The Ethiopian Customs Commission (ECC) has introduced a legally binding advance ruling system for determining the rules of origin of export goods, a move aimed at streamlining customs procedures and aligning Ethiopia’s trade operations with World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards and African Free Continental Trade Area (AFCFTA).
The directive, signed in May 2026 by Minister of Revenue & Customs Commissioner Aynalem Nigussie, allows manufacturers and exporters to obtain official origin determinations before initiating exports. The measure is particularly relevant for businesses operating under continental, regional, or bilateral free trade agreements, as well as unilateral duty-free arrangements.
Under the new directive, applicants seeking an advance ruling must submit extensive documentation to the Tariff Classification & Rules of Origin Directorate, including a renewed export licence.
The application requirements include a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), comprehensive production formulas, and a detailed cost breakdown of domestic and imported raw materials used in production. Where submitted documents are considered insufficient, the Commission retains the authority to conduct on-site factory inspections and request laboratory analyses.
The Commission is required to issue a written decision within 30 days of receiving a complete application. The timeline may be extended by an additional 15 days in cases involving complex assessments or delays in laboratory findings. Once issued, an advance ruling remains legally binding on the Commission for three years.
Applicants dissatisfied with the decision may seek reconsideration through the Directorate within 15 business days, with further appeals permitted through the Appeals Review Directorate. While legally binding, the ruling does not replace the proof-of-origin documentation required at the time of shipment.
A senior rules-of-origin expert at the Commission, who requested anonymity, likened a certificate of origin to a product’s citizenship. She explained that a product does not automatically acquire the citizenship of a country merely because value was added there or because part of its production process took place within its borders.
She added that exporters are responsible for covering the costs of laboratory tests and other investigations required to verify a product’s origin. At present, the certification process is handled exclusively at the Commission’s headquarters, where 223 declarations have been approved to date.
By shifting origin verification to the pre-export stage, the directive is expected to reduce clearance delays at customs checkpoints and strengthen confidence in customs administration. As Ethiopia expands its participation in regional trade blocs, the initiative signals an effort to improve institutional capacity and enhance market transparency through the public disclosure of non-confidential rulings on the Commission’s website.
The development comes six months after Ethiopia joined the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), launched by Kassahun Gofe (PhD) the minister of Trade and Regional Intergration.
Yet, major obstacles continue to hinder implementation. Persistent infrastructure deficits, including unreliable electricity supply and limited broadband access, combine with high internet costs to constrain digital trade adoption. Regulatory fragmentation, the absence of harmonised standards, data sovereignty concerns, financing challenges linked to currency instability and limited venture capital, as well as shortages of technical expertise and digital literacy, continue to weigh on the continent’s integration ambitions.
According to the latest available UN COMTRADE data with a detailed regional breakdown, 15pc of Ethiopia’s merchandise exports were destined for African markets in 2021, while the continent accounted for seven percent of the country’s imports.
A report titled Growth Through Innovation: Economic Report on Africa 2026, released by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), argues that deeper structural transformation is required to unlock the full benefits of regional integration. The report stresses that progress depends on embedding innovation into regional value chains, supporting industrialisation and manufacturing clusters centred on critical minerals and clean energy, rather than relying solely on tariff reductions.
Emerging technologies are already helping reduce transaction costs through initiatives such as the Pan-African Payment & Settlement System (PAPSS), which facilitates real-time cross-border payments in local currencies. The platform is also advancing efforts toward a unified digital market through the harmonisation of e-commerce and cybersecurity regulations, enabling African economies to bypass legacy constraints through modern logistics platforms such as the Africa Trade Gateway (ATG). PAPSS is currently being piloted in several countries and is expected to be introduced in Ethiopia, according to information confirmed to Fortune.
In 2025, the PAPSS African Currency Marketplace (PACM) facilitated the exchange of more than 120 million dollars in trapped aviation-sector funds. The most actively exchanged currencies in the aviation segment included the Malawi Kwacha, Mozambique Metical, and Central African CFA franc. As of April 2026, PAPSS supports 18 African currencies across West, Central, East, and Southern Africa, while the Egyptian Pound and Ethiopian Birr are scheduled for inclusion during the second quarter.
Edao Abdi, president of the Ethiopian Oil & Pulse Exporters Association (EPOSPEA), says exports of oilseeds and grains within Africa have begun gaining momentum, though trade remains concentrated in a limited number of crops and regional markets, particularly Kenya.
He noted that while Uganda and Tanzania produce maize, their output of certain pulses remains below Ethiopia’s production levels. At the same time, restrictions have been imposed on Cash Against Documents (CAD) arrangements for exports to Kenya, Egypt, and Sudan.
Edao argues that the African Union has yet to provide an effective solution to cases where buyers take possession of goods without completing payment. He maintains that the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) bears responsibility for protecting exporters from financial losses arising from such transactions. According to him, the core challenge has never been the absence of payment instruments such as Letters of Credit (LC), which are widely available, but the frequency of payment defaults. This reality has compelled traders to depend heavily on trust and consistent delivery performance to sustain long-term commercial relationships.
Logistics experts such as Tewodros Kassahun observe that certificates of origin remain relatively easy to obtain and, in many destinations, are not yet rigorously required. He believes this reflects the early stage of regional trade integration but cautions that stricter enforcement and verification requirements are likely to emerge as continental trade expands.
The international presence at Monday’s polls marks a historic low. The European Union, whose monitoring missions historically shaped global perspectives on Ethiopian politics, has deployed no observers. The current footprint is strictly limited to regional bodies, including the African Union, which has sent a short-term delegation, and IGAD, which has deployed 26 regional experts. NEBE officials have downplayed the absence of Western missions, publicly stating that the quality, independence, and meaning of observation findings outweigh dependence on raw numbers alone.
Kassahun Follo’s plan to keep an eye on the national polls set for Monday, June 1, 2026, ended before the vote began.
The Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU), which he leads as the country’s national trade union platform, had been accredited to observe tomorrow’s polls. The organisation represents more than one million workers through nine industrial federations and about 2,500 trade unions. It had observed elections before and planned to monitor this one through a labour-rights lens. But the money did not arrive.
“We’re trying to secure financing and observe the election,” Kassahun told Fortune. “But because we couldn’t obtain the resources, we’ll not observe this election.”
CETU’s withdrawal captures the mood around the general election, the seventh since the constitutional order was established in the mid-1990s, a contest expected to send representatives to regional councils and the federal legislative house for the next five years, but unfolding in a cold and subdued atmosphere. Hours before voters head to polling stations, the question is less who will win than what kind of political order follows the election.
According to senior officials of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), the machinery is ready.
Ballot papers have reached designated locations, election materials have been distributed, and polling stations are prepared. The Board’s chief, Melatwork Hailu, used a final briefing on May 27, 2026, at Skylight Hotel on Africa Avenue (Bole Road) to urge voters to participate. She has registered 10,438 candidates from 39 political parties, two coalitions, one front and 80 independent candidacies. One coalition includes eight parties, another includes four, and the front consists of four parties.
More than 250,000 candidate representatives have received badges, while 68 media organisations, including 56 local and 12 international outlets, have been accredited.
Yet the scale on paper masks a quieter election. The number of registered political parties fell by six to 42. The candidate list dropped by 451 from the initial list, including about 80 candidates removed for failing to submit required documents. Elections will not be held in 46 of the 547 constituencies, including all 38 in Tigray Regional State and eight in Amhara Regional State, where security conditions remain difficult.
The Board disclosed that over 50 million voters were registered when rosters were closed in April, with women accounting for 54.2pc. After reassessments allowed voter registration to resume in 40 previously suspended constituencies, 3,367 polling stations added 3.3 million voters, bringing the number to 53.8 million. Special polling stations also registered 20,122 university students, 28,632 internally displaced people and 126,498 military personnel.
“University-student registration figures were lower than expected, though some students may already have used the regular digital channel,” said Melatwork.
When she addressed the media last week, the total tally of voters was 54 million. Although a digital voter-registration platform was introduced, only 10.9pc of registrants used it.
Registration itself showed the Board’s caution. Security assessments initially suspended registration in 48 constituencies, mainly in Amhara regional State with 38 rated red and 10 yellow. After reassessment, 40 were reopened for registration. That has made the vote feel as much administrative as political, with the hours expected to show whether Ethiopia can hold an election whose reach is broad but whose competitive energy has narrowed. Observation, once a major measure of the electoral credibility, is narrower this time.
According to Melatwork, 114 organisations received support from funds allocated by the UNDP, the European Union and the federal government budget provided to the Board, while acknowledging the money was insufficient.
CETU is not alone in struggling with funding shortages, which have hit several domestic groups even as NEBE disclosed local observation groups have expanded by more than 32pc compared with the previous national elections. The Board has accredited 55 civil society organisations to deploy 64,770 stationary and mobile observers, with 1,572 coordinators. Its officials expect this number to increase on polling day.
Around 169 organisations were certified for voter education, though another figure from the Board put the active number at 143, nearly eight percent lower than in the previous cycle.
The accredited domestic groups include women’s associations, youth federations, disability advocates, peace and development organisations and legal professional associations. NEBE has also organised training workshops for civic groups involved in election work. Among those still preparing are the Ethiopian Youth Federation, the Federation of Ethiopian Associations of Persons with Disabilities, the Amhara Region Youth Associations Federation, the Oromia Women Federation, and the Gondar Development & Peace Association.
Diplomatic missions based in Addis Abeba have also requested permission to observe and have been granted observer badges. More than 220,000 party representatives have been accredited to observe voting on election day, adding another layer to the observation framework, though the Board has issued more than 250,000 candidate-representative badges.
The Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) chose to stay in despite the shortfall in funding. According to its Programme Manager, Wondimneh Mola, the Association, which deployed 178 observers during the last election with 15 million Br support from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), now depends on roughly 500,000 Br from internal resources.
“Due to severe shortages in funding resources, it has become extremely difficult for us to provide training and cover transportation and other operational expenses for our observers,” he said. “The funds we used to receive have been almost entirely reduced.”
The Association trained only 70 short-term observers to monitor election-day activities, who are expected to operate in the Amhara, Oromia, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Sidama, and Afar regional states, as well as in Dire Dawa.
The Coalition of Ethiopian Civil Society Organisations for Elections, the largest domestic observer alliance, is better positioned. Representing 180 member organisations, it plans to deploy more than 4,100 observers nationwide, with more than half serving as stationary observers and the rest operating as mobile monitors.
“The short-term observers are now in training,” Abera Hailemariam, the director general, told Fortune last week.
But its pre-election assessment, covering 4,990 polling stations, documented serious problems, particularly in the Amhara Regional State. It cited the killing of an election official in East Gojjam Zone, attempted attacks in Awi and Wag Himra, and risks to election workers and voters. It also reported voter registrations in prohibited locations such as military camps, police stations, religious institutions, health facilities, hotels, and private homes, as well as registrations without voters physically present or with invalid identification.
Elderly voters and persons with disabilities faced accessibility barriers.
International observation has also narrowed. The European Union (EU), whose past reports shaped international views of Ethiopian elections, is visibly absent. According to sources close to the EU Commission in Addis Abeba, “the EU doesn’t have an interest in participating, and budgets are not allocated.”
Board officials played down the shrinking footprint of election observers.
“The freedom, fairness, and credibility of any election are best reflected by the ability of observers to conduct independent monitoring and provide meaningful findings,” the Board stated. “The effectiveness and quality of observation matter more than relying on figures alone.”
So far, only the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have confirmed participation. The AU mission, led by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, arrived on May 26. It plans to deploy observers from 37 African countries, including ambassadors accredited to the AU. One Board account put the AU delegation at 59 members; another AU disclosure said it would deploy 73 short-term observers.
“The observers will be deployed across various regions of Ethiopia to observe election-day procedures, including the opening of polls, voting, closing, counting and tabulation at polling stations,” the AU said.
IGAD’s mission, led by former Ugandan Vice President Speciosa Wandira-Kazibwe (MD) and deputised by Mohamed Ali Houmed, includes 26 short-term observers from Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.
“We’re preparing to observe the election in Ethiopia by deploying experts from the region,” a senior IGAD official said.
The decline marks a departure from earlier cycles. Observers from 23 countries monitored elections when the current political order began in 1992. The 2005 election drew missions from the EU, the AU, and the Carter Centre and remains one of the country’s most closely observed contests. In 2021, after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) came to power, the EU and USAID sought to participate, but disagreements over operational conditions kept them out. The AU and the International Republican Institute observed that vote.
This year’s electoral content is also uneven. Political parties in Tigray Regional State, including the Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party, a.k.a. “Simret,” linked to former Tigray Interim Administration President Getachew Reda, are effectively excluded from the contest because voting will not take place in the region. The Social Democratic Party, founded by the late Beyene Petros and now led by Rahel Bafe (PhD), also left amid internal disputes.
Security has limited campaigning in parts of Oromia and Amhara regional states. Still, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), led by Dawud Ibsa, is participating for the first time. The Oromo Federalist Congress (ODF), led by Merera Gudina (Prof.), also joined, partly to avoid deregistration after missing the last contest.
The ruling Prosperity Party (PP) and the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) are the only parties that fielded enough candidates to realistically form a government. Even EZEMA’s President, Eyob Mesfin, has admitted his party does not expect to win and form one. Prosperity did not field parliamentary candidates in 48 constituencies, a decision watched closely after its Chairman, Abiy, told Parliament in January that opposition seats would increase “five to ten times” and that his party would deliberately work toward that outcome.
For his critics, leaving seats open does not guarantee a fair contest. Prosperity is running unopposed in 65 Parliamentary seats, mostly in Oromia Regional State (46) and Amhara Regional State (11). It will also stay out of 284 regional council seats. In many regions, those seats represent eight to 15pc of council positions; in Oromia, only one percent. In Addis Abeba, Central Ethiopia, Dire Dawa and Somali, the share is about 15pc.
Eyasped Tesfaye, a Horn of Africa political analyst, called the contest “unusually weak.”
“This election is the weakest of all elections Ethiopia has held so far,” he told Fortune. “Officially, this is an election where no real hope is visible.”
The ruling party, the opposition, and the public largely know the result before the polls open. He criticised the government for failing even to make the process appear competitive and the opposition parties for failing to connect with voters.
“They can’t sell themselves,” he said. “Some parties look too similar to the ruling party, while others with stronger programmes have campaigned too cautiously.”
Eyasped credited NEBE with better preparation and digital initiatives, but noted it struggled to respond to complaints. Arrests of politicians for campaigning, insecurity, uneven conditions and budget shortages deepened the pressure. He expects limited change, and the governing structure is likely to continue, perhaps with a somewhat stronger opposition voice in Parliament.
“The greater risk is that the election reinforces the belief that governments in Ethiopia can’t be changed through ballots, encouraging armed groups to seek other routes,” Eyasped told Fortune.
NEBE officials hope to hold elections in constituencies that cannot take part in the country’s polls tomorrow, later in the year.
“Once a suitable and conducive environment is established, the election will take place,” Melatwork said.
She recalled the sixth general election, when many constituencies in Benishangul-Gumuz did not vote until 2024.
For Kassahun and others, the issue is more immediate. The observers may be accredited, the badges printed, and the polling stations prepared. But an election that looks orderly from the centre is being tested at the edges by money, security and public apathy.
Brazzaville – Congo
Few institutional metaphors are less flattering than the “spaghetti bowl.” For Didier Acouetey (PhD), special advisor to the President of the African Development Bank (AfDB), it captures what Africa’s new financial doctrine confronts in overlapping mandates, duplicated agencies, trapped capital and blurred accountability.
It has national development banks, regional lenders, pension funds, insurers, guarantee agencies, sovereign wealth funds, central banks, commercial banks, private equity vehicles and multilateral financiers.
“The continent is not short of institutions,” he told Fortune, in an exclusive interview, on the sidelines of the Bank’s annual meeting opened this week in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. “Nor is it short of ambition. What it lacks is a financial operating system capable of turning scattered savings, fragmented mandates and underprepared projects into bankable investments.”
That operating system is the idea behind the New African Financial Architecture for Development (NAFAD), which emerged from the Abidjan Consensus made in April this year.
Hailed by its architects as a systemic approach to addressing Africa’s financing gap by unlocking domestic savings, NAFAD aspires to reorganise the deployment of capital and risk to strengthen financial sovereignty. Its advocates call it “a framework,” mindfully, and not another institution, secretariat or acronym, to make existing actors behave like a functioning capital chain.
For observers within the continent and beyond, Africa’s development problem has rarely been the absence of plans but the execution. Panellists from the myriad continental financial institutions speaking at the large forums and conferences often complain that viable projects remain scarce, capital markets are shallow, regulation is uneven, and political risk is mispriced.
Pension funds and insurers hold close to one trillion dollars in long-term money but struggle to allocate it to weakly structured assets.
“If you even manage to get a 20pc of that money for the continent, do you see the picture that it makes?” quipped the Special Advisor.
The African Economic Outlook, released this week at AfDB’s annual meeting in Brazzaville sharpens the debate. It declared Africa is not poor, but rich in underused fiscal, natural, financial, business and human capital. With deep and properly sequenced reforms, it estimates the continent could mobilise an additional 1.43 trillion dollars in domestic resources, more than the estimated 1.3 trillion dollars a year required to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in four years’ time.
Sidi Ould Tah, the AfDB’s president, elected last year, framed the argument before delegates.
“Africa represents about 18pc of the world’s population, holds more than 30pc of global mineral resources and possesses more than 60pc of the planet’s uncultivated arable land,” he said.
However, the continent accounts for about three percent of global trade and between three percent and four percent of global GDP. For him, the paradox is not potential but conversion in turning assets into investment, production, jobs, and economic power.
Ould Tah’s other paradox is Africa’s annual financing needs of more than 400 billion dollars for structural transformation. But, it is believed to have over four trillion dollars in domestic savings and assets held across banks, pension funds, insurers, sovereign funds and other financial institutions. Infrastructure alone requires 130 billion dollars to 170 billion dollars a year, with a financing gap of 68 billion dollars to 108 billion dollars annually.
For several regulars at such events and venues, money exists in one place, and projects remain unfunded in another. NAFAD’s authors argue it is designed to narrow the gap through “coordination, complementarity and subsidiarity.”
“Coordination is meant to reduce duplication. Complementarity is meant to ensure that institutions play distinct but mutually reinforcing roles,” Acouetey told Fortune.
Acouetey’s early career helps explain his systems view. In the early 1990s, in French advertising and packaging, he saw Western corporations expanding into Africa while highly educated African diaspora professionals remained marooned in Europe. That irony fed his work in talent, enterprise development and policy design.
“Subsidiarity is meant to push financing closer to the ground, allowing national institutions to originate and serve projects while regional and continental institutions use their scale, ratings and credibility to mobilise capital and absorb risk.”
According to Acouetey, a graduate of the Arts et Métiers school in Paris, the AfDB does not intend to replace national or regional financiers.
“It sits above and behind them as a catalytic institution,” he said. “National development banks may know domestic SMEs, women entrepreneurs, industrial corridors or municipal infrastructure better. Regional lenders may have the balance sheet and cross-border mandate to support several national institutions. The AfDB can provide guarantees, co-financing, risk-sharing instruments and credibility to strengthen the chain.”
He sees the “framework” as a practical link to a project originating nationally, being refinanced regionally, de-risked by a guarantee agency and attracting domestic institutional investors if its structure, currency treatment and risk allocation are credible.
“The Bank’s role is to make those links credible enough that capital begins to move,” Acouetey said.
Pension funds are central to this test because the money belongs to workers, retirees and policyholders. Trustees need predictable cash flows, clear regulation, enforceable contracts, credible sponsors, transparent procurement and manageable currency risk. They are not idle because managers are “unpatriotic.” They are cautious because too many schemes arrive at financing conferences without feasibility studies, permits, revenue models, procurement discipline or contracts.
“The thing is not to force people to invest in projects, and it isn’t mandatory,” said Acouetey. “It’s because the projects are valuable, and the returns on investments are assured.”
The “spaghetti bowl” will not be untangled by communiqués. It will be untangled by term sheets. The AfDB’s emphasis on guarantees and risk-sharing platforms, including the Africa Trade & Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI), to give NAFAD credibility beyond speeches, on whether Africa can industrialise.
“Reducing the cost of capital in Africa can’t be achieved by complaint alone,” Acouetey said. “Viable projects remain unfunded not only because investors misunderstand Africa, but because risks are often insufficiently mitigated.”
A first-loss layer, a political-risk guarantee, a currency hedge, a stronger sponsor, or better procurement can change the calculation.
“Investors don’t invest in intentions,” he said. “They invest in instruments.”
Still, the risk-perception argument holds. African officials complain that rating agencies and investors price the continent too broadly.
“Botswana shouldn’t be priced as Ethiopia because Ethiopia faces conflict,” Acouetey said. “Senegal shouldn’t carry the automatic premium of Mali or Burkina Faso; Kenya isn’t South Africa; Malawi isn’t Djibouti.”
But risk may sometimes be exaggerated, not invented. Investors have seen opaque debt contracts, arrears, exchange-rate distortions, weak tax mobilisation, political instability, shallow markets and erratic policy signals.
The AfDB outlook identifies institutions, economic governance and the rule of law as indispensable to making Africa’s capital work. Transparent public financial management, secured property rights and predictable legal systems are investment infrastructure. Countries seeking cheaper capital and fairer treatment are required to offer credible statistics, transparent accounts, stronger debt management, consistent regulation, enforceable contracts and macroeconomic policies.
“Money does not like noise,” Acouetey said.
The Bank’s posture is about convening, structuring and execution, not rhetorical confrontation. Its claim is that Africa can gain leverage by demanding fairer treatment abroad while building deeper capital markets, linked development banks, guarantee institutions, investable project pipelines and domestic investors able to participate at scale.
The task is a systems-engineering problem visible among SMEs trapped in the “missing middle”. While too large for microfinance, they are too small or risky for commercial banks and too understructured for institutional investors.
“This is why the AfDB’s new emphasis on ecosystems matters,” Acouetey said. “Infrastructure, energy, finance, skills, logistics, digital connectivity and industrial clusters can’t be treated as separate policy boxes. They’re mutually dependent. Without power, there is no industrial base. Without industry, Africa continues importing the machinery, technology and manufactured inputs that deepen foreignexchange pressure. Without stronger firms, there are fewer bankable projects. Without bankable projects, domestic savings remain trapped in low-risk instruments. Without domestic savings mobilised productively, the continent remains dependent on external finance as aid becomes less reliable.”
However, mobilising domestic savings does not remove hard-currency exposure. Large infrastructure, energy and industrial projects often need imported equipment priced in dollars or euros, while earning local-currency revenues.
According to the Special Advisor, hedging can help, and common-currency zones and regional projects can reduce some mismatch. For him, the deeper answer is industrialisation.
“Africa must produce more of what it imports if it wants to reduce the foreignexchange vulnerability embedded in its development model,” he told Fortune.
Africa’s growth outlook remains resilient but fragile. The AfDB projects growth of 3.9pc in 2025 and four percent in 2026, after downgrades from tariff shocks and global uncertainty. Aid cuts are tightening finance, while debt service is getting heavier. Exchange-rate pressures have eased in some countries but remain a persistent risk.
This makes domestic capital mobilisation urgent, and discipline more important. Experts argue that Africa cannot replace external dependency with domestic financial repression. Pension funds should not finance weak public projects, development banks should not become political cheque books, and guarantees should not disguise subsidies for unreformed borrowers.
Yet, Acouetey’s use of metaphor carries a warning. Spaghetti is tangled because every strand is soft, a reminder that untangling Africa’s financial ecosystem will require firmer lines over who originates projects, who prepares them, who lends, who guarantees, who regulates, who monitors, who absorbs losses and who is accountable when things fail.
Acouetey’s portfolio is centred on the private sector and the financial architecture. The promise is that the AfDB can become its catalytic centre, not by dominating African finance, but by making existing institutions more effective. The danger is that coordination without authority becomes another polished continental vocabulary, admired in official conference halls in Brazzaville this week and weakened in implementation.
Brazzaville – Congo
The reform began at the retail counter, not in the grand language of continental finance. Private operators have begun submitting permit applications to open independent foreign exchange bureaus in Ethiopia, a modest administrative step with implications that extend beyond the sale of cash notes.
For travellers, businesses and remittance recipients, it promises more legal counters where foreign currency can be bought and sold at “negotiated rates.” For policymakers, it tests whether a country long governed by foreign-exchange rationing can move toward regulated competition without losing control over scarce reserves.
There are now 13 independent foreign exchange bureaus among regulated financial institutions, giving Ethiopia’s painful foreign-exchange transition a new retail face. The policy change was narrow in design, yet today it presses on a central weakness of Ethiopia’s reform agenda where credibility is seen as the price of foreign currency.
However, the policy reform does not conjure dollars. It will not create exports, rebuild reserves, erase arrears, or end the scarcity that, for decades, has been managed through waiting lists, surrender rules, privileged access and a parallel market that has revealed the true price of the dollar more accurately than official postings.
But it is hoped to draw part of the cash market out of informal channels, making the exchange-rate regime more visible to regulators and more accessible to households and businesses.
This small Ethiopian experiment may sit naturally inside the larger argument made this week by Sidi Ould Tah (PhD), the African Development Bank’s new president.
In his first annual meetings address since taking over the Bank last year, Ould Tah was visibly avoiding spectacle. Instead, he offered a balance-sheet reading of Africa as a continent “rich in assets, poor in conversion mechanisms, and constrained less by the absence of capital than by the failure” to organise it into bankable instruments.
However, the contrast with his predecessor, Akinwumi Adesina (PhD), the Nigerian citizens who left the Bank last year after serving two terms, was hard to miss. Adesina made the AfDB presidency a public stage, filled with memoranda, launches, signings, photo opportunities and campaign-style performances. Ould Tah appeared quieter, more private and media-shy. He did not hold the traditional open questionand-answer session with the press corps during the opening of the Bank’s annual meeting on Tuesday, May 26, 2026, in Brazzaville, capital of the Republic of Congo.
But the restraint sharpened rather than softened the test before him.
On a panel, Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso looked at the new President and said, “We trust you.” Gabon’s Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema was blunter, telling him to “be courageous.”
The advice captured the political mood around Ould Tah’s presidency.
According to an AfDB official, “he does not need to outshine Adesina on stage. He needs to show that the Bank can move from announcements to assets, from signed memoranda to financed projects, and from visibility to delivery.”
According to Bank officials, Ould Tah wants the AfDB to act less like a competitor to smaller development financiers and more like a catalyst for large transactions, especially projects requiring more than 100 million dollars in financing. The model would rely on the Bank’s convening power, balance-sheet credibility and political access as much as its own lending.
It is a less theatrical mandate, but arguably a more demanding one. Ould Tah organised his language around Africa’s “three great paradoxes.”
The continent has about 18pc of the world’s population, more than 30pc of global mineral resources and over 60pc of the planet’s uncultivated arable land. Yet it accounts for only about three percent of global trade and three to four percent of global GDP.
Ould Tah called this “the weight without influence.”
Africa needs more than 400 billion dollars a year for structural transformation while holding more than four trillion dollars in domestic savings and assets across banks, pension funds, insurers and sovereign funds. It is projected to require between 130 billion and 170 billion dollars annually for infrastructure, with a yearly financing gap of 68 billion to 108 billion dollars, even as considerable opportunities remain in energy, logistics, digital infrastructure, food systems, and critical minerals.
The President’s diagnosis of the external environment was no less severe. The continent is absorbing the effects of a pandemic that disrupted supply chains, wars that changed trade routes and energy markets, imported inflation that squeezed households and public finances, declining official development assistance, higher interest rates that raised the cost of capital, and geopolitical fragmentation that has returned to the centre of international relations.
“Africa is no longer peripheral. From the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, from Bab el-Mandeb to critical mineral corridors, the continent is now central to logistics, energy security, transition minerals and future growth,” Ould Tah told delegates, in the presence of heads of state from Congo, Gabon and the Central African Republic (CAR). “But centrality has not yet translated into cheaper finance.”
The 2026 African Economic Outlook, released at the meetings, reinforced his point.
AfDB expects Africa’s growth to slow to 4.2pc this year, from 4.4pc last year, before returning to 4.4pc in 2027, as Middle East tensions push up fuel and food costs. The continent remains among the fastest-growing regions globally, but the Bank warned that the final impact would depend on the duration of supply-chain disruptions and their effects on energy and fertiliser prices.
Kevin Chika Urama (PhD), the AfDB’s chief economist and vice-president, framed thesame challenge in the 2025 Outlook as one of capital mobilisation and governance.
Africa’s growth improved from three percent in 2023 to 3.3pc the following year, but AfDB officials called it, “fragile, exposed to conflict, trade uncertainty, declining concessional finance and inflation.” They projected growth of 3.9pc last year and four percent this year after downgrades linked partly to tariff shocks and global uncertainty.
Urama also disclosed that Africa’s poverty headcount fell to 30.6pc in 2024 from 32.2pc in 2014, a sign of resilience, but not “enough to overcome weak per-capita income growth, youth unemployment and structural fragility.”
Ethiopia’s numbers fit uncomfortably into this continental story. According to the AfDB, the economy grew by 7.3pc in 2023/24, up from 6.6pc the previous year, driven by industry and agriculture on the supply side and private consumption and investment on the demand side. Inflation averaged 26.6pc, amid a current account deficit of 2.9pc of GDP.
The country remained at high risk of debt distress after defaulting on a 33 million dollars Eurobond coupon in December 2023.
The financial sector remained “cautiously stable,” with non-performing loans at 3.9pc,excess reserves to deposits of only 0.8pc, and subdued credit growth under a cap. The Bank projected Ethiopia’s growth at seven percent in 2025/26, with inflation easing to 11.7pc, the fiscal deficit steady at 1.9pc of GDP, and the current account deficit improving to 1.5pc as “reforms and a more export-friendly exchange-rate regime take hold.”
Yet the risks remain formidable due to debt vulnerabilities, commodity price volatility, climate shocks and conflict. Africa’s fourth-wealthiest country in renewable resources, Ethiopia has sizeable natural and human capital. But, according to the AfDB, weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure, low technology adoption, poor governance and weak capacity have blocked the conversion of those assets into development.
Ethiopia represents a country example of the paradox Ould Tah put before the Bank’s shareholders this week, where Semereta Sewasew, state minister for Finance, is attending.
“Africa should not wait for external benevolence to close its financing gap,” Ould Tah told delegates.
His contention is that money exists, but is not sufficiently pooled, de-risked, packaged and deployed at a scale equal to Africa’s needs. The annual meetings, organised around “mobilising Africa’s development financing at scale in a fragmented world,” drew more than 3,000 delegates and focused on long-term finance for energy, food security, climate adaptation, infrastructure and jobs.
Urama estimated that with the right policies, Africa could mobilise and retain about 1.43 trillion dollars annually from efficient tax mobilisation, curbing leakages, reducing risk premia and formalising business activities. He also listed small private firms, weak research and development, informality exceeding 85pc of economic activity, high capital costs, poor infrastructure, intra-regional barriers and governance weaknesses as barriers.
Sceptics counter that Africa’s internal capital is already invested, its savings rate is low, and its development needs are too large to be financed domestically alone.
The newly mushroomed forex bureaus across Addis Abeba, although too insignificant to decide the fate of Africa’s financial architecture, are a revealing miniature of the problem Ould Tah characterised.
A country with large ambitions, a central bank trying to reform, and abundant unmet demand is attempting to replace rationing with regulated markets. Success will depend less on licensing than on whether the system channels private incentives toward public stability.
That is also the test facing AfDB’s new President. Africa’s paradoxes are no longer difficult to state but difficult to execute against. The continent has weight without influence, savings without sufficient transformation, and opportunities without adequate financing.
የኢትዮ ቴሌኮም ዛሬ በስካይላይት ሆቴል የካፒታል ገበያን ተቀላቅሏል። ኩቢንያው በመጀመሪያ ደረጃ የካፒታል ገበያ (IPO) ባደረገው የአክሲዮን ሽያጭ በአስር ሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ አዳዲስ ባለአክሲዮኖችን መሳብ ቢችልም፣ ካቀደው የፋይናንስ ግብ ግን በእጅጉ ያነሰ ካፒታል ይዞ ወደ ሁለተኛ ደረጃ የገበያ መድረክ (Secondary Market) ተሻግሯል።
የኢትዮ ቴሌኮም በገበያው ላይ በይፋ መመዝገብ፣ አዲሱ የካፒታል ገበያ ማዕቀፍ እውን ከሆነ ወዲህ የታየ እጅግ ጉልህ ምዕራፍ ነው። ይሁን እንጂ፣ ይህ እርምጃ ትኩረቱን “የህዝብ ባለቤትነት ማረጋገጥ” ከሚለው አዋጅ ፈቀቅ በማድረግ፣ ወደ ተወሳሰበ የባለአክሲዮኖች ምዝገባ፣ የትርፍ ድርሻ መብት፣ የቁጥጥር ግልጽነት እና የገበያው ተአማኒነት ጥያቄዎች ላይ እንዲያርፍ አድርጎታል። የካፒታል ገበያው አሁንም ቢሆን “በአዳዲስ ሊበራል ልሂቃን የሚመራ” ሂደት ተደርጎ የሚወሰደውን የህዝብ ጥርጣሬ የመቀየር ከባድ ፈተና ከፊቱ ይጠብቀዋል።
ይህ ጅማሮ የመጣው መንግስት የኢትዮ ቴሌኮምን 10 በመቶ አክሲዮን ለህዝብ ግልጽ ሽያጭ ካቀረበ በኋላ ሲሆን፣ የአንዱ አክሲዮን መነሻ ዋጋ (Par value) ከሁለት ዓመት በፊት የተወሰነውን 310 ብር መሠረት ያደረገ ነበር። ነገር ግን የተመዘገቡት ውጤቶች የተስፋ እና የውስንነት ድብልቅ ሆነዋል። ወደ 47,377 የሚጠጉ ዜጎች በአክሲዮን ሽያጩ ላይ የተሳተፉ ሲሆን፣ የተቋሙ የስራ ኃላፊዎች ይህንን ውጤት በፋይናንስ ስርዓቱ ውስጥ የህዝብ ባለቤትነት ስር መስደዱን የሚያሳይ ማረጋገጫ አድርገው አቅርበውታል። ሆኖም፣ በተግባር የተሰበሰበው 3.2 ቢሊዮን ብር መንግስት ካለመው የ30 ቢሊዮን ብር ግብ ጋር ሲነጻጸር እጅግ አነስተኛ መሆኑ፣ በለውጥ ፍላጎት ፍጥነት እና የሀገር ውስጥ ቁጠባን በስፋት የማንቀሳቀስ አቅም መካከል ያለውን ሰፊ ክፍተት ቁልጭ አድርጎ የሚያሳይ ነው።
የካፒታል ገበያ ተቋማት ከህግ ማዕቀፍ ወጥተው በተግባር ወደሚሰራ የንግድ ስነ-ምህዳር መሸጋገር መቻላቸውን የሚመዝንበት ትልቅ ሚዛን ቢሆንም በዚህ ሂደት አክሲዮን ገዢዎችን በቀላሉ ወደሚሸጡና ወደሚለወጡ የባለቤትነት መዝገቦች የመቀየር ብቃት ገና በጅምሩ ተፈትኗል።
ከገዢዎቹ መካከል 45,000 የሚጠጉት የደንበኛ ማንነት ማረጋገጫ መስፈርቶችን አሟልተዋል። ኢትዮ ቴሌኮም በሂደቱ 96 በመቶ የሚሆኑትን ባለአክሲዮኖች በዲጂታል መዝገብ ማስፈሩን ይፋ ቢያደርግም፣ ስኬቱ ግን ከጎላ ክፍተት የጸዳ አልነበረም። በድምሩ 1,646 ባለአክሲዮኖች የማንነት ማረጋገጫ መስፈርቶችን ሳያሟሉ የቀሩ ሲሆን፣ 248 ኢትዮጵያውያን ያልሆኑ ግለሰቦች ደግሞ በዜግነት ገደብ ምክንያት ያደረጉት የአክሲዮን ግዢ ሙከራ ውድቅ ተደርጓል።
“ብሔራዊ መታወቂያ ማቅረብ ለሚችሉ ሰዎች አክሲዮኑን እናጸድቃለን። ማቅረብ ለማይችሉ ግን የአገልግሎት ክፍያውን ጨምሮ ገንዘባቸውን እንመልሳለን” ሲሉ የኢትዮ ቴሌኮም ዋና ስራ አስፈፃሚ ፍሬህይወት ታምሩ አስታውቀዋል።
የአክሲዮን ሽያጩ በይፋ የተጀመረው በጥቅምት ወር 2017 ዓ.ም ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር አብይ አህመድ (ዶ/ር) በተገኙበት ስነ-ስርዓት ነበር። ሽያጩ ለ121 ቀናት ክፍት ሆኖ ከቆየ በኋላ በየካቲት ወር 2017 ዓ.ም ተዘግቷል። በወቅቱ አንድ ባለአክሲዎን በትንሹ 9,900 ብር የሚያወጡ 33 አክሲዮኖችን፣ እና 999,900 ብር ዋጋ ያላቸው 3,333 አክሲዮኖችን መግዛት እንዲችል ተፈቅዶ ነበር። የሽያጩ ሂደት ሆን ተብሎ ለአነስተኛ እና ግለሰብ ባለሀብቶች ተሳትፎ ሚዛን የደፋ ቢሆንም፣ አጠቃላይ ውጤቱ ግን ኢትዮ ቴሌኮም ሁለተኛ ዙር የአክሲዮን ሽያጭ ላይ እንዲያስብ አስገድዶታል። ይህ ቀጣይ እርምጃ ተቋማዊ ባለሀብቶችን (Institutional Investors) እና ምናልባትም የውጭ ሀገር ተሳታፊዎችን ለማካተት የነበሩ ገደቦችን ሊያላላ እንደሚችል ይገመታል።
የገበያ ተንታኞች እንደሚሉት፣ እንዲህ ዓይነቱ አካሄድ “የባለሀብቱን መሠረት በከፍተኛ ደረጃ የሚያሰፋ ቢሆንም፣ አሁን ያሉትን የዜግነት ገደቦች ከወደፊቱ የውጭ ገዢዎች ተሳትፎ ጋር እንዴት ማስታረቅ ይቻላል?” የሚሉ የህግ ጥያቄዎችን ማስከተሉ አይቀሬ ነው።
የምዝገባው ይፋ መሆን የትርፍ ክፍፍል (Dividend) ውዝግብን ይበልጥ ወደ አደባባይ አውጥቶታል። አዲሶቹ የግል ባለአክሲዮኖች፣ ኢትዮ ቴሌኮም በበጀት ዓመቱ 162 ቢሊዮን ብር ከፍተኛ ገቢ ማስመዝገቡ ቢገለጽም፣ እስከ ሐምሌ 2017 ዓ.ም. ላለው የበጀት ዓመት ምንም ዓይነት የትርፍ ክፍፍል አያገኙም። ካለፈው በጀት ዓመት የተገኘውና ይፋ የተደረገው 12 ቢሊዮን ብር የትርፍ ድርሻ ሙሉ በሙሉ የተከፈለው ለፌዴራል መንግሥት ነው።
ይህ ውሳኔ በፋይናንስ ባለሙያዎችና በባለአክሲዮኖች ዘንድ ከፍተኛ ትችት እያሰናዳ ይገኛል። ተቺዎች እንደሚከራከሩት፣ የባለአክሲዮኖችን ህጋዊ እውቅና ማዘግየት ገና በማቆጥቆጥ ላይ ባለው የካፒታል ገበያ ላይ እምነትን የሚያሸረሽር ከመሆኑም በላይ፣ በንግድ ህጉ ላይ የባለአክሲዮኖች እውቅና በሶስት ወር ጊዜ ውስጥ መከናወን አለበት ከሚለውን ድንጋጌ የሚጋጭ ነው።
አዲሱ ገበያ ዜጎችን “የአክሲዮን ባለቤትነት ሊደፈር የማይችል ህጋዊ መብት ያስገኛል” ብሎ ለማሳመን በሚጥርበት በዚህ ወቅት፣ ይህ ውዝግብ ከቴክኒካዊ ጉዳይነት አልፎ መሠረታዊ ጥያቄ እየሆነ መጥቷል። አዳዲስ ባለአክሲዮኖች እንደ እውነተኛ ባለቤት የሚቆጠሩት አክሲዮኑን ከገዙበት ቅጽበት ጀምሮ ነው ወይስ መደበኛው የማረጋገጫ ሂደት ከተጠናቀቀ በኋላ የሚለው ጥያቄ እየበረታ ነው።
ዋና ስራ አስፈፃሚዋ ፍሬህይወት በበኩላቸው፣ በዚህ ዓመት የባለቤትነት ማረጋገጫው በይፋ ከተጠናቀቀ በኋላ፣ ለግል ባለአክሲዮኖች የሚደረገው የትርፍ ክፍፍል ድልድል በ2018/19 በጀት ዓመት እንደሚጀምር አስታውቀዋል።
Motor & Engineering Company of Ethiopia (MOENCO), the sole authorised dealer for BYD in Ethiopia, officially launched the BYD Shark 6, a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) pickup truck, at the Science Museum in Addis Abeba on May 22, 2026. The high-profile launch drew senior government officials, industry leaders, and representatives from BYD.
Unlike the fully electric models previously introduced by MOENCO, the Shark 6 combines electric and fuel-powered performance to navigate both congested urban roads and the country’s rugged rural terrain. Company executives said the vehicle’s adaptability positions it as a strategic option for commercial operators and private consumers seeking improved fuel efficiency without sacrificing off-road capability.
Equipped with advanced driver-assistance systems and modern connectivity features, the Shark 6 is being positioned as a premium yet durable contender in the increasingly competitive pickup segment. To ease concerns surrounding the long-term reliability of hybrid technology in the local market, MOENCO is offering an eight-year battery warranty alongside a six-year vehicle warranty. The dealership also confirmed that it has established a supply chain for genuine spare parts and specialised maintenance services to support the new model.
As the country continues to face persistent foreign exchange pressures and volatile fuel prices, the growing shift toward PHEV technology is emerging as a practical middle-ground solution for logistics, transport, and agricultural operations.
Addis Abeba’s most contested planning document is entering its final year, carrying the legacy of political rupture and the imprint of rapid redevelopment.
The 10th structural master plan, approved in July 2017, which led to one of the most consequential protest movements, is expected to lose its legal standing after next July. Its successor is now being prepared by the city Administration, which has begun assembling a new structural master plan for the capital to guide its expansion, investment, land-use regulation, and self-organisation.
The city cabinet under Mayor Adanech Abiebie recently approved a regulation establishing a dedicated project office to carry out the task. The Office will operate for two years, reporting to the Mayor and receiving technical supervision from the Planning & Development Bureau. The Land & Development Bureau, led by Adem Nuri, has already begun reviewing the outgoing plan, commissioning the Ethiopian Civil Service University to assess what the city gained from it, where implementation failed and which ambitions were left unattended.
Individuals close to the development disclosed that the University has begun the study, placing the next planning cycle within a review of its predecessor.
Cities traditionally prepare master plans every 10 years, and Addis Abeba has again reached a planning threshold. It will be the third plan prepared fully by Ethiopian professionals. Earlier plans were shaped through partnerships between Ethiopian and foreign consultants, especially French and Italian planners, before the shift toward local planning began with the ninth master plan. The last was meant to manage growth, infrastructure and land use. It became, instead, a symbol of political discontent around land, identity, federalism and state power.
Its most controversial element was an integrated development proposal introduced during former Mayor Diriba Kuma tenure. Officials described it as a mechanism to link Addis Abeba to the surrounding zones within the Oromia Regional State and to coordinate infrastructure with towns on the outskirts of the city. Many saw “an undisclosed boundary project” behind the technical language. Residents, activists, students and political groups used it as a rallying cry, arguing that the plan would extend Addis Abeba’s reach deep into the Oromia Regional State, dispossessing farmers and weakening the Regional State’s administrative control.
High school and university students became central to the backlash.
The protests widened and became more confrontational, evolving into broader anti-government unrest between 2015 and 2018. Thousands died in protests and security crackdowns, before public pressure forced the EPRDF-led government to abandon the project. The fallout reached beyond planning offices. The unrest surrounding the plan became one of the major crises that weakened the previous administration and helped create the conditions for Abiy Ahmed’s (PhD) rise to power in 2018.
Addis Abeba’s standalone master plan continued, while the formal link with surrounding towns in the Oromia Regional State was scrapped. Some argue the idea never fully disappeared, attributing the establishment of Sheger City in 2022 to several areas that were reorganised under it and had been included in the 2017 integrated plan for coordinated development with the capital.
Some officials and experts credit the same document that turned politically toxic with reshaping Addis Abeba’s current physical form. They link today’s corridor developments, expanding commercial districts and emerging urban centres to its urban vision, citing Cazanchis, Bole Medhanialem, CMC and the banking district around Mexico Square as illustrations. The outgoing master plan classified the city’s land into 14 categories and sought to change the housing model. It proposed moving beyond the state as the dominant housing developer toward more diversified and multimodal housing approaches.
The master plan’s assumptions were modest when drafted, but later leadership changes and more aggressive urban investment policies widened the gap between projections and implementation. According to city officials involved in developing the next master plan, it will have to reconcile scarcity, vertical growth, and political sensitivity.
Getachew Haile, a long-serving Planning & Development Bureau official and its deputy head, foresees the city moving to a new framework because the plan is nearing the end of its legal life.
“Because the current master plan will lose its legal base after next July, we’re working to establish the project office and prepare the city’s structural master plan,” Getachew told Fortune.
The new Office is designed to sit at arm’s length from the Bureau’s ordinary operations. The Mayor will appoint its General Manager, while technical staff will come from executive organs, universities and independent experts.
“The Bureau will only cooperate with the project office,” Getachew said. “The staff and technical team will operate independently.”
Funding is expected to come from the city Administration and institutional support. According to Getachew, the Office’s main task is to “ensure the continuous smart city development endeavours of the city” and enable it to become a hub for services, tourism, finance, and technology.
“The next plan should also improve the legal and institutional flow of investment,” he told Fortune. “It’s expected to review land use, building-height rules, municipal services, transport systems, cemetery locations, roads and the city’s direction for growth.”
The Project Office is expected to study urban lifestyle patterns, land utilisation, transport infrastructure, environmental systems, underground infrastructure, natural resources and social and economic conditions across the city. It will prepare maps and technical proposals for building heights, and study Addis Abeba’s ties with neighbouring cities and regional administrations. The scope shows how far the next plan would reach, while the previous integrated proposal continues to shadow the discussion of the capital’s relationship with the Oromia Regional State.
The outgoing plan theoretically allowed 100-storey buildings. But Getachew disclosed that several provisions are under review due to growing land scarcity, and that the capital is increasingly moving vertical. He also acknowledged that some areas identified as major urban centres did not develop as planned.
“Correcting such failures will be one priority,” Getachew told Fortune.
Authorities hope to complete the planning work within one year despite the Office’s two-year mandate. Extra time was included based on experience that the process may require it.
“The experience shows extra time is necessary,” Getachew said, noting that documentation and technical consolidation alone could take another year.
Urban planning experts welcomed the initiative, but warned it would test the Administration’s determination to protect technical independence.
Anteneh Tesfaye (PhD) is an architect and urban planner who participated in the preparation of the previous master plan and led the central city urban planning project office. He believes that planning horizons should run from five to 20 years and should not be driven by short-term politics. He warned against “short-sighted” planning in which political goals override technical projections and data.
According to Anteneh, there is always a risk that government direction overshadows technical research. He warned that when realistic projections are rejected in favour of ambitious government wishes, it creates unnecessary stress and unfavourable pressure on the urban system. For him, a master plan should be a technical and scientific projection of how a city can realistically grow, not merely a reflection of political aspiration.
“The new plan should avoid earlier mistakes and focus on social, environmental and economic sustainability,” he told Fortune. “Modern planning can’t depend only on physical expansion or infrastructure ambitions. It has to balance environmental limits, economic productivity and residents’ social needs.”
Anteneh could not see how Addis Abeba can be planned in isolation from nearby cities and regional administrations. The capital and surrounding urban centres need integrated relationships while preserving their identities.
“If possible, the master plans should be prepared jointly,” he said. “If not, they should at least follow a shared understanding and reference one another during implementation.”
Anteneh called for institutional neutrality in the project office. He urged that experts leading the studies should be chosen on merit, not political affiliation. Universities, which he said have been sidelined, should have a larger role.
Manalush Alemu, a veteran urban planner and former head of the Land & Development Bureau in Lideta District, welcomed the initiative. She advocates designing cities around daily life and economic realities. For her, the core purpose of planning is to enable residents to live comfortably while remaining productive.
“Comfort doesn’t only mean having green areas, parks, and recreational spaces,” Manalush told Fortune. “It also means ensuring workplaces and residential areas are located close to each other because that increases productivity.”
Manalush cautioned that plans prepared without broad public consultation can become detached from residents’ needs.
“Otherwise, it becomes an attitude of ‘I know what is best for you,’” she said.
Infrastructure priorities, she added, should mirror conditions on the ground, as building roads in areas without access to water would not truly benefit the people.
According to Manalush, Addis Abeba’s future should also be framed through its economic and logistical links with neighbouring cities.
“The plan should make clear what the capital gives and receives,” she said. “For example, if shoes are produced here and sent elsewhere, there should be a clear system showing how products move and reach their destination.”
The question is whether the next plan can organise the city’s growth while earning public trust. Getachew said consultations with residents, experts, institutions and stakeholders will begin as the Office takes shape.
“We’re preparing a plan that will guide the city’s development for the next 10 years,” he said.
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