The foreign-exchange market last week demonstrated the contours of a tightly managed currency regime under mounting pressure. Despite assertions by Central Bank Governor Eyob Tekalegn (PhD) that the economy faces no shortage of foreign currency, market behaviour revealed otherwise.
While headline rates for the Brewed appeared stable, the underlying dynamics told a more complex story, of divergence among banks, implicit signalling from regulators, and a market whose stability is more engineered than earned.
At first glance, the Birr’s movement seemed marginal, with little headline volatility. However, behind this apparent calm, a closer look at the banks’ postings and pricing strategies revealed a market increasingly divided by size, competitive posturing, and the unique relationship each bank has with the Central Bank.
For six trading days between December 22 and December 27, 2025, the overall numbers hardly signalled turmoil. The average buying rate for the Birr was about 152.36 to the dollar, while the average selling rate was nearly 155.23. The daily swings were small.
Instead of reacting to market signals alone, the foreign exchange market’s steadiness echoed strict adherence to policy and expectations that the Central Bank was about to inject liquidity. Market stability was engineered. The Brewed Buck showed what might be called a “gentle firming” across the week, less as a result of organic trading than as a function of disciplined pricing by banks and the signal sent by the Central Bank.
The banking industry as a whole maintained rates within a narrow and policy-mandated corridor. Banks signalled pent-up demand through slightly higher nominal prices, but the overall market remained locked, showing the effects of both administrative guidance and contained pressures.
By the week’s end, most banks posted buying rates in the tight range of 151.6 to 152.8 Br to a dollar and selling rates between 154.6 and 155.9 Br. The rates most commonly quoted were close to 152 for buying and 155 Br for selling. The entire market crept up by three to five cents, revealing not a sudden depreciation but a slow, steady drift that revealed ongoing depreciation bias. There were no sharp reversals by any bank, and the traditional spread of about two percent was not breached, save for a statistically negligible reading of 2.01pc at Lion Bank on a single day.
Even as nominal price levels increased, spreads remained steady. It was a picture of a currency in a managed crawl, neither fully pegged nor left to float.
But beneath these smooth averages, the details revealed another story. Some banks were clear leaders, others laggards. Oromia Bank repeatedly posted the highest selling rates, reaching 158.07 Br to the dollar on December 27, a notable outlier. Berhan Bank briefly joined those at the top, exceeding 156 on multiple days. These banks were effectively pricing their rates closer to where they sensed underlying demand, even as regulations kept the spread in check.
On the other end, banks like Tsehay, Amhara, Awash, and Zemen anchored the lower boundary, keeping their buying rates at 151.6 and 151.7 Br and selling rates at around 154.7 Br. Their persistence in the gap between the top and bottom rates unveiled differences in banks’ risk appetites and liquidity needs rather than simple chance.
The Central Bank operated on a plane of its own. Its rates declined slightly from 155.28 Br a dollar on December 22 to 154.99 Br on December 27. Rather than making markets, these rates signalled intent and anchored policy, acting as a reference for the market. The fact that the Central Bank’s posted rates trended down while private banks’ rates drifted up uncovered the tension between official policy guidance and real-world market pressures.
Despite daily movements being small, they trended in a consistent direction. No institution sharply reversed course, and none tried to compress spreads further, even as absolute levels rose. This uniform behaviour, along with the absence of outliers breaking from the group, defined the market as not an open competition.
One of the most notable themes over the period was the restrained behaviour of the largest private banks. Usually the first to move in response to depreciation pressure, Awash, Abyssinia, Dashen, and Zemen kept their buying rates below the 152 Br mark for most of the week. Even on December 27, when the overall average was pushed higher, Wegagen Bank, the sole exception last week among the five big private banks, posted a buying rate a little above that line, at 152.02 Br, and remained well below the more aggressive smaller banks.
The deliberate restraint seemed intended to protect bank balance sheets and manage customer expectations, rather than to chase marginal trading volumes.
The cautious approach of these large financial institutions was in sharp contrast to the actions of several third-generation banks. These newer and smaller banks consistently quoted buying rates well above the cluster formed by the established players. Oromia Bank, in particular, led the pack on the selling side, topping out at 158.07 Br on the last day of the week, though its earlier dominance on the buying side faded somewhat as the week went on.
Nonetheless, the most notable presence was the Central Bank itself. In recent weeks, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) displaced even the most assertive commercial banks as the high reference point, with buying rates as high as 155.44 Br a dollar, over four Birr above the day’s lowest quote, on December 25.
At the bottom end of the market, the smallest and most liquidity-constrained banks set the lowest buying rates, with Tsehay Bank registering a trough at about 150.72 Br. The difference between the highest and lowest buying offers widened to 4.26 Br by December 27, a sizeable spread in a market meant to operate with uniformity.
Last week’s trading patterns can be grouped into three broad categories.
First are the systemically important banks (both state-owned and the biggest private players), who stick close to industry averages and view deviations as a statement about policy, not a commercial opportunity. Second are the assertive mid-tier and third-generation banks, which post higher rates to attract foreign exchange flows, standing out from the consensus. The third category consists of administrative outliers, including the Central Bank, who collapse the spread to zero, prioritising signalling over market activity.
These dynamics played out against the backdrop of the Central Bank’s increasing intervention.
On December 27, the Central Bank announced a foreign-exchange auction for 150 million dollars, the largest single injection to date. Even more striking, the Central Bank pledged to offer up to 210 million dollars in additional auctions between early January and mid-March next year. These were not simply liquidity operations but clear messages to the market that Governor Eyob would set the floor and the ceiling for foreign-exchange prices.
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