Authority Spends 25.8b Br on Roads Ahead of Fiscal Year Closing

Seven local and three Chinese companies have inked deals with the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) for the construction of 1,022Km worth of road projects for a total of 25.8 billion Br. The projects were awarded to the companies days before the conclusion of the current fiscal year.

The companies were awarded the projects on June 11, 2020, with a ceremony that was held at the premises of the Authority. The companies are expected to deliver the projects within 18 months to four years, and the government will fully cover the total cost of the 15 projects out of existing budgetary resources.

Yotek Construction, DMC Construction, the Ethiopian Construction Works Corporation and Walabu Construction S.C., all local companies, secured two projects each, while Afework Gidey General Construction, Oromia Road Construction Enterprise and Defence Construction each secured one project.

China Railway Seventh Group secured two projects, while China Civil Engineering Corporation and China Wu Yi obtained one project each. The Chinese companies secured the projects that cover 36.5pc of the total cost.

Except for one, all of the projects will be upgrades of gravel roads to asphalt concrete. The remaining project is for a gravel road. All of the projects include structural works, drainage systems and bridges.

Among the projects, the longest one is the maintenance of a 178Km asphalt road that stretches from Dodola to Guba. Afework Gidey General Construction was awarded the project for 202.7 million Br. The shortest road is the construction of an 8.7Km bypass road in Metu town. Oromia Roads Construction Enterprise was awarded the project for 661.8 million Br.

The most expensive project among the 15 is a road project that extends from Dire Dawa to Shinile. China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation was awarded the 17.3Km project for 76.3 million Br a kilometre. The cheapest project is the construction of a 61.7Km gravel road from Guba to Konge. The Ethiopian Construction Works Corporation will build this road for 3.3 million Br a kilometre.

Most of the projects were retendered due to failures in the previous bidding processes, according to Habtamu Tegegne, director-general of the Authority, which has a 53pc failure rate when it comes to that critical step.

“We want the signed projects to be kicked off before the conclusion of this fiscal year,” he said.

In this fiscal year, the Authority signed a total of 30 projects, including the latest ones, and it is planning to sign agreements for 16 more projects before the end of this fiscal year.

“Even though the country is currently in a very challenging situation,” said Habtamu, “we’re very committed to making sure that infrastructure development projects are going well.”

The Authority, which has completed 40 projects in the last two years, is currently administrating 157 projects with a total cost of 195 billion Br. In this fiscal year, it launched the construction of 20 projects, 15 projects were finalised and 21 projects were entirely handed over to the Authority.

The awarded companies have three months of preparation time to camp at the site, move machinery, prepare raw materials and work on other preparations, according to Habtamu.

“By September, the construction works of all projects shall begin,” he said.

Fikadu Gurmessa (PhD), a transportation geography lecturer at Addis Abeba University for more than a decade, believes that new roads are being constructed based on the principle of fulfilling the obvious and latent needs of the country.

Fikadu also says that the government should work on fairly distributing the projects across the regional states.

“The public investment fund should prioritise road construction for three-dimensional purposes,” he said, “political, economic and military.”

When roads are constructed, the government should also consider the cost-benefit analysis of projects since road infrastructure development is a costly investment and the country cannot afford to waste its scarce resources on projects that are not feasible, according to Fikadu.

White Women in Ethiopia: The Double Whammy

I recently met up with a non-national friend of mine. Having moved here with her family two decades ago, she is currently living in Addis Abeba with her granddaughter. She is a nice woman in her late 50s.

We talked about the people she has met in Addis Abeba, the places she visited, the foods she has tried and the nannies she has had. She believes most people in Ethiopia are loving and welcoming. But, she stressed, not everyone is. Walking on the streets and travelling on public transportation is not a particularly pleasant experience for her.

On multiple occasions, she was subjected to verbal and sexual harassment by random young men on the streets. Recently, while riding in a minibus taxi that had only two passengers, she was hit on. The driver, after the only other passenger had alighted, started flirting on her. Things got out of hand when he tried to put his hands on her legs and kept insisting they meet again and offered to drop her home. The only reason he let her go was when she told him her son was waiting for her at the next stop.

What happened to chivalry? What happened to being respectful of our elders?

We cannot judge a whole country based on the experiences of a few people, but being a woman and being married to a white person, her experiences were not surprising to me.

I am used to rude remarks whenever I walk with my husband. I have been called an opportunist and much worse. But that was me. I had at least hoped the experience would be somewhat different for non-nationals themselves.

It used to be the case that Ethiopians were known for being welcoming toward those that came from outside our borders. We smiled and waved at them. Some even kissed the ground they walked on, because they assumed they had money. But they were at least respectful in doing that.

The driver that harassed her in the taxi spoke good English. This meant that he had some level of education and exposure to different cultures and attitudes. It seems like he should have known better, how it would feel for a non-national female to be harassed by a guy in an empty minibus.

The prevalent traditional belief is that women are not sexual animals and therefore require the forceful initiative of men to be prodded into expressing it. This is a view that is propagated not just through cultural norms but even movies that attempt to depict men as forceful and active and women as weak and passive.

If anything, women prefer men that respect their desires and recognise that “no” means “no.” Women are mothers, daughters, sisters and wives who deserve respect and should not be taken advantage of or abused.

What is annoying is that to be a non-national makes these things worse. Whenever people see her walking with her granddaughter now, they ask her if she was adopted, since she is half Ethiopian and has darker skin.

“You foreigners take our children and raise them as your own,” someone once said to her.

I could see tears in her eyes when she told me that she tried to explain to the person that this was her granddaughter and how it was not her intention to change her culture. I was touched, embarrassed and angry at the same time.

We need a change in our behaviour. We have to be able to put ourselves in each other’s shoes and understand how certain actions can be traumatising. Unless we are able to treat strangers with compassion, especially those from other countries, then we are no better than the insensitive and biased non-nationals we accuse of treating us badly in other countries.

Crisis in the Horn: An Attempt to Choke Ethiopia

The Horn of Africa is witnessing far-reaching changes in its external security relations. It is simultaneously experiencing an increase in the build-up of foreign military forces – on land and at sea – and a broadening of the security agendas pursued by these external actors.

The combination of these factors has made the Horn the most militarised and complex security region, housing the largest number of foreign military bases in the world. Though Egypt and Yemen are not in the Greater Horn, they are however part of the security complex of the Red Sea arena. It is known as the “choke point,” because much of the world’s commerce goes through this maritime route. At one point, when Somali pirates ruled the sea, the area was identified as the most dangerous naval zone in the world, notoriety now claimed by the Gulf of Guinea.

Those who control the Horn of Africa control a significant chunk of the world’s economies. The massive presence of six foreign military bases in Djibouti, and more in Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland, underlines the strategic importance of the Horn. This situation would have inspired or forced the countries of the Horn to be more united and have common strategic and security policies. Each of these forces has a stake in the development of events in the Horn and an agenda that puts their interests at the forefront.

However, there are notable rivalries between the countries of the Horn of Africa, which has not enabled the forging of the necessary harmony in their relationships. Eritrea and Djibouti have not put their border conflict of 2007 behind them. However, they agreed to normalise their relationship two years ago, although Djibouti still considers Eritrea an enemy, considering a recent statement in relations to the prosecution of a pilot that allegedly tried to run away to an “enemy” territory.

But a conference call between the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and East African countries on March 30, 2020, was made to forge a regional plan to combat the Novel Coronavirus pandemic. Four presidents from Somalia, Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti were joined by the prime ministers of Ethiopia and Sudan and the first vice-president of South Sudan. Eritrea did not participate, because its membership has not yet been regularised since it left IGAD in 2007.

This is while Kenya-Somalia relations have escalated in the last few years. It stems from the security concern related to the terror group Al-Shabaab and the maritime border dispute between the two states. The terror group has been continuously launching attacks across the border at Kenyan military outposts and against civilians in the area.

The maritime boundary dispute between Nairobi and Mogadishu further complicates the relationship between the two. Somalia instituted proceedings against Kenya before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) about their maritime boundary in the Indian Ocean, on August 28, 2014. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has approved a request by Kenya to delay the public hearing of its maritime boundary case with Somalia. The case is still pending.

Taking the matter further, Kenya has started negotiating the withdrawal of its forces the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) by 2021, making Ethiopia carry the bulk of troop contributions of the five countries that will remain. These are bad signals of souring relationships, which can contribute to the overall destabilisation of the fragile region.

Neither are Ethiopia and Sudan on the best of terms. The borders between the two countries are the scene of occasional fighting, with recent skirmishes having turned deadly. It is unnecessary and preventable incidents that only add to the burden of stress the two countries have on their very sensitive and fragile relationship.

“It is not clear exactly what triggered a flare-up of this long-standing border dispute,” stated the International Crisis Group (ICG). “Sources suggest that Sudanese security forces may have responded to incursions by Ethiopian troops.”

Sudan is in the unique position of being a member of the Arab League, which makes it close to Egypt, but a generally close ally of Ethiopia as well. It has to play high stakes diplomacy not to be seen as siding with either. Despite enormous pressure from Egypt and the United States, Sudan has held its ground. The bold and calculated decision manifested this in voting against other members of the Arab League on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Sudan expressed “reservations” that the resolution does not serve its interests and might lead to confrontations between the Arab League countries and Ethiopia. This support of Sudan should not be taken for granted though. Last week, Sudan called for the United Nations Security Council`s intervention regarding Ethiopia’s plan to fill the Dam.

“While acknowledging Ethiopia’s right to utilise its natural resources, Sudan has stressed the need for consultation and cooperation among the three countries to avoid the harm lower stream countries could suffer as a result of Ethiopia’s activities,” read Sudan’s memorandum to the Security Council.

Concerning the GERD, Sudan highlighted the benefits and threats that could follow the construction. It acknowledged the benefits the Dam could have in helping manage periodic flooding and in raising Sudan’s capacity to generate electric power.

“On the other hand, Sudan claimed that the construction of the Dam could change the flow line of the river and that it could affect Sudanese citizens negatively if the design, construction and filling works are not followed daily and closely.”

This should be of great concern to Ethiopia, especially considering that a new regional organisation with suspect motives – Council of Arab & African States Bordering the Red Sea & the Gulf of Aden (CAASBRSGA) – has already been established on January 6, 2020. Although Egypt first initiated the idea, it was later taken over by Saudi Arabia.

Its members are the coastal states of the Red Sea, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen (the internationally recognised government), Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. The stated goals of this new organisation are to improve cooperation and coordination among the members in matters related to politics, economy, culture, the environment and security. The Council is an unnecessary organisation and one loaded with an Arab and Egyptian agenda. The Arab League is installing its subsidiary branch closer to home.

“One of the most important issues is the one of membership. Currently, the criteria to be a member of the Council are to be a Red Sea coastal state. This is the criterion defended by Egypt,” wrote the Middle Eastern business and financial news outlet MENAFN. “This position seeks to keep Ethiopia outside of Red Sea affairs, a position not shared by many of the members, who believe that despite its lack of access to the sea, Addis Ababa is a key player in Red Sea affairs. The reason for this absence is the litigation that Egypt and Ethiopia maintain over the construction of the Renaissance Dam in the Nile.”

The stated goals of the Council include matters related to the Nile, an issue vital for Ethiopia. The strategy of Egypt and its allies is to choke Ethiopia through myriad projects. Ethiopia must vigorously fight such moves, but it does not seem that the Ethiopian government is aware of the dangers. At the same time, it flirts with the very countries that are active partners on the other side of the debate.

There has been a flurry of activities between South Sudan and Egypt as well since the crisis between Ethiopia and Egypt intensified over the GERD. Some of these activities are suspicious.

South Sudan had submitted its application in 2018, for a second time, to join the Arab League. There have also been diplomatic moves led by Egypt within the Arab League emphasising the importance of South Sudan joining the organisation, given Juba’s strategic geographical position serving as the Arab gateway to Africa. With steadily and warmer relations with Ethiopia’s new neighbour, South Sudanese President Silva Kiir and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi have exchanged visits followed by several others at ministerial levels.

Bringing South Sudan into the Arab League completes the strangulation of Ethiopia by Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. Seen together with the Council on The Red Sea Coast, the threats directed at Ethiopia are real and severe.

This is the result of the failure of Ethiopia`s diplomacy. Its fractured unity and volatile internal security situation have resulted in establishing a fertile ground for Egypt and other extremist and hostile forces to recruit people and spread propaganda that will further destabilise the country.

Ethiopian diplomacy suffered a big blow when the 23 Arab League members, except Sudan,  supported the draft resolution prepared by Egypt. This must have been a clear sign that there was little effort from Ethiopia’s side.

“The draft agreement proposed by the United States and the World Bank is fair and serves the interests of the three countries,” affirmed The Arab League.

Somalia and Djibouti, Ethiopia’s “close allies,” voted for it. Eritrea, an observer, said nothing. Although its president, Isaias Afwerki, has come out as an elder statesman and mentor of Ethiopia`s Prime Minister, we have yet to see him as “a friend in need, a friend indeed.”

This diplomatic spat is occurring in a region that should otherwise be banding together to address challenges that affect every member. Besides the COVID-19 pandemic, the UN Food & Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has warned East African countries about the outbreak of the desert locust, which has already placed around 20 million people in acute food insecurity in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania.

Ethiopia and the region are facing three-pronged attacks: pandemics, possible famine and regional and internal security challenges. A vital organ in such a time would have been IGAD, which until 1996 was preceded by the establishment of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought & Development (IGADD) was initiated in the mid-1980s.

This was after Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda took action through the United Nations to establish an intergovernmental body for development and drought control in their region in 1983 and 1984. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Djibouti in January 1986 to sign the agreement, which officially launched IGADD with its headquarters in Djibouti. Eritrea became the seventh member after attaining its independence in 1993. Then the focus was drought and food security.

The recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters in the decade beginning 1974 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the Eastern Africa region. Although individual countries made substantial efforts to cope with the situation and received generous support from the international community, the magnitude and extent of the problem argued strongly for a regional approach to supplement national efforts.

IGAD has never solved any political crisis. But it serves as a forum where leaders can meet and discuss their shared concerns.

However, IGAD can only be what its members want it to be. It can be an excellent tool if external agendas do not subvert it. Members must first be committed to peaceful resolution through bilateral negotiations. Creating other layers of organisations for the Horn will not help achieve any of the development, security and cooperation goals, but merely makes IGAD redundant. The regional body must be supported and reinforced to be a relevant organisation. The spirit of cooperation needed here is one that President Isaias, Somalia’s Mohamed (Farmaajo) Abdullahi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) showed when they agreed on a joint plan of action for this year after the third edition of a tripartite summit in Asmera. This was in February 2020.

The alliance also adopted a new Joint Plan of Action for 2020.

The plan focuses “on two main and intertwined objectives of consolidating peace, stability and security, as well as promoting economic and social development,” as Yemane Gebremeskel, Eritrea`s Information Minister, explained.

“They also agreed to bolster efforts for effective regional cooperation.”

On the security front, the leaders formulated a strategy to combat common threats, such as terrorism, arms and human trafficking, and drug smuggling. These efforts are leading “to some sort of Horn of Africa coalition,” even a “Cushitic Alliance,” according to theEast African newspaper.

Such an alliance will overlap with the mandate of IGAD. It remains ambiguous what is in the minds of these leaders. But to an outsider, this looks like more of a problem than a solution.

How can the three countries, in exclusion of Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya, forge an alliance that can bring peace to the region?

Beyond the long-term ambition of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to control the Horn of Africa, the immediate goal of Egypt is to secure its interest on the Nile. Many Ethiopians are expressing their anger and showing patriotism through a rhetoric of war. War in this politically charged, highly militarised strategic region would be destructive beyond our imagination. If anyone “wins,” it will only be at enormous cost. Even that will be a preparation for the next round of war.

The case of Egypt needs wisdom and patience. War should be the ultimate exercise to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country. Heroes are those who prevent war and not make war.

There is an attempt to resuscitate discussions between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt, but tripartite talks should not be the preferred way for Ethiopia. This case is about the Nile and the rights of the Nile Basin countries. Sudan is not a reliable partner in this case for Ethiopia. The issue is best served if brought before the Nile Basin countries and not a tripartite meeting where the odds do not favour Ethiopia.

The only viable option for Ethiopia and Egypt is to bring back their case to Africa, call an emergency meeting of the heads of state of the Nile Basin countries and continue the dialogue and, if necessary, bring it to the level of the African Heads of State.

But before this can be done, the Ethiopian government has to do the legwork by approaching each of the Nile Basin countries and presenting its case and a possible solution that will serve the interests of both Egypt and Ethiopia. These discussions should be led by knowledgeable people that understand the intricacy of the problem at hand. In the meantime, unilateral actions on both sides should be avoided as much as possible.

The foundation for stability in the Horn begins with bilateral efforts to solve their differences in the face of mounting political, security and pandemic crisis. It is not patriotism not to compromise but is expressed best when the crisis between countries are solved through bilateral negotiations, including compromise.

Give and take is the essence of diplomacy. But leaders need to know what to give and what to take. This requires a grasp on history and debate. The building blocks for sustainable peace in the region begin with a capacity of each leader to discern the truth and not to mistake information as knowledge. For the latter, leaders have people who have a sense of history and can see the big picture through the lenses of current affairs.

The fact that the Horn of Africa is the most militarised region on earth is not a coincidence. Let us encourage our leaders to take stock of the situation on the area and trek carefully in this treacherous minefield: what the Horn has become.

Sudan’s Delicate Dance Over the Blue Nile

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile that Egypt and Ethiopia are at odds over is more than 30Km from Ethiopia’s border with Sudan. The Dam’s enormous hydro-electric potential that might allow future power-sharing arrangements and the project’s natural proximity to Sudan puts the country in an enviable position. Moreover, as several Sudanese officials have acknowledged, besides avoiding destructive floods, the GERD also presents Sudan with an opportunity for agricultural transformation.

Unfortunately, the Sudanese authorities’ recent reluctance in re-asserting their past stance over the Renaissance Dam is raising questions in Nile Basin countries. The country’s position of not taking a position is the result of political expediency reflected in a choreographed dance that is tuned to the dynamic of local power centres and strategic manoeuvring with an eye for Sudan’s long-term interests.

In the past, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has expressed views in line with Ethiopia’s position on the GERD. Nonetheless, his administration’s recent lack of assertiveness on such a critical regional matter reveals increasing tensions between General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman, head of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, and the country’s collective transitional head of state, who leans heavily toward Egypt.

The tension between the civilian administration and the 11-member military Sovereignty Council has caused an unnecessary gap between Sudan’s short and long-term interests. This has increasingly jeopardised the high level of trust that the country has gained both from Ethiopia and the other upper Nile riparian states without necessarily winning favours with Egypt. While the internal dynamics might weigh heavily on whatever Prime Minister Hamdok decides, his administration’s recent lack of resolve entails costly miscalculations.

There is a reason for this. Though Sudan’s interests align with those of Ethiopia in terms of seeing the Dam in full operation as soon as possible and breaking Egypt’s hegemony over the Nile River, it appears that Sudan is contradicting itself in terms of those same interests.

Its long-term strategy of reaching a comprehensive water-sharing treaty between the three countries should take precedence over its short-term, but vital, interest in expediting the completion of the Dam.

In Prime Minister Hamdok’s calculus, Sudan finds it prudent to use Ethiopia as long-term leverage to end Egypt’s colonial-era hegemonic control over the Nile without appearing to side with Ethiopia. Moreover, by opposing the filling of the Dam without what they referred to as a “comprehensive agreement,” his administration has also been tactfully siding with Egypt to appease its Egypt-sympathising military generals.

Such an approach is problematic for one simple reason: both Egypt and Ethiopia understand Sudan’s positions on the GERD.

For Sudan, the Dam presents a historic opportunity that would make it the “New Gift of the Nile.” Unfortunately, the fact that Hamdok’s administration is playing two different hands in this game of geopolitical cards and attempting to present itself as neutral rather than asserting its interests and making its case unambiguously clear is undermining the nation’s vital interests.

Sudan’s delicate dance between Ethiopia and Egypt, which is not a substitute for a strategy, is manifested in its June 2, 2020, letter to the UN Security Council. For example, Egypt insists that the tripartite negotiation in Washington between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan has been concluded and the international community must pressure Ethiopia to sign onto the “agreement text” that the United States and the World Bank have drafted without a mandate or consent from Ethiopia and Sudan. Like Ethiopia, Sudan has refused to endorse the “legal text” that purports to resolve technical issues but underhandedly favours Egypt’s hegemonic water-sharing position.

Another area on which Sudan is not in agreement with Egypt is whether the noted US and World Bank text should be an integral part of any future mediation, as Egypt insists. Sudan unequivocally favours drafting “a new text.”

Moreover, contrary to Egypt, which sees nothing positive about the GERD, Sudan’s letter to the UN lists a string of benefits Sudan stands to gain from it.

Some of the potential benefits listed in Sudan’s letter included regulating the water flow of the Blue Nile, thus reducing the annual floods during the rainy season; enabling Sudan to better manage its irrigation system; increasing the hydropower generation from existing hydropower plants; and increasing the navigational depth along the Blue Nile and other Nile rivers.

Where Sudan parts ways from Ethiopia is also where it parts ways from its own long-established official position. This is where the delicate dance turns into wobbling on a slippery slope, undermining Sudan’s long-term strategy rather than advancing it.

“With this gigantic size, the GERD risks causing significant negative impacts on Sudan if not properly designed, constructed, filled and operated. These impacts range from threatening the lives and safety of millions of Sudanese citizens living directly downstream to the GRED,” stated Sudan’s letter.

The statement about the design and construction of the GERD, however, contradicts Sudan’s official position under two administrations.

“[GERD] does not pose a threat to Sudan,” former President Omar al-Bashir’s administration asserted publicly in 2013.

The new administration’s position is no different.

“The percentage possibility of breakdown or collapse is almost non-existent according to its design and the implementation of the latest data and technology for building dams available globally at present,” Yasser Abbas, Sudanese Irrigation minister, stated in an interview with Egyptian news portal Masrawy. “The Renaissance Dam’s degree of safety is better than that of Sudanese dams and Egypt’s High Dam,” he said in a televised interview.

The minister attributed the safety of the Ethiopian Dam to state-of-the-art technology and high-performance materials used in its construction.

Another negative the Sudanese letter to the UN highlighted is sediment reduction.

“The annual sediment carried by the river flood is a good natural fertiliser, the quantity and quality of the sediment will be significantly reduced,” it asserted.

This, too, stands in stark contrast with previous public statements by Sudanese officials that the GERD will increase the area of irrigated land and the intensification of agriculture in the current areas and also allow huge sums to be saved that were formerly allocated to removing the silt from irrigation canals.

Though Sudan has consistently highlighted that the GERD has both pros and cons, its position has been and continues to be that the pros significantly outweigh the cons. In this resides its fundamental difference with Egypt and its continued rejection of Egypt’s courting to stand with it.

Despite such consistent affirmations of its positions in the past, Sudan finds itself in a state of ambivalence that is uncharacteristic of Prime Minister Hamdok’s promising administration. Regrettably, as a matter of local as well as regional political expediency, Sudan now wants Ethiopia to carry the mantle to challenge Egypt’s hegemonic claim over the Nile.

In the meantime, it supports Egypt’s request to stop Ethiopia from filling the GERD prior to reaching a comprehensive agreement, echoing Egypt’s groundless suggestion that the design and the construction of the “gigantic” Dam represents a serious threat to millions of its population.

If Sudan is not worried about the filling of the Dam and what it wants is a comprehensive water rights concession from Egypt, it can openly state as such. If siding with Egypt on short-term issues is a strategy to bring Ethiopia to the negotiating table, Prime Minister Hamdok’s administration needs to have a principled position on long-term strategies without shooting itself in the foot in the short-term.

Unless the Prime Minister corrects the diplomatic wobbling and stands firm to defend Sudan’s interest, he could further risk a continuation of past Egyptian attempts to maneuver around Sudanese internal matters, thereby undermining the sovereignty and strategic interests of his country.

The Uncertain World

It is astounding how, in a matter of just four years, what was a largely stable global order has unravelled and is threatening to swallow us whole. It speaks to the sheer complexity of our current predicament that no one can meaningfully predict the near future. Starved of the assertiveness of multilateral institutions in the wake of the regression of a world police (the United States) and lacking a broad acceptance of the values that we used to uphold, anything can happen now.

The world powers have been caught up in their own social and economic problems and do not give us as much attention as they used to. With anti-globalist conservatism on the rise in many of the developed countries and the left never at peace with itself, it seems that we have our destiny in our hands, even if for a brief time. No doubt, the outside world is carefully observing what goes on inside our borders, but the rise of a multipolar global order and political and economic uncertainty make it that we have a certain increased level of independence.

Is this good or bad?

Independence usually sounds like a great concept. It entails the freedom to act. It also entails a certain level of uncertainty. We give in to authority not because it feels great, but because we have to – because we desire protection.

The last time there was no longer a world superpower that commanded economic and military hegemony, we had the Cold War. As far as we were concerned, those were devastating years. We lost almost two decades to an idea – Marxism-Leninism – that effectively siphoned us off from a part of the world that was technologically taking off.

The pre-Cold War was not great for our sort either. The world’s major powers were on a “civilising mission,” and Africa was for the taking. There were no effective multilateral institutions that recognised the right to sovereign existence and no one questioned that the democratisation of the imperial powers did not extend to their colonies. The United Nations might not have been instrumental in securing the independence of African nations, but it served as a check from blatant attempts at violating the sovereign rights of nations, at least symbolically.

If the current state of affairs continue as they have over the past four years, what we will have is a global order full of disinterested, undemocratic nation-states that will attempt to increase their power at the expense of their competitors.

This is not good for Ethiopia. We would be rats trying to get breadcrumbs amidst a field of brawling elephants, with no one being able to enforce order. The elephants may survive the ordeal, but by the time a new order is established that has found its footing, we might have been stepped on.

In a world of foxes, it is questionable whether or not we should be seeking independence or expect a world order in which there is no police but a multitude of gangs that do not see beyond their immediate national needs.

The world is an unfair place. Despite being the most likely to be severely affected by this polarised world, we are powerless to do anything about it. But we must have no illusions of the developing state of world affairs. It will be uncertain, violent and illiberal. Dark times are ahead. The least we can do will be to take stock of our place in the world and play our cards as if our collective fate depends upon it.

Museums Should House Relics, Not Become Them

Recently, I was talking with a friend when she mentioned her experience of going to the National Museum in Addis Abeba. She had taken some friends with her as well.

“We left after 10 minutes, because they were so bored. It was not well-curated, and it never changes. It is the same content every day,” she said.

Just a couple of months ago, I, too, had taken friends on two different occasions to the Ethnological and National museums. The content within the museums had more or less remained the same as the last time I had visited them, which was over eight years ago.

Aside from the monotony of the content, what is striking is the semi-derelict condition that parts of the Museum are in. Dust had gathered on irreplaceable artefacts. Information on items in exhibition displays were outdated. Preventative conservation of items was not practised consistently. At the Ethnological Museum, for instance, precious art pieces were on display without glass, exposing rare pieces to damage.

While the museums housed significant items, the institutions themselves feel like relics. Sadly, there has been little evolution here, both in content and in style, across the board.

Unfortunately, these issues are not unique to museums in Addis Abeba or to Ethiopia. Many museums in Africa were established during the colonial period.

Following independence, “African nations witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of Africans receiving higher education and specialised training. Institutions such as museums began to come under the leadership of indigenous Africans but, in most cases, the exhibits and their condition(s) remained the same,” writes researcher Lorna Abungu.

Moreover, in parts of Africa, years of unrest and economic downturn meant that museums were both mismanaged and low in priority on national agendas.

Museums are a tangible part of any city. For many tourists, a visit is never complete without heading to one. Travel sites and guides always have a list of recommended museums to go to. Yet the importance of museums goes beyond the mere must-see needs of the tourism sector.

These institutions are keepers of heritage and legacy. They are windows into the history of humankind and serve as tangible links to our past. In a way, they house the cultural soul of nations.

“Nothing replaces the authenticity of the object presented with passionate scholarship,” said Thomas Campbell, the then-director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in a Ted Talk he gave. “Bringing people face-to-face with our objects is a way of bringing them face-to-face with people across time, across space, whose lives may have been different from our own but who, like us, have hopes and dreams, frustrations and achievements in their lives.”

Well-managed and well-curated museums are a necessity. They are spaces of informal education as well as tools that shape our society. For nations like Ethiopia, museums are vital. The country’s cultural and natural heritage is both rich and vibrant. Accordingly, museums of the calibre the nation deserves are much-needed.

Ethiopian art and archives, human remains, ceremonial objects and photographs can be found all over the world. In fact, the restitution of looted Ethiopian artefacts scattered across Europe has garnered attention.

In February of this year, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed saw the return of a rare 18th-century ceremonial crown discovered in the Netherlands 20 years after it went missing.

While this was a story of successful restitution, plundered artefacts stolen by the British army from Ethiopia in 1868 remain housed in the Victoria and Albert Museum, the British Library and the British Museum.

In 1868, the Battle of Maqdala was fought between the British army and the ancient kingdom of Abyssinia. Following the defeat of Emperor Tewodros and his army, hundreds of artefacts were looted by the British. Among the stolen treasures are 11 wood and stone tabots, religious plaques, the return of which Ethiopia has repeatedly asked for. However, the answer has not been positive.

Several African countries have faced similar responses. Up to 90pc of sub-Saharan Africa’s material cultural legacy is outside of the continent, according to a study released by Senegalese economist Felwine Sarr and French historian Bénédicte Savoy.

While the return of looted artefacts will be an ongoing struggle, perhaps now is the time for Ethiopia to rethink and rework its museums. In major cities like Addis Abeba, museums need to become more relevant to foreign visitors as well as local communities. They need to evolve into dynamic centres, hubs that foster dialogue, critical thinking and curiosity.

Alongside increased funding, specialised training of local museum staff and restoration experts is crucial. Advances in technology also mean that museums should reimagine their approach to their exhibits as well as to their audience.

The recent opening of Unity Park at the National Palace and the impressive and uniquely designed Zoma Museum is a step in the right direction. From incorporating technology in to the various exhibits and different mediums used, both offer a rich and memorable experience. Similar efforts must be put into the already existing museums that house rare and precious artefacts. Doing so will help ensure the preservation of our collective story.

Trust, Mutual Benefits: Basis for Sustainable Partnership on the Nile

Political tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) have recently intensified. Ethiopia has asserted its strict policy of non-harm to the Egyptian national interest and is pressing ahead with its plan to start testing and filling the Dam this summer. Egypt has argued that the GERD will deprive it of water from the Nile and has disseminated the argument widely, including to the Oval Office in Washington, DC.

In his recent article, “So Close, Yet So Far: An Account of the Negotiations on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” in the Egypt Independentnewspaper, the legal counsel at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Helal (PhD), indicated many reasons why negotiations between Ethiopia and Egypt failed. Those reasons were misleading, insincere and concerning, and an indication of the stand of the Egyptian government.

His first argument was the safety of the Dam.

He said that Egypt is concerned, because the GERD has “serious flaws with the design specifications of the GERD, which cast doubt over the Dam’s structural safety and stability.”

It is, however, in the public domain that the GERD was designed and is under construction by Salini Imperegilo, a highly reputable international engineering firm that has completed 257 dams around the world.

“A system of three spillways safeguards the project … The different typology and location of the spillways introduces redundancy in the system, a key ingredient to guarantee the highest standard of hydrological safety,” as international hydrological safety experts concluded with respect to the GERD in Hydro Review, an industry journal.

The second argument is that Ethiopia has not been transparent and did not share documents about the project with Sudan and Egypt.

“GERD was a closely guarded secret,” said Helal. “Aside from the occasional leak in the local media, downstream states had virtually no knowledge of Ethiopia’s plans to construct the GERD or of the size and design specifications of this dam.”

That Ethiopia has been transparent in sharing data and technical information with downstream countries is a well-documented fact. The GERD was not and has not been a closely guarded secret, as evidenced by Ethiopia’s efforts to build a coalition of all the countries that would benefit. Sudan signed on as a result of these efforts.

Not only did the Ethiopian government engage and share data with downstream countries, the GERD has been accessible from the beginning to any interested party including journalists from around the world.

Finally, Helal also asserts that Ethiopia’s refusal to sign the Washington document prepared by the United States was driven by domestic political motivations given it is an election year in Ethiopia. He argues that Ethiopia is bound by the recent mediation efforts in the US from which Ethiopia withdrew.

In 2015, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan agreed on a practical framework for the resolution of disputes. That agreement addressed the prevention of significant harm in the use of Nile waters, dam safety, exchange of data and equitable and reasonable utilisation, among other things. This agreement does not authorise Egypt to unilaterally invite a third party to mediate disputes, which it tried to do through Washington.

Ethiopia demonstrated its goodwill and engaged in negotiations in Washington but negotiations failed because, as former US Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn said, “The United States seems to be putting its thumb on the scale in favour of Egypt.”

The claim referencing “political expediency” during an election year in Ethiopia does shed light on Egypt’s own deep-seated political ambitions on this topic. Egypt cannot hope to keep Nile riparian states in perpetual poverty by employing political tactics like divide and conquer and using media threats and diplomatic clout – this outcome is unacceptable in the long run. Recent intensification of counterproductive propaganda and one-sided diplomatic campaigns from the Egyptian government has damaged trust and confidence in this matter.

So what is the solution here?

There is a win-win solution. First, Egypt must cease its hostile propaganda and diplomatic campaign against Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government’s intention is clear: to assert its right to utilise its water resources while preserving the interests of all riparian states consistent with relevant international law. The Egyptians and the Ethiopians are two people drinking from the same bountiful river.

The Nile is a shared resource that has and will continue to link the people of these two great nations together and can be used as an opportunity to shed light on the many things that Ethiopians and Egyptians have in common. The people of these two nations are brothers and sisters who share a destiny as two developing countries in Africa. They both are members of the African Union.

Relations between Ethiopia and Egypt have to build on these common assets not on the incorrect premise of a zero-sum game as we see today. The GERD is an opportunity for these two governments to come together through honest dialogue and mutual respect and understanding, rather than hostility and conflict. We should take heed to make this so.

There is yet a chance for tensions to be deescalated. The GERD does not arrest the flow of water to Sudan and Egypt. The sole objective of the GERD is to generate hydroelectric power that will transform the lives of millions of Ethiopians. It is a critical component of Ethiopia’s strategy to fight poverty, first and foremost, by providing electric power for millions as well as addressing the country’s need for electric power for her national economic development.

The GERD is a matter of survival for Ethiopia. At the same time, we have to make it clear that Ethiopia’s plan to utilise its transboundary water resources is in strict adherence to the principles of international law on transboundary rivers – the principle of equitable utilisation and to not cause significant harm to downstream countries.

Let us look forward. Though badly damaged, the path to honest negotiations is still a possibility. The Camp David Agreement of the 1970s is a good example.

COVID-19 Worsens the Digital Divide, Delivers Blow to Women’s Health

As soon as the first COVID-19 case was reported in Ethiopia, I started working from home in Addis Abeba, because the company I was working at insisted on it. Our internet bills were paid, and we were provided with support for us to adapt to this new normal.

At first, I was optimistic about the arrangement. It would give me an opportunity to spend quality time with my daughter while she is home due to school closures. And I was thankful for the option – a considerable number of people in Ethiopia cannot work from home given the nature of their work.

Quickly, though, my optimism faded. The several Zoom calls I was supposed to make each day turned out to be impossible for me to join because of our poor internet speed. I am also not able to connect on video chat with friends and family since the stay-at-home orders separated us, unlike people in many parts of the world.

Still, I am among the few in my country to even have an internet connection, as slow as it may be. Only around 17pc of the population has internet access in Ethiopia, far lower than Africa’s average of 39.9pc. To download a five-gigabyte file in Ethiopia, it takes an average of 14 hours. The gap between those countries that have the fastest and the slowest internet speed is 125 times. Among the 50 countries with the fastest internet speed, only one is in Africa – Madagascar.

Given the relative privilege the country affords when it comes to internet access, this global pandemic is bringing the experience of the digital divide home. Most importantly, it is calling attention to the disadvantages women face.

To respond to the pandemic and to make sure that essential services like family planning and sexual and reproductive health services are available, organisations, as well as government agencies, are taking on a number of adaptations, for instance, using digital technology to harness the opportunity in telemedicine. This is important since, due to COVID-19, people would be understandably wary to visit health facilities, including girls who need to renew their contraception method.

Therefore, introducing a digital solution is critical to keeping girls safe from COVID-19 and also making sure that they get access to essential health services such as family planning. Countries with better internet connectivity and digital infrastructure are delivering COVID-19 and sexual and reproductive health information using social media channels such as WhatsApp and Facebook.

However, most girls in rural Ethiopia do not have a similar opportunity to access information online. Only 1.4pc of the 15 to 19-year-old girls used internet services, according to the Ministry of Health’s 2017 baseline report. This is why organisations that provide personal protective equipment and continuous orientation both on COVID-19 and family planning services to the frontline service providers are essential. This way, we can ensure the continuity of family planning information and service provision for girls; however, the impact of our effort is limited due to the travel restrictions and the stay at home protocols.

Some have said COVID-19 is the great equaliser. It is not. Instead, the virus has amplified various inequalities, as we have seen with the higher death rates of black people in both the United States and the United Kingdom. It has also shown the imbalances between those with access to the internet and essential services such as health advice and those without it. Internet access offers immense opportunities to facilitate social, economic and political advancement of a given society. The opposite is also true, and lack of access to quality internet fuels the discrepancy and inequality among countries as well as individuals. These discrepancies are worsening due to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic.

The pandemic is a reminder that an illness somewhere is an illness everywhere. Inequality somewhere means inequality everywhere.

This pandemic poses a clear call to action to countries with a significant number of vulnerable populations, including Ethiopia, to transform the challenge of this unprecedented pandemic into an opportunity to address the wide range of inequalities and discrepancies, including the digital divide.

In the Face of Child Abuse, Society Tries to Save Face

Despite any level of socioeconomic progress, abuse is the one true constant. This is all the more unforgivable, because children are often on the receiving end of these terrible acts. The COVD-19 pandemic, which has disrupted existing support systems, has only made the situation worse. But the greatest obstacle has been and continues to be a conservative society that attempts to save face even when injustice has been perpetrated.

A few years ago, I heard about the disturbing trials a family living in Gerji had to go through because of what happened to their adopted child.

Their daughter was a nine-year-old relative of theirs from one of the regional states. She was active and made many friends around the neighbourhood and the nearby place of worship she attended. When school was closed, she was allowed to go there to play with other children.

One fateful day, she went to the place of worship and found it empty except for a man who worked there. He invited her inside and raped her. She called for help, but no one heard her. If they did, they did not come to her rescue.

Immediately after, the girl went to her mother and told her what had happened. It was only obvious to the mother that the man should be apprehended and charged. But the people who were in charge of running the place of worship did not believe it was a good idea for them to go to the police. They argued that this would tarnish the reputation of the institution even though the girl needed hospitalisation because of the physical trauma she had received.

The mother went to the police and reported the crime anyways. The man was deservedly sentenced to 13 years in prison, but the family had to cut ties with friends who no longer felt they were welcome at the place of worship.

The man had been married for just a month before he committed the crime. He was respected by his peers and in his community, and his conduct had been judged to be above reproach – to the point that the community believed it was important that he not be held accountable for committing rape.

His new wife was angrier with the couple for outing her husband and, in her mind, causing the failure of her marriage than she was with her husband for committing the offence.

But the victim’s family stayed strong. They did not let the society or their community stop them from seeking justice for their daughter. We need more people like them to address the injustices that are allowed by the complacency of society.

At the very least, in this instance, the girl had loving parents that stood by her. It is often the case that abuses are committed by those who are charged with their care and guidance, such as parents and relatives. When this is the case, it is harder to address the crime.

There is often high societal and religious pressure on victims to internalise the abuse they have received from their parents and elders. Victims are also less likely to speak out when the perpetrator is also their main provider of shelter and food.

But inaction in the name of protecting the image of the society provides the grounds for the propagation of these crimes. The primary support needs to come from the government, which has the resources to create awareness, pass laws aimed at protecting children and setting up the institutions that could be used as refuges for children from their own parents.

Religious and traditional institutions, which are instrumental in forming the moral foundation of a society, should do their part to insist that knowledge and understanding be the basis for societal progress.

The severity of these crimes and the public neglect demands immediate and effective action to ensure prevention, education and interventions, including treatment and rehabilitation. Just as we are collaboratively battling and eradicating the current pandemic, let us all join hands to end the epidemic of physical and emotional abuse that has long been lingering in our country for generations.

 

STREET GREENING

Part of the greening of the streets of Addis Abeba, flower vases have been fixed to the poles of street lights close to the National Palace in Arat Kilo. The government began its Green Legacy challenge on June 5, 2020, in which it hopes to see five billion trees planted across the country.