The Race to the AUC Follows Mahamat's Grand Entrances, Quiet Exits Legacy

Feb 9 , 2025.

This week, the African Union’s (AU) annual summit in Addis Abeba is set to be more than a routine exercise of convention by heads of states. The continent is beset by increasingly intricate conflicts and a leadership vacuum left by outgoing Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. His tenure, marked by few notable milestones, has been equally defined by glaring missteps.

Mahamat oversaw the AU’s historic full membership in the G20 and launched ambitious initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the Pan-African Payment & Settlement System (PAPSS), and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). Regrettably, his record is tarnished by his inability to arrest the civil war in Ethiopia, the very country hosting his office, and by his disorganised response to the Sudanese crisis.

The African Union, born from the Organisation of African Unity’s lofty ambition to free the continent from colonial legacies, was once seen as a bastion of inclusivity and forward-thinking. That founding spirit now contends with a reality of internal strife and external pressure. A 65-year-old former Chadian Foreign Minister, Mahamat personified this duality, a blend of diplomatic ambition and the sobering limits of capacity.

Under his stewardship, Africa’s diplomatic profile ascended. Following the European Union's inclusion, the AU’s admission to the G20 symbolised recognition of the continental potential as a unified economic bloc. Yet, these achievements exposed the contradictions of an institution fundamentally reliant on the cooperation of its 54 sovereign members. The next leader will inherit an organisation without binding authority, one whose effectiveness depends on persuasion and the ability to galvanise a continent wary of external intervention.

Three candidates from Eastern and Southern Africa are now vying for the top position at the AU Commission. Each has pledged to restore the institution’s historical legitimacy and diplomatic heft, but the contest appears to have taken on a personal dimension.

Former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, known for his fiery opposition credentials in his home country, has emerged as a high-profile contender. His impassioned, occasionally bullish style contrasts Djibouti’s Mohamoud Ali Youssouf, the continent’s longest-serving foreign minister, whose measured demeanour and deep institutional experience signal continuity. Late to enter the race, Madagascar’s former Foreign Minister Richard Randriamandrato positions himself as a reformist, echoing proposals from Rwandan President Paul Kagame that real change should be born of collective commitment rather than imposed from above.

Critics warn that Odinga’s penchant for political showmanship, reminiscent of eras of grand declarations, may obscure the need for pragmatic policy.

Financial constraints loom large. Up to nine percent of annual national budgets would be needed to build infrastructure resilient to extreme weather, a burden made heavier by America’s recent aid retrenchment. The AU’s 2024 budget was 605.76 million dollars, heavily reliant on external financing. Donor contributions have reached 370.08 million dollars, funding 76pc of the program budget and 100pc of support for peace operations. The African Union Commission (AUC) alone accounts for 37pc of the budget, illustrating the central body’s heavy operational load and the vulnerability of key initiatives to delays and paralysis in the face of growing troubles.

Mahamat’s era may have seen Africa’s diplomatic rise, yet it coincided with a troubling shift in conflict dynamics.

Weak state institutions, simmering ethnic tensions and proliferating nonstate armed groups have redefined conflict. Localised insurgencies and political violence have become common. In the Sahel, military officers have repeatedly seized power in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, replacing civilian administrations that have proven unable to subdue jihadist groups. The withdrawal of Western military support, combined with emerging Russian influence – often channelled through private military companies like Wagner or its successors – has further destabilised regional security.

Military takeovers, the erosion of democratic accountability and external influences have created a governance vacuum that exposes civilians. In the central Sahel, six coups in three years have dismantled security apparatuses, claiming nearly 14,000 lives in 2023 alone. In the Horn of Africa, civil wars and insurgencies have upended promises of stability. Sudan’s civil war, which has displaced more than 12 million citizens and plunged an estimated 26 million into food insecurity, illustrates the human cost of political paralysis.

Crises in Africa are not confined to isolated hotspots. Chronic economic underperformance, pervasive poverty, and the ravages of climate change have merged with political and security issues, intensifying communal strife across vast regions. With external actors exerting outsized influence and declining state capacity, the call for substantive reform grows increasingly urgent. This week's leadership contest should transcend bureaucratic manoeuvring and serve as a litmus test for progressive governance and meaningful regional representation.

Recent arrangements have seen the candidacies for Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson geographically circumscribed – East Africa for the Chair and North Africa for the Deputy – marking a departure from past practices and an attempt to balance regional interests amid rising tensions. Yet, with internal discord and a governance framework inhibited by fiscal and operational constraints, the challenge for the next leader is formidable. The new head of the AU will need to harness the institution’s intrinsic legitimacy to secure critical funding, drive reform and steer a continent through a maze of longstanding and emerging conflicts.

In Mogadishu, where the AU military mission has long served as a bulwark against the Al Shabaab insurgency, local leaders contend that even modest increases in funding or troop contributions could yield tangible improvements. In Nigeria’s floodravaged farmlands, farmers recall how a single, welltimed disbursement of humanitarian aid salvaged entire harvests, a reminder that behind every figure lies a story of hope despite adversity.

At a time when the AU’s legacy is a mix of grand promises and grand disappointments, this week’s summit should assume an urgency that belies its routine trappings. The AU needs to shift from a passive observer to an active mediator, bridging the gap between lofty ambition and harsh reality. The prospect of reform, which seeks not to maintain the status quo but to enable a more integrated and accountable leadership, is as tantalising as necessary.

The gathering should not serve merely as a mechanism for selecting a successor to an institution mired in inertia. It should be used to recalibrate the AU’s trajectory in an era of unprecedented challenges and transformative potential. The incoming Chair will be responsible for reinvigorating an organisation long trapped in external funding and the need for consensus among diverse sovereign states.

PUBLISHED ON Feb 09, 2025 [ VOL 25 , NO 1293]