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Feb 14 , 2026.
Nearly 50 countries will hold national elections this year. In more than 20, the campaign trail runs between sandbags, with voters expected to queue while rifles glare. Ethiopia is one of the latter.
Melatwork Hailu, the country’s election chief, plans to marshal tens of millions into government offices and schoolrooms that in some regions double as barracks. Her Board has cleared 45 domestic observer groups and is processing applications from over 60 parties. The vote is pencilled in for June 2026, but the country already looks like a polling station under siege.
Federal troops, regional special forces and freelance militias still exchange fire in parts of Amhara, Oromia and Tigray regional states. More than four million people are displaced by war or drought. An election held in such conditions is less a celebration of democracy than a stress test of the state. If Ethiopia pulls it off fairly, the exercise could echo Sri Lanka’s 2024 crisis poll, when a debt-stricken society still used ballots to spur change. Failure would merely confirm who commands the guns.
Precise population figures are elusive, as several national and international agencies now habitually mint their own. But the federal agency in charge of statistics, the Ethiopian Statistics Services (ESS), reckoned Ethiopia would house 111.6 million people in 2025. About 40pc are believed to be under 14, and those aged 15 to 29 make up roughly half of all adults. It is this youth bulge that is being asked to choose the rules that will shape their working lives through mid-century, even as the country wrestles with eurobond default, IMF's prescriptions, festering insurgencies, and unpunished wartime crimes.
Last week, this newspaper asked a little over 100 young Ethiopians about the election. Many could not name the polling date, and several were unsure they would vote. Their collective apathy appears to flow from the sense that ballots change nothing. However, several insisted they would still turn out so that jobs, schooling and clean government make the agenda. The tussle between fatalism and fragile hope may decide the day more than any manifesto.
Ironically, the endless official talk of pluralism, on paper, masks fractures on the ground. The ruling Prosperity Party (PP) is riddled with regional and ideological incoherence. Opposition outfits are splintered along ethnic frontiers, and ostensibly pan-Ethiopian parties often talk past one another. The security services, busy fighting shifting foes, loom over politics. A nationwide state of emergency, imposed in August 2023 to curb the rebellion in the Amhara Regional State and extended through mid-2024, granted officials sweeping powers of arrest and surveillance. Thousands were detained with courts sidelined.
Conflict-tinged voting is not new. In 2021, Ethiopians cast ballots while war raged in the north. Polling was postponed in Tigray and swathes of Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. However, official turnout hit an eye-popping 89pc, and Abiy Ahmed’s (PhD) party walked away with 457 of the 547 federal seats. Poll observers, under the auspices of the African Union (AU), declared the logistics were competent in many districts. The Americans and the Europeans said the absence of a level field skewed the contest. That is the low bar against which 2026 will be judged.
The economy is as unforgiving, too. In December 2023, Ethiopia missed a one-billion-dollar eurobond payment. It has since struck a four-year, 3.4-billion-dollar deal with the IMF and an agreement in principle to reschedule 8.4 billion dollars of official debt, saving about 2.5 billion in service until 2028. The World Bank has added 1.5 billion dollars in budget support, part of a 10.7-billion-dollar reform pot. Headline numbers still sparkle. The World Bank pegged 2024 growth at 7.6pc and income per capita at 1,134 dollars.
However, street-level reality is gloomier. Living costs, especially for food and fuel, have soared. Youth unemployment has sat above 20pc for a decade, exceeding 25pc for young women, and for some graduates, jobs exist only on paper.
Logistics, at least on spreadsheets, look solid. Ballot boxes are meant to be dispatched on time, and local councils, or weredas, are tasked with converting classrooms and offices into temporary polling centres. In several frontline zones, the same buildings shelter federal soldiers by night and serve as schools by day, a reminder of how thin the gap is between civic life and conflict. Melatwork's Board is confident it has enough indelible ink and printed rolls, although its sceptics retort that the harder test is not materials but persuading citizens to turn up against violence and vote-rigging.
Officials promise reform without pain, a trick Sri Lanka’s leaders tried after their own default. The island still recorded a 79.5pc turnout in 2024, and Anura Kumara Dissanayake won the presidency with 42.3pc, turning the race into a referendum on who should bear the brunt of austerity between the older and younger generations. Ethiopian parties are more coy, mouthing support for reform while ducking the details of subsidy cuts and currency float. Economics, as in Colombo, has become existential politics.
Even willing voters may find the road blocked. UN agencies estimated 4.5 million Ethiopians were internally displaced by mid-2024, heavily in Somali, Oromia and Tigray, with clusters in Amhara regional states. Many lack identity papers or safe passage to their original polling stations. Deploy the army heavily, and the vote looks occupied; pull back, and insurgents may pounce. Military and intelligence units are woven into local administration, so promises of a free poll ring hollow to citizens who meet uniforms at checkpoints and kebele offices alike.
The survey of youngsters this newspaper conducted revealed three overlapping doubts.
Trust tops the list, as many suspect the results are pre-ordained and the courts too politicised to protect their vote. Representation follows, with a roster nearing 70 parties offering a cacophony but few clear and youth-centred choices. Last comes information. Social media delivers rumours and ethnic dog-whistles, not plain talk on what the ballot decides. In Colombo, activists fought such fog with TikTok explainers, campus forums and peer-to-peer messaging.
Ethiopia’s digital organisers labour under tighter surveillance, risking an authoritarian equilibrium in which angered youth protest yet stay home. A 50pc turnout among 18-to 29-year-olds could still reshape parliament.
Making June 2026 matter will require five things.
First is insulation, putting a demand on Melatwork to apply rules to all, from equal airtime on public media to penalties for intimidation, and let the 45 observer groups work unhindered. Parties should spell out how they would share the pain of IMF prescriptions rather than promise growth without sacrifice. Field young candidates and publish costed plans for jobs, education and connectivity. Clear laws should fence the security forces off the campaign. And lastly, inclusion. Special registration and polling sites could let displaced Ethiopians vote.
History offers diverging precedents. Bangladesh in the 2010s and Venezuela in recent years show how crisis polls can entrench incumbents. Ethiopia’s own 2010 landslide, when the ruling party claimed 99.6pc of seats, is another cautionary tale. Yet, Sri Lanka demonstrated that even amid default and despair, a credible vote can unjam politics. For Ethiopia, the hinge is not which party wins but whether power can again be tested at the ballot rather than on the battlefield.
If the campaign reaches every region, violence remains contained, and youth and women gain real visibility on the ballot, the election will not end wars or cancel debts, but it may grant Ethiopians an opportunity to renegotiate their social contract in public. A stage-managed show - emergency laws in one hand, pre-written results in the other - would deepen the cynicism heard in the survey. Ballots under bayonets are rarely ideal, yet for a generation reared on conflict and recession, even a flawed vote is better than none, provided it is recognisably theirs.
PUBLISHED ON
Feb 14,2026 [ VOL
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