at this time.”

City officials disclosed that procurement contracts already signed may continue. Utility expenses, including electricity, fuel and water bills, will be unaffected. Project-related procurements are also exempt. All other new procurement activities are suspended, leaving routine administrative purchases on hold unless they fall within the exceptions.

However, the impact is uneven as the Women, Children & Social Affairs Bureau appears to have avoided disruption. According to Konjit Debela, the Bureau’s head, the Bureau had already secured what it needed for the fiscal year and did not expect any interruptions.

“We already secured all necessary supplies for the current fiscal year,” she told Fortune. “Internal meetings are held inside the Bureau’s own facilities, avoiding external venue rentals or last-minute purchases.”

The freeze follows another cost-cutting order by the Mayor’s office. Months earlier, the city banned the use of hotel venues for official meetings, trainings, workshops and evaluations. It was a measure city officials say was intended to reduce bureaucratic spending and channel money to capital investments, though it unsettled parts of the hospitality industry and exposed the tension between public-sector austerity and private-sector activity.

Gebeyaw Yitayih, a former staff member of the Federal Public Procurement & Property Authority, characterised the new restriction as “stringent.” Acknowledging its impact in reducing wasteful spending, he cautioned that a blanket order may create problems for agencies facing unforeseen demands.

Gebeyaw commended the Bureau’s effort to strengthen financial discipline but said the Administration should preserve mechanisms for urgent and unforeseen purchases.

“Unanticipated health, safety and security needs require flexibility,” Gebeyaw told Fortune.

He also pointed to delays within the Finance Bureau itself, arguing that slow budget disbursement can undermine procurement planning. Lengthy tendering procedures add delay, making it harder for offices to execute purchases on time.

“Many institutions don’t follow their procurement plans and instead push spending toward the closing months,” he said.

Irrigation Spending Leaves Parliament Searching for the Harvest

Posted on April 26, 2026May 9, 2026 by Digital Editor

Abraham Belay (PhD), minister of Irrigation & Lowlands (MoIL), and his senior officials appeared before Parliament last week with the awkward balance sheet of a federal agency that had nearly exhausted its purse before many of its projects could be seen on the ground.

In nine months, the Ministry, headquartered off the Tito Road in the Casanchis neighbourhood, had used 98pc of its annual budget. Yet, several irrigation schemes remained delayed, underperforming, or suspended due to security disruptions. For federal lawmakers, the Minister’s report raised a blunt question.

How could almost all the money be spent when too much of the work appeared unfinished?

According to data from the Ministry of Finance, a capital budget of 17.1 billion Br was allocated to large-, medium-, and small-scale irrigation projects (including external financing)in the 2025/26 budget year. This represents 4.1pc of the 415 billion Br total capital expenditure budget and 0.9pc of the total federal budget of 1.93 trillion Br. Federal legislators pressed Minister Abraham on Thursday, April 23, 2026, turning a routine hearing into an interrogation over budget discipline, project delivery and the gap between reported execution and visible progress. No fewer than 12 MPs challenged the Minister over delayed schemes, stalled works, and the absence of new projects in their respective constituencies.

Abraham, who has led the Ministry since May 2024, replaced Aisha Mohammed after a cabinet reshuffle that moved him from the Ministry of Defence to his current Ministry and sent Aisha to the Ministry of Defence. Mandated to study, develop and supervise irrigation projects, including design work and implementation oversight, the Ministry is working on 12 large and medium-sized projects in the design phase and 19 irrigation projects under construction.

Minister Abraham disclosed that nine of the 19 construction projects were fully completed during the first nine months. The completed projects, including Walmel, Chelchel, Gidabo, West Gode, Qeto and Dubti Dyke, have brought about 59,000hct of land into productive agricultural use.

Other schemes remain unfinished, including the Megech Irrigation Development Project, Arjo Dedesa, Khalid Dijo, Ajima Chacha, Logiya, and Adea Becho, all of which are still under construction. The Minister conceded that the Upper Rib, Fantale, and Upper Guder irrigation development projects have been delayed or suspended due to security-related challenges.

Abreham appeared uneasy as MPs pressed him, while he kept taking notes. Legislators demanded to know why projects in Oromia, Amhara, South, Central, and South West Ethiopia regional states were not completed on schedule, and why new projects had not started in their constituencies despite what they described as available capacity. While opposition MPs attending the hearing were observed to be muted, all the questions were fired by MPs representing the ruling Prosperity Party (PP), who focused on execution, financing, and the scheduled delivery of projects.

The Standing Committee member, Mesfin Dagne (MP-PP), fired off questions, focusing on financial management, overpayments, underpayments to contractors, and gaps between planned activities, budget use, and implementation.

Alemu Gonfa (PhD), an MP-PP, directly challenged the figures reported by the Minister. He pointed out that the Ministry had used almost its full budget within nine months, while many projects were stalled or not operating.

“Almost 100pc of the budget has been used, but many projects aren’t functioning,” he probed the Minister. “Why is that?”

Alemu also asked whether the Ministry had received less money than it needed or had released advance payments beyond planned allocations. He pressed Abraham to explain how his Ministry would complete the remaining projects with only a small portion of the approved budget remaining.

Bizuayehu Degefa (PhD), another MP-PP, raised concern over the Ministry’s reported 96pc plan execution. He demanded to know how such a high implementation rate could be justified when several projects were delayed or in trouble.

“On what basis was the 96pc calculated for execution when most projects are struggling?” Bizuayehu asked.

Abraham, a close ally of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) from their years at the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), defended his Ministry’s record. He has held board roles at the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA), the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), and the Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP). He told lawmakers that many questions reflected concern over the absence of new irrigation projects in their constituencies. Since taking office, his Ministry has not launched new schemes but rather focused on completing ongoing and delayed projects.

“We aren’t starting new projects this year,” he told Parliament. “We’re focusing on what we already have in hand.”

The Minister defended the budget utilisation rate, blaming the financing gap and claiming that actual implementation requirements were closer to 50 billion Br.

“We didn’t receive sufficient budget to execute our plan fully,” he said.

According to Abraham, the shortage of funds had constrained the Ministry’s targets, but it could achieve them if it secured the required financing.

“We used 98pc of the budget, but that does not mean we’re now at zero,” he said with a tone of reassurance. “We also have funds from partners.”

Nonetheless, his explanation did not seem to settle all doubts. It clarified that the Ministry bases the spending rate on the approved allocation, not its projected needs, but left unanswered how much partner financing has been available and disbursed, and how the reported execution rate was calculated, given that security, slowed construction, and weak functionality remain in the same portfolio.

For Biniyam Yaziz, a researcher and irrigation expert at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR), budget constraints explain only part of the Ministry’s ordeals. Agriculture is often given priority in policy language, but the budget does not match that ambition.

“Even though the government says it prioritises agriculture, the budget allocated is not sufficient to support effective implementation,” he said.

According to Biniyam, deeper problems lie in project management. He pointed to poorly studied projects, weak feasibility assessments and design flaws that begin before construction. Some projects, he said, are implemented mainly to satisfy regional allocation targets rather than be technically ready. He also raised concerns about contractor selection, noting that some irrigation projects are awarded to firms with insufficient experience or competence in irrigation infrastructure development.

“Community engagement is another weakness, with limited local ownership in protecting and sustaining projects,” Biniyam told Fortune.

Security disruptions in project areas have compounded delays. For Biniyam, Ethiopia’s food self-sufficiency ambitions depend on shifting away from reliance on rain-fed agriculture and enabling two to three harvest cycles a year. With adequate budget, stronger project management, and community ownership, he hopes that irrigation could reduce dependence on rainfall and deliver national gains.

The Standing Committee Chairwoman, Fetia Ahmed, closed the session with a caution. The Ministry, she said, should maintain its positive achievements while contending with its shortcomings.

Last week’s Parliamentary hearing left Abraham with little comfort. He remains in charge of a Ministry that claims to have spent nearly all of its approved budget, completed nine projects, and opened about tens of thousands of hectares to production, but still has to prove that the accounting matches water, land, and harvests.

New Golden Visa Turns Residency Into a Bet on Foreign Capital

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

Ethiopia is preparing to introduce a “Golden Visa” scheme for foreign nationals willing to invest substantial capital in the country or pay for residency privileges in foreign currency, as the federal immigration agency folds a sensitive area of migration policy into the government’s wider investment drive.

According to Selamawit Dawit, director general of the Immigration & Citizenship Services (ICS), the agency has begun issuing property-based residential IDs and visas to foreign nationals who own immovable property, including residential real estate. The change, disclosed at a press briefing she gave last week at ICS’s new headquarters on Beyene Aba Sebsib Street, near Gotera Junction, turns a residency document into part of a broader federal effort to attract foreign capital, raise revenue and reduce procedural bottlenecks for selected qualifying foreign residents and their families.

The rollout gives legal effect to visa categories first introduced in February under the approved “Immigration & Citizenship Service Fee Regulation.” The Council of Ministers had discussed the regulation and unanimously approved that it would come into force upon publication in December. Officials said the revision was intended to close “gaps observed” in the implementation of the previous amended regulation and to facilitate enforcement of the law allowing foreign nationals to acquire immovable property.

The regulation, revised for the third time in four years, sets service fees across 21 areas, including residence permits. A five-year permanent residence permit now costs 3,000 dollars, triple its previous level. Expedited processing within one to two days costs applicants between 4,000 dollars and 4,500 dollars, placing speed among monetised premium services. Investment visa fees are tiered by duration. Applicants pay 60 dollars for a one-month visa, 150 dollars for three months and 250 dollars for six months. A three-year visa costs 2,000 dollars, while a five-year visa costs 4,000 dollars.

Foreign nationals buying a property can obtain a visa valid for up to five years for the same 4,000 dollar fee.

The property-linked arrangement offers foreign homebuyers a pathway to residency while enabling them to acquire immovable property under the new law. After the purchase is completed, the buyer receives a property-based residential ID valid for up to five years. Both the ID and visa can be extended to the buyer’s immediate family. If the property is sold, the ID is revoked, tying residency privilege directly to ownership.

The law allows foreign nationals who own immovable property in Ethiopia to acquire property through lease or by investing at least 150,000 dollars. Non-Ethiopian nationals covered by the law can obtain property-linked visas and residential IDs. The Golden Visa occupies a higher tier. Non-Ethiopian nationals seeking it are expected to pay 10,000 dollars. It grants residence permits and travel rights. Holders renewing after 10 years would again pay 10,000 dollars, while immediate renewal requires 12,500 dollars. The visa, however, is granted under “special circumstances.”

Such circumstances include foreign nationals investing five million dollars and engaging in activities considered favourable to the country’s economic development, such as job creation or technology transfer. According to the Director General, ICS will “soon launch these visas.” The country previously lacked a legal framework for Golden Visas or property-based visas for homebuyers.

“Now, we’ve established the law and are in the process of availing them,” Selamawit told Fortune. “The framework is designed to attract foreign direct investment and simplify procedures for foreign nationals seeking to work in the country.”

According to Biruk Nigussie, a former Ministry of Revenue staff member who advises on tax and investment issues, premium services for investors encourage investment and can deliver substantial benefits for the country. He believes such incentives “make them privileged and encouraged.”

“Investors may not come only for incentives and premium services,” he said, “but such treatment can help them stay longer and invest more.”

These changes arrive as the Service expands its revenue base and administrative footprint. In the first three quarters of the fiscal year, ICS reported total revenue of 31.2 billion Br, 88.3pc of which came from domestic services, with the balance from overseas consular services. Passport issuance also climbed by four percent from the same period last year, where the Service issued more than one million copies, including 1,986 service passports and 446 diplomatic passports during the period.

Border control remained central to Selamawit’s report, including legal action against more than 10,530 individuals for attempted illegal entry or exit. The group included 4,576 foreign nationals and 5,954 Ethiopian citizens.

The investment backdrop is broader than immigration. Ethiopia attracted more than 3.19 billion Br in foreign direct investment, including Dangote Group’s fertiliser production complex in Gode, Somali Regional State. Under a joint venture arrangement, development costs are expected not to exceed 2.5 billion dollars, with completion targeted within 40 months from commencement. Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) will hold a 40pc equity.

Biruk hailed the government’s stated commitment to change the culture of how foreign investors are treated as “commendable,” arguing that retaining investors through ease of doing business would benefit the country more in the long run.

Universities Win Autonomy Only to Find the Purse Strings Tightened

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

The Ministry of Education (MoE) plans a new block-grant budget regulation for autonomous universities, replacing discretionary allocations with a formula-based system, its officials believe will make funding more transparent and tied to national development priorities.

The proposal follows complaints that budgets are insufficient and unstable, leaving managers unable to plan for teaching, research, and internships.

According to Kora Tushune, state minister for Education, the system allowed the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to release block budgets quickly, while financial management responsibility was shifted to universities through a block grant. The regulation is meant to alter that relationship.

“This is to change the university funding mechanism,” the State Minister told Fortune.

Public universities are moving toward autonomy as the Ministry rewrites their financing, promising more institutional room while tightening rules for allocating, using and auditing public funds.

The draft rests on seven principles, ranging from result orientation to equity and from inclusivity to accountability and adaptability. It divides support into general-purpose grants that would be unrestricted, giving universities discretion to cover services, survival needs and priorities. Restricted-purpose grants would be tied to infrastructure, teaching hospital operations, national priorities, and equity support for women, persons with disabilities and students from underdeveloped regional states.

Under the formula, general-purpose support would include a base grant that can cover up to 40pc of recurrent budgets for essential spending. The Budget Support Management Council, under the Ministry of Finance, would calculate it annually based on enrollment, ownership status, and geographic challenges. The rest would be determined by a formula that combines input, output, and equity indicators, with the formula reviewed every two years.

Restricted grants would be subject to tighter supervision, with a technical committee to verify needs before funds are released. Funding for teaching hospitals would be based on patient numbers, treatment complexity, and verified medical costs. The money would be disbursed quarterly through direct transfers from the Finance Ministry to the universities’ accounts, with strict reporting obligations.

The design seeks to answer demands for autonomy without surrendering oversight. Officials expect it to improve allocations and strengthen competitiveness without eroding fairness. It also tells universities to generate internal revenue through community-sensitive fees while maintaining comparable standards. What remains unclear is how the Council will weigh enrollment, ownership, location, outputs and equity, and whether data systems can prevent new disputes over budget pressures.

A separate financing problem sits in research, internships and externships. These activities are central to practical learning and innovation, but stall because resources arrive late or not at all. The Ministry is exploring alternative financing for a steadier base.

“We’re planning on pool funding,” Kora told Fortune.

The pooled model is expected to draw contributions from industries that host students during training placements. It is intended to strengthen links among education, research institutions, and the private sector. According to the State Minister, a new law governing linkages between higher education and TVET research with industries has been issued. Under this law, industries would pay a small, structured levy into a shared fund dedicated to partnerships among universities, TVET institutions, and companies. When lecturers and instructors are placed in factories or business settings to solve practical problems and address skills gaps, firms would channel modest contributions into a national pool fund.

“Since there are many industries, sufficient funding will be found,” Kora said. “Implementation is awaiting review by the Ministry of Finance.”

The joint guideline covers universities, TVET institutions, and industries that host interns or run “teacher extension” programmes in which educators enter industrial settings.

Says Kora: “Funding should not constrain participating institutions because industries would contribute directly to the pool.”

The arrangement, he argued, is not intended to treat internships and teacher placements as simple services. It is framed as a production and research collaboration generating value for both sides. Industries are expected to benefit from practical problem-solving, applied research, and skills development, while universities and TVET institutions could gain exposure to production. The unresolved issue is whether the levy has a defined rate, collection mechanism and enforcement procedure, details likely to determine whether the fund becomes reliable financing or another promise dependent on voluntary compliance.

Even as the Ministry seeks new funding mechanisms, procurement rules continue to weigh on universities. Officials say procurement laws remain unfavourable, creating operational constraints. Newly established universities alone spend close to 60 million Br a year on vehicle rentals, while all public universities together spend about 600 million Br. The Ministry has asked the Ministry of Finance to facilitate the procurement of more than 1,200 vehicles. The request has yet to be approved.

Six universities are expected to move to autonomous status soon. They are largely first-generation educational institutions, including the universities of Gondar, Hawassa, Haramaya and Arba Minch. They were established under a uniform model, with little emphasis on specialisation or diversification. Autonomy is expected to force them to define clearer missions and financing strategies.

The changes form part of a wider shake-up in higher education. In the private sector, reforms over the past two years have led to the closure of more than a hundred institutions. Others have shut down departments or restructured academic programmes to comply with new regulatory requirements. The standards reform is expected to extend to public universities soon.

Fitsum Gebremichael, assistant professor teaches educational planning and management at Hawassa University and has more than a decade of academic experience, including doctoral studies at Addis Abeba University. Over the years, he has seen how donor-led recommendations have shaped educational policies.

“As universities move toward autonomy, they will need strategies that meet global academic and research markets,” he told Fortune.

He cited Harvard and Stanford universities as examples of institutions that use revolving funds to finance research and innovation. Fitsum foresees that some of the incoming autonomous universities may evolve into research-specialised institutions, requiring substantial spending on research infrastructure and funding.

Fitsum urged researchers to seek grants and earn income by producing policy briefs and applied research outputs that address national financing and development challenges. But he warned that deeper problems remain in bureaucracy, institutional structure and efficiency.

“Stronger follow-up mechanisms, especially around accreditation and audit reports, will be needed if autonomy is to improve accountability rather than merely shift pressure from government to universities,” he said.

Amhara Bank Survives Rough Waves Yet to Outrun Risks

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

Amhara Bank’s accounts for the last year tell a recovery story edged with warning. The Bank closed the 2024/25 financial year larger, better capitalised and back in profit after a concerning opening quarter, yet its figures showed a financial institution still trying to turn scale into durable earnings.

The Bank expanded its balance sheet, rebuilt confidence, and reversed heavy losses, but remained burdened by a costly branch-and-payroll structure, weak productivity, and credit-risk signals that warrant a closer look. For shareholders, the year brought neither collapse nor vindication. It marked a transition from emergency repair to a phase in which governance, earnings quality, and credit discipline will determine whether survival becomes performance.

The drama began early. The previous year, the Bank recorded a loss of 924 million Br. By the end of the following fiscal year, that loss had been fully reversed. Gross profit reached 655 million Br, and profit after tax was 592 million Br. Had the Bank started from a zero-base scenario, profit by June 2025 could have reached nearly 1.6 billion Br.

Yet the annual outcome was a stabilisation, not a decisive breakout.

According to Gashaw Debebe, the board chairperson, who had served as a senior official at the Ministry of Trade, the Bank was able to “sustain its growth” and called the outcome a “substantial progress.”

Amhara Bank survived a year that began with distress and ended with profit, but the numbers show a lender closer to a turnaround case than a top-tier mid-sized performer.

Yohannes Ayalew (PhD), the Bank’s second president, offered a sharper version. He came to the helm in September 2024 after serving as vice governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), and called the year a rescue mission.

“I saved the Bank from death and made it a bank again,” he said.

He attributed the recovery to aggressive loan collection, improved asset recovery and renewed customer confidence. Fee and commission income also helped.

Revenue grew by 1.3 billion Br to 5.6 billion Br; interest income contributed 4.5 billion Br (80pc of total revenue), and fees nearly doubled to one billion Birr, while other income contributed 91 million Br.

Gross income increased by 28.8pc and net interest income by 25.4pc, representing 79.9pc of gross income, down from 86.2pc. Fees lifted its share to 18.5pc from 12.1pc, while net interest income was 53.9pc of gross income and 72.9pc of operating income, down from 80.1pc a year earlier.

Aminu Nuru, a Doha-based financial analyst, saw this as a positive trend in the broader banking industry, which has expanded more rapidly.

Industry assets expanded by 44.5pc to 4.74 trillion Br, deposits climbed by 40.7pc to 3.51 trillion Br, liquid assets almost doubled to 1.07 trillion Br, and net income after tax by 61.3pc to 93.4 billion Br. Total liquid assets grew by 90.9pc.

Among 11 banks that are peers of Amhara Bank, deposits grew by 33.49pc, while loan growth was 17.4pc, keeping the average loan-to-deposit ratio at 73.48pc. Return on assets (RoA) averaged 2.1pc, asset-to-equity 7.97 times, capital-to-asset 12.54pc, and employee profit 310,655 Br.

Amhara Bank sat awkwardly inside this performance. Its asset base reached 43.4 billion Br, up by 8.2 billion Br (23pc). Total assets grew by 23.2pc to 43.38 billion Br, below the 31.24pc average. Deposits jumped to 31.5 billion Br, a 25.7pc increase, lagging the average deposit growth of 33.49pc.

Loans grew by 28.6pc to 25.62 billion Br, well above the peer average of 17.4pc, and accounted for about 60pc of assets. Total liabilities expanded by 6.7 billion Br to 34.8 billion Br.

These made Amhara Bank more credit-heavy while peer banks built liquidity. Its loan-to-asset ratio was 59pc, close to the average of 59.62pc. Its loan-to-deposit ratio reached 81.36pc, materially above the average of 73.48pc. Only Hibret Bank, at 85.6pc, was more stretched, while Ahadu Bank posted 55.10pc. According to financial analysts, the ratio was not alarming on its own, but it left less room for deposit shocks.

Capital was strongest, with total equity expanded by 21.3pc to 8.62 billion Br, while paid-up capital reached 7.42 billion Br. The capital-to-asset ratio was 19.86pc, far above the 12.54pc average. Its asset-to-equity multiple was only 5.03 times, compared with 7.97 times. That made Amhara Bank safer but limited returns if assets were idle. Only Addis and Sidama banks were less leveraged, both at 4.21 times. Coop Bank was the most leveraged last year at 11.30 times.

However, returns were weaker, with gross profit growing by 85pc, above the peer group’s 55.38pc growth. But net profit increased by only 12.9pc, partly due to the previous year’s large tax credit.

Gadaa Bank’s profit after tax surged by 280pc to 342.76 million Br, leaving Amhara Bank’s profit nearly 73pc higher. Amhara Bank was larger than Addis Bank’s 23.6 billion Br asset base, but less profitable. Addis Bank posted 2.2 billion Br in after-tax profit, though foreign-exchange gains heavily supported its profit.

Amhara Bank was smaller than Anbesa Bank, whose assets reached 54 billion Br, deposits 44 billion Br, and pre-tax profit 1.8 billion Br.

Return on assets fell to 1.36pc, 1.37pc on the peer comparison, below the 2.1pc average and far behind Addis Bank’s 9.32pc and Berhan Bank’s 3.55pc. Return on equity slipped to 6.87pc (6.9pc) from 7.4pc, because equity grew faster than after-tax profit. Hence, earnings per share declined from 8.3pc to eight percent.

Net profit margin fell to 10.5pc from 12pc. Asset utilisation improved slightly, with gross income rising to 13pc of total assets from 12.4pc, while the equity multiplier moved from 4.96 times to 5.03 times.

Costs explain the drag as total expenses reached about five billion Birr, up by 24pc. Interest expense was 29.4pc of total expense, below the 11-bank pooled ratio of 40.22pc and down from 33.6pc a year earlier.

Personnel costs were 1.7 billion Br, 34.1pc of total expenses, and administrative expenses were 1.34 billion Br, comprising 26.9pc. Together they consumed 61pc of expenses. The peer ratio was heavier at 77.34pc, but Amhara Bank’s burden remained high.

Cost-to-income improved from 85.7pc to 79.8pc, but that was still uncomfortable. Other operating expenses jumped by 72.1pc, partly due to a net foreign-exchange loss of 367.25 million Br.

Aminu urged management to review staff productivity, restructure cost-heavy branches and reduce non-essential administrative costs. Yohannes, the former president, disagreed.

“Profit came from diversifying income and controlling costs, while wages had not been adjusted for almost three years,” he said. “A new wage scale had begun to be implemented in the current fiscal year.”

Credit quality was harder, with loans growing by 28.6pc to 25.62 billion Br, driven by growth across most sectors. The portfolio was mostly commercial, while exports and manufacturing together accounted for 77.3pc, equivalent to 20 billion Br.

According to Yohannes, non-performing loans dropped from nearly 15pc, about three times the regulatory limit, to around four percent after aggressive recovery and stopping loan rescheduling. The Bank recovered nearly 10.2 billion Br, representing more than 40pc of its 20 billion Br loan portfolio. Cash and cash equivalents increased to 7.6 billion Br.

Yet IFRS staging points the other way. Stage 1 loans grew to 24.07 billion Br from 19.57 billion Br, but Stage 2 loans surged to 751.9 million Br from 306.2 million Br, and Stage 3 loans jumped to 1.12 billion Br from 172.9 million Br. Gross Stage 3 loans reached 4.31pc of gross loans, close to the five percent regulatory ceiling, while Stage 2 and Stage 3 together reached 7.21pc, up from 2.39pc. Loan impairment provision increased by 148.8pc to 189.95 million Br.

For Abdulmenan Mohammed (PhD), the London-based financial analyst, the increase “should concern the management of the Bank.”

Loan allowance was 319.43 million Br, equal to 1.23pc of gross loans and 28.5pc of Stage 3 loans. The impairment charge was 0.73pc of gross loans, up from 0.38pc and above the 0.56pc peer ratio.

Abdulmenan warned of exposures to a handful of large borrowers behind the veneer of loan growth and profit.

“The Board and Management were blamed for credit concentration, large exposures and repeated rescheduling of loans for large borrowers, practices that could have serious negative consequences,” he told Fortune.

He urged an overhaul of lending and credit management practices, closer examination by the Central Bank and accountability for those responsible.

Governance has been another unresolved issue at Amhara Bank, which had the largest shareholder base (165,000) when it was incorporated in 2022. Yohannes left months after leading the recovery, but he blamed “elements within the Bank who wanted to capture the institution” and did not want him to stay, for his resignation in January this year.

He joined Amhara Bank after the founding President, Henok Kebede, resigned in December 2024, and an interim leadership led by Chanyalew Demissie took over.

After Yohannes’ departure, board members alleged that the Bank submitted misleading reports to the Central Bank, omitting internal audit findings. They cited accounting inconsistencies between system records and actual balances, alleged inflated loan disbursements beyond approved limits, breaches of lending caps, weak loan classification, high-risk exposure to poorly secured loans, flawed credit-loss models, and cash shortages during branch inspections.

Yohannes rejected all the charges.

“I rectified what they mismanaged,” he said.

After his departure, Gashaw, who replaced Melaku Fenta, the founding board chairman, has installed new leadership. Samuel Tadesse was appointed chief retail banking officer and acting president. Eshete Yimata became chief corporate banking officer; Mengistu Hailu, chief corporate support services officer; and, Behailu Gullalat, chief banking operations officer.

According to Yohannes, now leading Tseday Bank, Amhara Bank “rests on a stronger foundation and could become strong if stability is maintained.”

However, not everyone appears to be reassured. According to a branch manager in Addis Abeba, speaking anonymously, networks often outweigh professionalism in appointments and promotions, with posts treated as “gifts from the Board.”

The Bank ended June 2025 with 315 branches and 4,762 employees. Gross profit per employee was about 137,500 Br, far below the peer average of 310,655 Br. Deposit per branch was about 100 million Br, below the average of 150.05 million Br.

“Leadership instability has kept the Bank below its potential,” he told Fortune, sceptical of a full turnaround this fiscal year.

Shareholders share the scepticism. A founding shareholder, Gebrehiwot Worku, claimed he has never received dividends and would sell his shares if a buyer were to come. Another shareholder, Sewagegn Chane, quipped that investing in the Bank might have been a mistake.

“As an investor, I should expect returns,” he told Fortune, “but now I only hope the bank survives.”

However, analysts say Amhara Bank should not be viewed as distressed, as its 2024/25 result was a successful stabilisation, although with unresolved quality risks. Its performance for the eight months of the current financial year showed progress, with gross profit reaching 1.82 billion Br, assets expanding to 52.76 billion Br, deposits reaching 37.9 billion Br, NPLs remaining at 4.9pc, and more than 9.9 billion Br in loans recovered. The test is whether survival becomes durable profitability.

Brewed Buck Stays Calm, But Not Idle. Stability Mirrors Discipline, Not Necessarily Liquidity

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

The Birr (Brewed Buck) spent the six days to April 25 doing what often passes for calm in the official foreign exchange market. It barely moved. More than a month after the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) last held a foreign exchange auction, quotations against the dollar stayed tightly grouped, held in place by the near-universal two percent spread and cautious daily changes.

On the surface, the message was stability. Beneath it, the message was hesitant. Banks were not repricing the dollar aggressively, but the absence of auctions left the supply question unanswered.

Across commercial banks, excluding the Central Bank’s zero-spread quotation, the average buying rate for the dollar increased from 154 Br on April 20 to 154.18 Br on April 25. The average selling rate moved from 157.15 Br to 157.27 Br. The six-day change was 0.1153 Br on the buying side and 0.1176 Br on the selling side. In percentage terms, the movement was tiny. In market terms, it was revealing that the official market did not break away without auctions. It edged forward through isolated step changes, fixed postings and a broad reluctance to show stronger pressure in public quotes.

Last week, the commercial-bank average was 154.12 Br on the buying side and about 157.20 Br on the selling side. On April 25, the average buying rate was 154.18, 1.05 Br above Nib Bank’s 153.13 Br, the lowest buying rate quoted.

Oromia Bank remained the premium outlier among the private commercial banks. It quoted 157.05 Br buying and 160.19 Br selling on April 25, the highest commercial-bank rates, nearly four Birr above the lowest commercial selling rates. Oromia Bank has long occupied the top end of the official cash market, though its movement last week was fractional, at 0.0153 Br on the buying side and 0.0156 Br on the selling side.

The sharper shift last week came from the Central Bank, which has become the highest quoted buyer, standing above all commercial-bank buying rates, including Oromia Bank’s, while still sitting below the latter’s selling rate because commercial banks continued to apply the two percent margin.

This structure is uncommon, as it leaves the Central Bank appearing as the formal price leader on the buying side, while commercial banks remain restrained by spread discipline on the selling side. In a forex market that has gone more than a month without auctions, the Central Bank’s movement may be the clearest signal in the table. The official reference point is being allowed to rise, but banks are adjusting unevenly around it.

The Central Bank posted rates that jumped from 156.83 Br on April 20 to 157.47 Br by April 24, and stayed unchanged on April 25. That was a 0.64 Br increase within the six days, far larger than the commercial-bank average drift, and a rare jump of about 0.90 Br from the previous week.

The big private banks did not move as a bloc. Awash Bank barely shifted, raising its buying rate from 154.1 Br on April 20 to 154.13 Br on April 25, a change of 0.025 Br. Its selling rate increased from 157.18 Br to 157.21 Br. The Bank of Abyssinia (BOA) moved more visibly, lifting its buying rate from 153.83 Br to 154.11 Br, an increase of 0.28 Br, while its selling rate jumped from 156.91 Br to 157.19 Br. That pulled BOA from the lower cluster toward the industry average.

Zemen Bank was more assertive last week. It began at 154.71 Br, already above most banks, and ended at 155.19 Br, crossing the 155 Br threshold by 0.19 Br. Its selling rate finished at 158.3 Br, second only to Oromia Bank among commercial banks. However, Zemen’s 0.47 Br buying-rate increase was not a rounding adjustment. It moved the Bank into a premium class, away from the broad group clustered between about 153.8 Br and 154.6 Br. The change revealed a stronger willingness to pay for cash dollars, tighter internal demand, or an effort to attract supply through posted prices.

Dashen and Wegagen banks took a different path. The first kept its buying rate unchanged at 153.17 Br and its selling rate at 156.23 Br throughout last week, leaving it among the lowest-rate commercial banks by April 25. Wegagen Bank also kept rates unchanged, but at much higher levels of 154.59 Br for buying and 157.68 Br for selling. Its stillness was not a low-demand signal but could be a high fixed posture.

The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) posted 153.21 Br on April 25, up from 153.1 Br on April 20. Its selling rate changed from 156.16 Br to 156.28 Br. CBE remained closer to Dashen, Nib and Coop Bank than to the upper-tier private banks. Still, even a small move by CBE carries weight because it acts less like an aggressive competitor than a stabilising reference institution.

The market was split into clear groups. Oromia, Zemen and Wegagen banks formed the premium tier, joined by banks such as ZamZam, Gadaa, Lion, Amhara and Goh Betoch in the upper range. Awash, Abay, Coop Bank, Enat, Hibret, and Sidama banks made tiny maintenance adjustments. BOA, Zemen, CBE, Siinqee, Tsehay and ZamZam showed step changes. Tsehay Bank increased by 1.2 Br, from 152.99 Br to 154.19 Br, the largest increase among commercial banks. Siinqee Bank jumped by 0.91 Br, from 153.11 Br to 154.02 Br.

Addis, Ahadu, Amhara, Berhan, Bunna, Dashen, Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), Gadaa, Global, Goh, Hijra, Lion, Nib, and Wegagen banks showed no change in buying rates.

The low end was as telling. By April 25, Nib Bank was the lowest buyer at 153.13 Br, followed by Dashen at 153.17 Br, CBE at 153.21 Br and Coop Bank at 153.26 Br. The lowest reliable selling rates clustered around Nib Bank at 156.2 Br, Dashen at 156.23 Br and CBE at 156.28 Br. These banks looked less willing to advertise stronger dollar demand, or less ready to chase supply through public cash rates.

CAKE Takes the Place of Wine in Addis Abeba’s Social Visits

Posted on April 26, 2026April 29, 2026 by Digital Editor

Weeks after the Easter holiday, Addis Abeba has slipped back into its ordinary pace. The holiday crowds have dissipated, shopfronts are quieter, and families have returned to work, school and routine.

Yet one habit from the season has lingered in living rooms and across dining tables. Visitors who once arrived with wine, soft drinks, fruit or neatly wrapped goods increasingly came with boxed cakes, decorated and ready to share. Repeated across neighbourhoods, it unveiled a shift in the city’s language of hospitality. Cake is becoming a visiting gift, less formal than wine and more immediate than traditional offerings.

In Piassa, Enrico Pastry, on General Wingate St., offers a window into the change. Established in the mid-1950s by Italian entrepreneur Enrico Lumini, Addis Abeba’s oldest pastry shop has become part of its everyday food culture. The Easter rush has passed, but its trace remains in records and routines still measuring what the season revealed.

Manager Kidist Gebregziabher describes the period as strong but complicated.

“During Easter, demand was high,” she recalled.

However, the numbers were contradictory as revenue jumped from last year, but the number of cakes sold declined. Inflation did the work, with rising ingredient and operating costs and household strain pushing prices higher, changing what bakeries earn.

“Prices have gone up,” Kidist told Fortune. “Even though we earned more in value, we sold fewer cakes in number. Cake is becoming more of a luxury.”

Even so, demand held through the holiday, with Torta cakes the most popular choice. Customers ranged from children to older residents, giving the product broad appeal.

“There is always a spike after fasting ends,” she said. “People want something rich to mark the moment.”

Enrico has tried not to raise prices during peak seasons, a decision Kidist believes is meant to retain customer trust in a sensitive holiday market. But she sees a wider social shift that may matter as much as the sales figures.

“In Addis Abeba, cake is becoming the main gift when people visit,” she told Fortune.

For Wondosen Kebede, a 46-year-old father of three, the change is visible at the doorstep. He remembered when gifts followed a more predictable order.

“In the past, people brought fruits or wine,” he recalled. “Cake was something you ate in cafeterias, not something you carried to someone’s house.”

That separation has faded.

“Now most visitors come with cake,” he said. “It has become the first choice.”

The reasons are practical and emotional. Wine and imported gifts have become more expensive. Cake, though also affected by rising prices, remains manageable for many families and carries a different meaning.

“When someone brings cake, it feels more personal,” Wondosen stated. “You open it and share it immediately. It creates closeness.”

He now buys cakes weekly from Enrico for his children.

“It gives a familiar taste,” he said. “And the price is still manageable.”

Fitsum Tesfaye, a 53-year-old catering professional, also sees the shift as more than a holiday fashion.

“During this Easter, cake was everywhere,” she said. “I brought cake when I visited others, too.”

For her, cake fits the urban household.

“In many homes, there are children,” she said. “Cake is something everyone can share.”

Unlike alcohol-based gifts, cake moves quickly to the centre of the table. It is sliced in front of guests, divided openly and consumed together.

“It creates a lighter atmosphere,” Fitsum said. “It brings people closer without much formality.”

Among younger residents, the habit appears less like a departure and more like the new normal. For someone like Sara Mamo, Easter made the change plain.

“Cake is now the normal gift,” she told Fortune.

She finds its symbolism is simple.

“It represents love,” Sara said. “When you cut it and share it, it brings people together.”

Rising prices have not erased that appeal.

“We still buy it because it has become part of the celebration,” she said.

Samper Timoteos, 23, reads the change as generational. Cake suits that mood.

“Before, alcohol was used to show respect,” he observed. “Now the focus is family and children. It makes occasions feel complete. You see it everywhere now.”

For bakeries, the shift has brought opportunity and pressure. Koba Pastry & Bakery, part of Romina Group, has expanded quickly, opening several branches across Addis Abeba. According to its Marketing Manager, Musse Mulugeta, demand is rising as customers become familiar with the variety.

“Customers are becoming more aware of different cake types,” he told Fortune.

Koba imports vital ingredients, tests international recipes and adapts them for local tastes. Delivery services have widened their reach during holidays, when orders rise. To manage inflation, the company stocks ingredients early, hoping to avoid holiday price spikes. Its customers now include families, corporate clients and event organisers across the city.

The business case is clear, but the meaning of cake goes beyond volume. A week after Easter, what stood out was not only consumption but function. Cake is becoming part of how social ties are performed. It marks arrival, softens formality and gives guests and hosts something to share without ceremony.

For some entrepreneurs, the change has also made cake a craft of identity and reinvention. Mahder Solomon began at home, drawing, baking and experimenting before formal training in the United States and Dubai. She opened Occasion Cakes in Addis Abeba a decade ago and built a brand around themed designs, cakes shaped like objects, characters and scenes rather than standard forms.

From its outlet in the Bole Medhanialem neighbourhood, the business expanded across the city. Mahder still handles complex custom designs herself, especially realistic cakes. She saw the market widen sharply.

“A decade ago, options were limited,” she said. “Now Addis Abeba has many more varieties.”

Inflation has narrowed the room for error. Eggs and milk have become more expensive, forcing careful pricing. Mahder uses a base price per kilogram, adjusted for design complexity and labour. When a cake demands too much time, she either raises the price or recommends a simpler alternative.

Seasonality remains decisive, for holidays lift orders. Fasting periods reduce them, though vegan options partly offset them. But some events matter beyond the register. First birthdays and weddings, she noted, remain the most meaningful.

“They carry memory. People look back at those moments,” she said.

Not every baker operates with that scale. Lemlem Tadesse, with more than a decade of experience, built her career through hotels, training, and, later, a small baking business after winning recognition in a televised contest. She now teaches students while making cakes, often reinvesting earnings into training materials. She sees the same cultural turn.

“People have stopped bringing drinks,” she said. “They now bring sweets instead.”

But the market is harder at the smaller end. Orders have declined, and competition from informal bakers has intensified. Lemlem has not raised prices despite higher costs.

“The society can’t afford more right now,” said Lemlem.

During fasting seasons, demand falls sharply, leaving gaps she often covers personally. Still, she remains, hoping stability will return with seasonal cycles.

For now, cake has not replaced tradition so much as recast it. Addis Abeba’s Easter visits showed how small choices can redraw social customs. The box carried through the door is a gift, a dessert and a signal at once. It is affordable for some, costly for others, profitable for bakeries and risky for small producers. Most of all, it is immediate. It is opened, cut and shared before the visit ends, placing the cake at the centre of a changing urban ritual.

Sociologists say such changes rarely arrive in clean lines. Sintayehu Yehun, a sociologist at Bahir Dar University, links the rise of cake gifting to trade, migration, education and especially media exposure.

“Globalisation plays a major role,” he said. “People are exposed to new ways of celebrating, and they adopt them.”

In urban settings, visibility accelerates the habit.

“Sometimes these practices are associated with modernity or improved economic status,” Sintayehu said.

But he warned against assuming permanence.

“These trends can change quickly depending on how cultural preferences evolve,” he told Fortune.

Deposit Insurance Fund Expands Investment Portfolio

Posted on April 26, 2026April 27, 2026 by Digital Editor

The Ethiopian Deposit Insurance Fund (EDIF) reported strong financial performance for the first nine months of the 2025/2026 fiscal year, with cumulative premium collections reaching 20.61 billion Br since its establishment three years ago.

Created under Council of Ministers, the Fund serves as a safeguard for depositors, ensuring protection in the event of bank or microfinance institution failure.

During the reporting period, EDIF collected 6.76 billion Br, meeting its target and marking a 31.26pc increase compared to the same period last year, driven by rising deposit volumes across the financial sector. Conventional deposits accounted for 18.72 billion Br of the cumulative total, while Sharia-compliant deposits contributed 1.89 billion Br.

Private banks contributed 10.41 billion Br, followed by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) with 9.96 billion Br and microfinance institutions with 0.24 billion Br.

To strengthen liquidity and ensure timely payouts of up to 100,000 Br per depositor, the Fund expanded its investment portfolio to 22.98 billion Br, an 89.76pc increase year-on-year. Government Treasury Bills accounted for 20.97 billion Br, while Mudarabah accounts held 2.01 billion Br, generating 1.74 billion Br in investment income during the period.

EDIF, which operates under the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), now includes 95 member institutions comprising 31 commercial banks and 64 microfinance institutions, reinforcing its role in safeguarding financial system stability.

Why Slums Persist

Posted on April 26, 2026April 25, 2026 by Digital Editor

The standard policy response to slums (relocate people, bulldoze the settlement, and build public housing elsewhere) is older than the slums themselves. It has never worked.

The logic seems straightforward. Slums are viewed as unsanitary, unsafe, and visually jarring. Those who want to build a modern, orderly city want to remove them. But people do not live in slums by choice. They do so because there are no affordable alternatives near their jobs and essential services. Destroying their homes without addressing the conditions that drove them there merely shifts the problem to a different, often worse, place.

Experience bears this out. In 1968 and 1975, Brazil’s military government launched an aggressive slum-demolition campaign in Rio de Janeiro, forcing nearly 50,000 families into housing projects on the city’s periphery. The residents of Catacumba favela, which housed nearly 15,000 people on prime real estate in Lagoa before its destruction in 1970, experienced a decline in household income, higher commuting costs, and reduced access to jobs following their relocation. Meanwhile, the overall favela population continued to grow.

A similar pattern has been documented in Addis Abeba, Lagos, and Mumbai, with slums eliminated in one place only to reappear elsewhere, often nearby. Even after eradication was abandoned as an official policy, as in Brazil, new informal settlements continued to emerge.

In new research, my co-authors, Pedro Cavalcanti and Alexander Monge-Naranjo, and I examine the emergence and persistence of slums in Brazil using detailed data on labour markets, housing, and education. We find that slums are not simple poverty traps. Under the right conditions, they can also be stepping stones.

For families with very low levels of education, slums can provide an entry point into urban economic life. Compared to rural areas, they offer better access to jobs and schools. But the quality of those schools remains poor, so as households accumulate education, the slum becomes a constraint. Put simply, slums can help households get onto the first rungs of the economic ladder but prevent them from climbing higher.

While some households manage to improve their economic circumstances enough to leave the slums, many, often those with intermediate levels of education, do not. And there are always more low-educated rural households moving in, often motivated by the desire to improve their children’s educational prospects. In fact, our research shows that schooling plays a key role in slum formation. Households with low years of schooling want their children to have better lives, but cannot afford to live in cities.

These findings help to explain why slums persist despite the economic opportunities they provide. They are not static communities. Slums are dynamic systems that are continuously renewed. Instead of attempting to eliminate slums through demolition and forced relocation – a recipe for failure – policymakers should address the deeper mismatches between job proximity, housing affordability, and access to quality education.

Improving schools within slums is essential, though it might attract new migrants, causing slums to grow. Countries in earlier stages of development, where most people live in rural areas, should thus place a high priority on improving rural schools so that migration to cities reflects opportunity rather than desperation. Better-prepared migrants are more likely to enter formal housing markets rather than informal settlements.

As urbanisation progresses, the emphasis should shift toward integrating slum residents into the formal economy, especially by ensuring their children have access to higher-quality schools. Such policies should be sustained across generations to enable households to build sufficient human capital to achieve upward mobility and break the cycle of informality.

But education is only the first step. If formal urban housing remains prohibitively expensive, even upwardly mobile families will struggle to leave slums behind. Because the market does not supply affordable housing where it is needed, and long daily commutes are unrealistic, governments have to intervene with a coherent strategy that accounts for both education and housing.

Slums persist not because they are desirable, but because they are necessary. As long as people lack better options, they will continue to flourish. The task for policymakers is not to eliminate slums by diktat, but to make them obsolete over time by promoting the educational opportunities and spatial integration their residents need.

Month: April 2026