Democracies Rearm Fast But Too Often for Politics Not Deterrence

Feb 28 , 2026
By James Ryseff

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For democracies, a rare moment of strategic clarity and shared purpose, with rising defence budgets, updated strategies and heightened awareness of security risks. The way today’s spending choices balance industrial priorities with lethal, robust, and flexible forces will influence whether, in the wars of tomorrow, they keep pace with authoritarian adversaries already preparing for a more contested international order.

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We are living through a crucial moment for global security. The norms, assumptions, and systems that underpinned relative global stability since the Cold War's end are reaching an inflexion point.

The decisions the world's democracies make in this decade will shape the international security landscape for generations to come, determining whether the future is defined by greater democratic resilience or further authoritarian encroachment.

Three shifts are driving this transformation.

For starters, the world has moved from passive rivalry to active confrontation. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which brought war back to the European continent, and its coordination with other authoritarian regimes have challenged long-standing assumptions about deterrence and stability. China is using military coercion, economic leverage, and cyber operations to reshape the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, the relationship between the United States and some of its traditional allies has faced turbulence, prompting many of those allies to increase their defence spending and some to reconsider long-standing assumptions.

At the same time, AI is beginning to transform economies, societies, and national security, promising to confer decisive economic and strategic benefits on the countries that apply it most effectively. And warfare is becoming increasingly data-centric and defined by the speed, precision, and flexibility of networked systems. It is now adaptability, more than brute force, that offers actors the greatest strategic advantage.

Rather than cling to old systems and worldviews at the expense of their ability to shape the security landscape, countries should recognise these shifts, and prepare accordingly. Fortunately, democracies in Europe and Asia have lately begun to do just that. Over the last several years, these countries have increasingly abandoned the complacency enabled by the post-Cold War peace dividend, updated their security strategies, and expanded their defence budgets.

After acknowledging in 2022 that it had reached a Zeitenwende ("turning point"), Germany created a 118 billion dollar special defence fund. By 2024, military expenditure reached 88.5 billion dollars, making Germany the top defence spender in Central and Western Europe for the first time since reunification, and fourth globally. Poland, for its part, is building one of the largest and most modern land forces in Europe, and plans to raise defence spending to 4.7pc of GDP this year.

Beyond Europe, Japan has pledged to double its defence spending this year and acquire counterstrike capabilities that, until relatively recently, would have been politically unthinkable. And Australia is restructuring its defence posture to emphasise long-range strike capabilities, undersea operation and advanced industrial cooperation with its AUKUS strategic partners (the United Kingdom and the US).

These initiatives and investments reflect an understanding that deterrence should be built up and maintained, and that credible military power is a prerequisite for stability and freedom. But not all defence spending is created equal, and too often, such expenditure has been leveraged less to enhance military capabilities than to support domestic manufacturing and employment.

For example, plans by Belgium and the Netherlands to transform shuttered auto factories into military production facilities prioritise employment over operational relevance. French and Italian companies touting their investments in naval shipbuilding appear to be as focused on job creation and industrial benefits as they are on improving warfighting effectiveness.

Equally concerning, European governments have sought to reclassify investment in NATO infrastructure and even renewable energy as defence expenditure, arguing that progress in these areas boosts resilience. But at a time when authoritarian powers are modernising their military forces and showing an increasing willingness to coerce, intimidate, and threaten others, defence budgets should serve one purpose. It is to build the most lethal, robust, and capable militaries possible.

Such militaries cannot be tethered to 20th-century systems, approaches, and force structures, including large platforms with slow procurement cycles and industrial-age concepts of mass. Just as established corporations facing challenges from innovative startups should adapt or die, militaries have to continually renew themselves to preserve their qualitative edge in an era of intense technological competition.

This is not about abandoning the old (legacy systems still have important roles to play) but rather about rapidly elevating the new. That means embracing new ways of operating and investing in evolving technologies to develop and perfect the advanced weapons and capabilities that can win the wars of the future. There is no time to waste. In an era defined by speed, adaptation, and innovation, the greatest risk is not disruption, but delay.

Across the democratic world, governments are recognising that they should prepare for a new era defined by heightened security risks. At this rare moment of political alignment, strategic clarity, and shared purpose, the US and its allies have a critical opportunity to lay the foundation for a more secure and stable world, an endeavour that would benefit from greater unity than exists today. If they squander it, they will quickly lose ground to adversaries preparing for the wars of tomorrow.

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PUBLISHED ON Feb 28,2026 [ VOL 26 , NO 1348]

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