Global Power Shifts Leave Africa on the Sidelines

Jan 31 , 2026. By Mikiyas Mulugeta (PhD) ( Mikiyas Mulugeta (PhD) (mikiusc2017@gmail.com) is a consultant and director of training and development programs at the Centre for African Leadership Studies (CALS) and XHub-Addis. )

As global priorities shift, Africa’s economic agency is increasingly shaped by decisions made elsewhere. Debt burdens have grown, while access to concessional finance has tightened. Migration routes, once seen as engines for growth, have narrowed amid stricter border policies. For many African economies, the recalibrated global system brings new challenges.

The global economic order is shifting, not with sweeping declarations but through the priorities of powerful actors and, perhaps more tellingly, in what they choose to omit.

The approaches of Donald Trump and Mark Carney do not chart opposing futures so much as they represent different reactions to a system both see as broken. Each diagnoses the same ailment. The post-Cold War economic system no longer provides stability, legitimacy, or widely shared prosperity. The difference is in their prescriptions and the intended beneficiaries of any cure.

Trump’s economic policy is direct, transactional, and firmly zero-sum. He leans toward deglobalisation, not for its own sake, but as a political tool. In his view, borders become instruments of economic control, not simply lines demarcating sovereignty. Migration, recast as a threat to domestic wages and national unity, is no longer about labour mobility or balancing demographics. Instead, restrictions, deportations, and the rhetoric of exclusion become core to a vision that seeks to reestablish national authority over labour, even as capital remains elusive and mobile.

But America’s inward focus under Trump tells only part of the story.

The United States, while tightening its borders, also demonstrates an outward strategic ambition. When Trump floated the idea of acquiring Greenland, he used language more suited to national security and global strategy than practical governance. The proposal, however unlikely, uncovered a deeper trend. Resources, territory, and geography are returning to the heart of economic calculations. In a fractured global economy where supply chains are used as leverage and access to critical minerals underpins industrial strength, land becomes a strategic asset and security acts as a form of economic guarantee.

The apparent contradiction between shutting borders and seeking territorial expansion fades once power, not efficiency, becomes the principal organising force.

Trump’s economic agenda is not about restoring a cooperative world order. Instead, it wants to ensure the burden of adjustment is carried elsewhere. Instability is used as leverage, and rules are followed only when convenient. Shared stability becomes negotiable, not presumed.

Mark Carney, Canada's prime minister, offers a different rhetoric, one that focuses on repairing the current system. His outlook holds that markets can work, but only if they are forced to recognise risks that have long been ignored. Issues like climate exposure, financial fragility, inequality, and long-term instability are not mere moral failures but the result of pricing errors. In Carney's assessment, capital that chases quick returns distorts risk allocation and undermines the broader foundations of the system.

The Prime Minister advocates for improved rules, greater transparency, robust institutions, and the alignment of finance with broader societal goals.

While Trump disrupts norms to expose the raw dynamics of power, Carney tries to fortify norms to preserve a semblance of order. Globalisation, for Carney, is not the problem. Unbridled globalisation is. Multilateral frameworks remain central, not for the sake of fairness, but because uncontrolled fragmentation is dangerous to economic stability. Carney’s warnings are driven by fears of systemic collapse, not diminished dominance.

Despite the different tone and intent, both perspectives share a notable omission. Africa. This absence is no accident.

On Trump’s economic map, Africa is not viewed as a decisive market, a rule-maker, or a vital political constituency. It surfaces only as a source of resources, security partnerships, or diplomatic support, and even then, rarely at the forefront. In Carney’s framework, Africa appears but only in abstract terms. It is classified as an emerging market, a climate-vulnerable region, or a site of frontier risk. Here, Africa is managed through standards, disclosure, and conditional financing, but not engaged as an equal author of the rules.

The economic meaning behind this silence is clear. Africa is expected to adapt to the changing system rather than shape it. Capital will flow in if local conditions are deemed right. Labor pressures are treated as domestic issues elsewhere. Debt sustainability is approached with frameworks drawn up far away. African economies remain price-takers in trade, not price-setters. As the global order is recalibrated, Africa is treated as a parameter, not a variable.

The effects of this recalibration are already apparent. Capital is growing more selective, expensive, and political. Finance increasingly follows strategic priorities or compliance with complex reporting regimes that many African countries are ill-equipped to meet. Debt burdens are rising as concessional finance dries up and restructuring options become more fragmented. Exchange rate pressures worsen as global liquidity tightens and risk aversion spreads.

Labour surpluses, once viewed as a potential engine for growth, now emerge as social liabilities, while migration routes into developed economies narrow further.

Trump’s vision increases the costs for those deemed weak. Carney’s raises the standards for participation. In neither case is inclusion assured. Both accept a global economy that is tougher and less forgiving, where adjustment costs are not evenly shared. Trump makes this asymmetry overt, using force and negotiation. Carney’s approach embeds it in systems and reforms. One accelerates disorder to restore hierarchy. The other tries to manage the disorder to prevent collapse. But for economies excluded from global decision-making, the result is often the same.

This is not a new global order built on promises of shared growth. Instead, resilience is reserved for some, while others must adapt. In this context, silence is not mere neutrality. It is a tacit assumption that some will not be consulted, only expected to adjust. Africa’s greatest risk is not in being left out of speeches or summits, but in being written into a future where decisions are made elsewhere, standards set elsewhere, and the cost of volatility absorbed at home.

In a world where power increasingly outweighs rules and stability is no longer taken for granted, those without leverage are simply told to adapt. This expectation, more than any grand statement at global forums, defines the economic reality of the moment.

PUBLISHED ON Jan 31,2026 [ VOL 26 , NO 1344]